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Abstract: Humanitarian Intervention: Great Expectations and Shattered Hopes, 
By Charles W. Peraino, in Candidacy for the Degree of Masters of Arts at the 
University of Richmond, 1995; Thesis Director: John W. Outland, Ph.D. 
America faces the moral dilemma of whether to intervene militarily, at great risk, in 
states which commit massive human rights violations against their own citizens. A 
systematic look at the intellectual ideas guiding international relations reveals such 
atrocities to be an established part of international behavior. Ending this structural 
violence is difficult because of the epistemological and ethical limits of social science, the 
rule of law, political theory, and moral philosophy. The resulting, insolvable problems of 
international politics--such as the preference for international order over individual justice, 
the unlimited aspirations of nationalism and self-determination, the conflicts of cultural 
relativism, and the lack of universal standards for state legitimacy--present obstacles to 
Americans changing their traditional foreign policy perspectives into a moral and effective 
policy of military humanitarian intervention. But there is hope, for non-military forms of 
humanitarian intervention provide the potential for greatly reducing structural violence. 
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Chapter I 
Humanitarian Intervention: 
An American Moral Dilemma 
The use of military force against the sovereignty and in the internal affairs of 
other states, such as Bosnia and Rwanda, to stop genocide and other human rights 
violations is a frustrating moral dilemma for Americans after the Cold War. It is a 
dilemma of two compelling moral arguments: one, to intervene because of the 
horrific nature and number of atrocities, and, the other, not to intervene because of 
the intense violence of ethnic conflict. It is a frustrating situation in which genocide--
that unconscionable act of violence striking at America's core values of democracy 
and human rights--never seems to end and, therefore, always seems to prey on the 
American conscience. It is also frustrating in that, like most idealism at the end of 
a major conflict, the idea of military humanitarian intervention--defined here as the 
use of military force against another state's sovereignty to stop it from committing 
mass atrocities such as genocide or ethnic-cleansing upon its own civilian population 
or refusing to respond to the massive starvation and disease of its civilian population 
for political reasons--has not fared well recently against the realities of local and 
international politics.1 As a result, the international community is left with the 
1This definition is essentially the same as Jack Donnelly's of" ... [the dictatorial coercive interference 
in the internal affairs of another state] in order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the human 
rights of foreign nationals by their own governments." Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory 
and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 260; Genocide or the massive, systematic killing 
2 
option of non-military intervention to stop unconscionable human rights violations. 
Although non-military intervention is not a focus of this study because of the almost 
infinite forms it takes and the controversy about its effectiveness, it still remains the 
best hope to end genocide and other heinous human rights violations. 
New Hopes After the Cold War 
At the Cold War's end, there were a number of reasons to hope for a new 
world order of greater peace and security. Changes in international politics were 
perceived as presenting opportunities for the use of force to stop genocide and 
suffering, which were tempting to the West. The increase in democracy, the decrease 
in totalitarianism, the dissipation of the nuclear threat, and the end of the 
superpower rivalry gave hope for more cooperation among states and a more 
effective use of collective security not only to stop aggression of one state against 
another but also to stop a state's internal aggression against its own civilian 
population by gross, massive human rights violations. Not surprisingly, this optimism 
was part due to the hope that a renascent United Nations, once freed from its role 
and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 260; Genocide or the massive, systematic killing 
of people for racial or religious reasons is its most obvious target. However, the acts covered in this 
paper, which I term structural violence, are broader than genocide and include the massive deprivation 
of both political and economic rights, i.e., the severe denial of political rights or survival necessities 
resulting in massive loss of life, caused by the state's incompetence and/or oppression. Included are 
the state's unlawful acts (e.g., the malfeasance of the Serbs ethic cleansing in Bosnia), the state's lawful 
acts performed harmfully (e.g., the misfeasance of Russia's preservation of its unity by its war on 
civilians in Chechyna), and the state's acts of omission (e.g., the nonfeasance of the anarchic fighting of 
the clans of Somalia while the people starve). The issues covered here go beyond the restricted 
definition by Adam Roberts and Richard Haass, of short term use of military force, to include the idea 
of nation-building or reforming the target state's political institutions causing its massive infliction of 
death and suffering. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World 
(Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 132; Adam Roberts, 
"Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," Intemational Affairs 60(July1993):445. 
3 
as an international forum for the superpowers, could play a larger role in eliminating 
genocide and human rights violations.2 
Also emerging was the perennial, idealistic aspiration to replace power politics 
with a more altruistic foreign policy.3 The opportunity seemed to be there since the 
United States as the last superpower was in a unique position to be the world leader 
against oppression and atrocities. The relevance of realism and power politics, which 
had dominated American foreign policy during the Cold War, was being questioned, 
and Americans began to consider more seriously the idea of replacing the narrow 
statist version of the national interest with a new focus on the common interest of 
humanity. The emphasis was now on the more highly profiled, and perceived 
worsemng, global threats, such as overpopulation, environmental degradation, 
economic disparity, crime, disease, and hunger. 
In addition, the perception that power politics was on the decline was 
accompanied by a greater focus on the idea that governments have a fiduciary 
2A period of idealism after a great conflict is a pattern of 20th century international politics. See 
Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and Intemational Politics 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 91-7; President Bush's "new world order" 
during the Gulf War was a reversion to idealism with its belief in collective security, U .N. restraints on 
the behavior of states and authorization of a U.S. led intervention, emphasis on international law and 
order, and respect for self-determination hopefully as replacements for the old power politics of the 
balance of power. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New 
World Order and America's Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 54-5. 
3ln its basic form, power politics is the reliance of foreign policy on military or economic coercion: 
Alexander Deconde, ed. The Encyclopedia of America11 Foreig11 Policy: Studies of the Principle 
Movements and Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), s.v. "Power Politics," by Thomas H. 
Etold. Also see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 137. Kissinger 
defines. power politics in terms of the German conception of realpolitik, which is " ... based on 
calculations of power and the national interest." Political power, according to Hans Morgenthau, is the 
struggle for control among political leaders, as well as between the people and their political leaders; 
Kenneth W. Thompson, Traditions and Values In Politics and Diplomacy: Theory a11d Practice (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 148, citing Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. 
Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Stntggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., (New York: Knopf, 
1985), 32. 
4 
responsibility to their citizens and could no longer excuse cruelty against their civilian 
populations in the name of international and domestic order. If they continued to 
do so, justice would require the international community to intervene against them 
to alleviate the human suffering and unjust treatment of local populations. 
Old Realities 
In such a world, it was not surprising that Americans felt confirmed in their 
sense of exceptionalism that their values and way of life were special and would 
eventually become the universal foundation of a stable international system of 
economically viable democracies. The liberal world order of democratic capitalism 
based on the Enlightenment's ideas of progress, optimism, scientific rationalism, 
individualism and equality seemed to have proven itself superior to all other 
ideologies.4 
But the severity of the global threats and the re-emerging ethnic, religious, 
and other conflicts of group identity contradicted America's new idealism. The flare-
up of ethnic conflict seemed to be a regression into a much more intense, disrupting, 
and unconscionable form of violence than that of the Cold War. The ferocity of 
ethnic violence increased doubts for Americans about the international community's 
ability to preserve peace and order, to stop atrocities, and to encourage democracy. 
The hoped for cooperation to resolve both the global threats and the conflicts within 
4Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace: Prospects for Order and Disorder," 148-53 in Charles 
W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., Tlze Global Agenda: Degrees and Perspectives, 4th ed., 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), originally published in World Policy Joumal, Vol. X (Winter 
1993-94). Fukuyama, Francis. 111e E11d of History and the Last Ma11 (New York: Avon Books, 1992), 
xi-xiii. 
5 
states, which was symbolized by the international alliance against Saddam Hussein, 
seemed to be unraveling.5 
Power politics, contrary to the hopes for its remission, was taking bold in the 
political turmoil of the former Soviet Bloc, the Balkans, and Africa. The result was 
the creation of local conflicts and pockets of power within and between the world's 
new and old states. Also, the ethnic nationalism and economic failure of Africa 
elicited a virulent form of regional disorder that threatened to draw the West 
reluctantly into a neo-colonialist role there. This situation was made worse by the 
superpowers no longer exercising orderly authority over their former blocs and client 
states. In particular, the disintegration of the former Soviet Bloc was threatening to 
draw Russia back into expansionism, which would place pressure on NATO to 
include former Bloc members in its alliance.6 
Nationalism and self-determination also made an unexpected and malevolent 
comeback to challenge the status quo of state sovereignty. The demise of the Soviet 
Bloc and the superpower influence in Africa left a power vacuum within states whose 
citizens still felt the unfinished business of self-determination. As old grievances of 
oppressed groups surfaced, the people of these states became susceptible to 
5See "Russia Blocks Serbs' Censure," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 12, 1994, Sec. A, p. 4. 
60ne expert estimated in 1992 that " .. .there are 125 ethnic or minority disputes in the former Soviet 
Union alone, with about 25 classified as 'armed disputes."' See Eugene Robinson, "Communal Violence 
Likely to Endure in Post-Cold War Era," 171e Washington Post, 18 August 1992, sec. A, p. 9; According 
to the Center for Defense Information, "there are 29 military conflicts in the world today, up from 24 
in 1992 .... In most of them, the divisions fall along ethnic or religious lines .... " Thomas W. Lippman, 
"Ethnic Strife Succeeds Cold War's Ideological Conflict," 17ze Washington Post, 18 December 1994, Sec. 
A, p. 36; On NATO and Russian expansionism, see "Russia Jangles Nerves of Neighbors," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, April 22, 1995, Sec. A, p.4; John Hall, "Chill Over NATO Grips U.S. Russian 
Relations," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 2, 1994, Sec. A, p. 4; Yelsin Denounces U.S. Over NATO 
Expansion," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 6, 1994, Sec. A, p.4. 
6 
exploitation by demagogic leaders preaching nationalism. The resulting mayhem and 
hatred arising from the explosion of self-determination and nationalism made the 
world appear more unstable and self-destructive than ever, made the task of nuclear 
nonproliferation more difficult, and placed less international restraint on potential 
rogue states. As the authority of state sovereignty declined, any resulting increase 
in humanitarian aid seemed to be more than offset by the emerging secessionist 
movements of disintegrating states.7 
Because of these factors, the status of human rights after the Cold War 
appeared as precarious as ever, and perhaps even worse, and still subject to the 
machinations of power. The old threat of totalitarian order was transformed into the 
new threat of chaotic, political decentralization. Because power appeared to be 
changing in terms of its allocation rather than diminishing in importance, the form 
but not the substance of the threat to political and economic human rights appeared 
to be changing. Instead of the orderly oppression of totalitarianism, there was the 
disorderly oppression of ethnic nationalism and dissolving states. The demise of state 
sovereignty and the ascendancy of nationalism ironically threatened political and 
economic human rights as much, if not more than, the old totalitarian order. 
Certainly discouraging was the ineffectiveness of the international community and the 
West to stop the genocide occurring in Bosnia and Rwanda. Such events appeared 
frightfully anti-modern and regressive, and, therefore, disillusioning and frustrating 
to Americans. 
7See Robert D. Kaplan, "Into the Bloody New World Order," Washington Post, April 17, 1994, Sec. 
c, p.1. 
The Legitimacy of the Post-Cold 
War State and Structural Violence 
7 
Despite all the hopes and the attainment of a stronger human rights regime, 
genocide was happening again, suggesting that it is an inherent element of an 
international system that emphasizes the power of the state. The state was still the 
primary, political unit of life, and it still carried with it the problem of where to draw 
the line on the legitimate use of violence. Even in democracies--as the controversy 
over the U.S. use of violence against the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas attests--
the people were not certain of its legitimate limits, but in the non-West, where 
genocide or genocide-like atrocities were taking place, the problem was worse. The 
situation represented the failure of international politics to end the horrific and 
unconscionable mass violence which seemed to be a part of the structure and process 
of the conflict between and within states. 
The shame shared by the West and the rest of the world was that 
international politics still involved a form of structural violence in which states 
committed genocide, atrocities, and other unconscionable, massive human rights 
violations against their own civilian populations predicated either upon general 
principles held by humanity about international politics--e.g., beliefs in non-
appeasement, the sanctity of the state, and the preservation of credibility--or 
inexplicably upon hatred without any rational political purpose--e.g., genocide and 
ethnic-cleansing. Such acts involved the deprivation of both political and economic 
rights caused by the state's unlawful acts (e.g., the malfeasance of the Serbs in 
Bosnia), the state's lawful acts performed harmfully (e.g., the misfeasance of Russia 
8 
in Chechyna), and the state's acts of omission (e.g., the nonfeasance of the conflicted 
tribes of Somalia). And that shame is still there today as genocide and similar 
atrocities are de jure illegal while de facto tolerated several years after the demise 
of the Soviet Union.8 
Not only is the shame of structural violence still prevalent, but the 
pervasiveness of the media, especially television, reminds Americans daily of the 
world's atrocities and suffering and, likewise, the cost of stopping it. Hence, 
whatever the discomforts and pressures on foreign policy practitioners and citizens 
to make moral and practical decisions about international politics, the emotional ante 
is raised by television pictures of both starving Africans and dead U.N. personnel. 
The actual effect of the media on foreign policy after the Cold War is a matter of 
controversy and a subject beyond the scope of this study, but it nonetheless impinges 
on the conflicting feelings Americans have about humanitarian intervention.9 
8Johan Galtung also uses the idea of structural violence, though differently than used above, to 
mean a violence beyond direct physical assault in which exploitative political systems of the rich and 
powerful employ indirect coercion to take the world's resources for themselves. The term is used above 
in a more elementary and less ideologically burdened sense to ask why masses of people are killed and 
terrorized as a result of deprivation of their political and economic human rights by political authority. 
See Johan Galtung, "Nonterritorial Actors and the Problem of Peace," in On the Creation of a Just World 
Order: PrefelTed Worlds for the 1990s, ed. Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 151-5. 
9See James F. Hoge, Jr., "Media Pervasiveness," Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994):136-44. Also 
see Nika Gowing, "Behind the CNN Factor," The Washington Post, July 31, 1994, sec. C, p. 1. Gowing's 
thesis, based on a research project that he did at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center at Harvard 
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, is that the ability of television's shock value to 
influence foreign policy decision-making is grossly exaggerated. Gowing's thesis is probably correct in 
that, If anything, the pressure of the media reinforces the sense of dilemma without improving decision-
making and aiding resolution of the problem. Certainly in the 1990s, we have ridden the highs and lows 
of humanitarian intervention on television from the moral outrage of ethnic-cleansing in July of 1992 
to the euphoria of intervention in Somalia in December of 1992 to the pictures of dead American 
Rangers being dragged naked around Mogadishu. More than anything, however, these events show how 
we, though well intentioned, get caught up in what Geoffrey Stern calls the "fashionable conscience" in 
which we adopt a cause celebre only to later recognize the horrific consequences of both action and 
inaction, leading to our disillusionment. Geoffrey Stern, "Morality and International Order," in Alan 
James (ed.) 17ie Bases of Intemationa/ Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 138, 144. 
9 
The Limits of Moral Action: 
American Foreign Policy Adrift 
As a result of a political world transfigured but still morally wanting, 
Americans began to agonize even more than usual over their traditional 
preoccupation of matching their ideals to the real world. It was the classic inner 
tension of American exceptionalism where its greatest strength, its liberal aspirations, 
confronted its greatest weakness, its unrealistic idealism. Doubts were rising about 
the place of democracy and social justice in the world and about the eventual 
universal acceptance of liberal ideas. There was a confluence of hope and 
disappointment which was taking its toll on the development of ideas by Americans 
about the future of international politics. The United States was failing to take the 
moral and diplomatic lead with its allies. The situation eventually manifested itself 
in a vacillating U.S. foreign policy subject to moral uncertainty and lack of political 
will. 
Certainly the failure to produce realistic policy prescriptions for the use of 
humanitarian intervention against structural violence and human rights violations has 
played a significant role in the drift of American foreign policy. This failure is due 
in part to the genuinely difficult issues involved but more importantly to the tension 
in international politics between international order and individual justice. It is the 
thesis of this paper that an ambitious use of military, humanitarian intervention will 
not end structural violence, which is an established part of international relations and 
which is seen as a means of preserving international order and the power of the 
state. The termination of structural violence is greatly inhibited by a number of 
10 
fundamental political issues that the best of human knowledge and moral values 
about politics--as embodied in social science, the rule of law, political theory, and 
moral philosophy--cannot resolve in the foreseeable future. These issues are the lack 
of predictive theory in the study of international relations, the unbridgeable divide 
in understanding between the various socio-political cultures of international politics, 
the preference among foreign policy practitioners for international order and justice 
in terms of the state and not the individual, the influence of state-centric thinking 
and realism on international behavior, the lack of consensus among states on what 
is the legitimate relationship between a state and its people, and the aspirations of 
justice without solutions presented by the problems of self-determination and 
nationalism. With such significant obstacles to ending structural violence, intervenors 
cannot find the political will, i.e., the national, psychological and moral commitment, 
for the sustained effort needed for successful humanitarian intervention. For 
Americans, these obstacles prevent the various U.S. foreign policy perspectives of 
liberalism, conservatism, neo-isolationism, realism, and internationalism from 
developing a moral and effective policy of military humanitarian intervention. 
To reconcile the U.S. foreign policy perspectives on humanitarian intervention 
with political reality, a systematic look at the problems of ending structural violence 
and human rights abuses is presented in the chapters that follow. Chapter II 
examines the failure of the rule of law and social science to provide either 
enforceable values or prescriptive and predictive theory in international relations to 
end human rights violations and genocide. Chapter III examines the reasons why 
international order and the power of the state eclipse individual justice. Chapter IV 
11 
analyzes the problem of basing humanitarian intervention on the state's legitimacy 
in terms of its actual representation of its people, while chapter V looks at the 
inability of humanitarian intervention to penetrate the intractable, local problems of 
self-determination and nationalism. Chapter VI examines the effect of humanity's 
limited abilities concerning international politics and justice on America's traditional 
foreign policy perspectives as they relate to humanitarian intervention. And the 
concluding chapter analyzes the inabilities and obstacles to resolving structural 
violence and human rights abuses in terms of the possibilities of future moral and 
epistemic changes in international politics. The conclusion is that humanity's 
incremental acceptance of ideas advancing human rights is working, but, for the 
foreseeable future, the end of structural violence and oppression, especially by the 
use of force, is beyond humanity's abilities. 
To set their foreign policy free from intellectual drift, it is important that 
Americans resolve their moral dilemma over humanitarian intervention and 
recognize their true limits of moral action. The way to do this is to acknowledge that 
military, humanitarian intervention, except as a temporary expedient such as safe 
zones for the dying and suffering, is unworkable and ineffective. Americans need to 
recognize intellectually what they know intuitively, which is that there are 
transcendental limits to moral, political action and that the incremental steps toward 
a better world and against evil are always part of an uphill battle.10 
Recognition of their limits would allow Americans to keep their political 
values, despite a world of suffering and despair. Otherwise, the continued ad hoc 
10See Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace: Prospects for Order and Disorder," 153. 
12 
toying with the idea of military intervention, which is destined to fail, is likely to 
result in terrible cynicism and disillusionment for Americans about the future of 
democracy and human rights. 
Historically, states have not exhibited the political will to intervene except 
under very limited conditions and mostly based on self-interest.11 Despite the 
idealism of American exceptionalism and the humanitarian impulse of Americans, 
the United States also has no tradition of humanitarian intervention. This is not to 
say that America is a moral failure as a nation. Rather, the point is that the U.S. 
failure to assert influence over structural violence is not an excuse for humanity's 
moral deficiency but is a reminder that humanitarian intervention is an attempt at 
policy beyond the limits of those good people who see the end of genocide as a 
desirable, primary goal of foreign policy. 
But that moral political action is limited in today's world does not mean that 
an effective human rights' policy is impossible. A coherent political philosophy of 
morality, constituting a vision and strategy for strengthening justice for the individual 
within the arena of international politics, would provide Americans the psychological 
and moral foundation, i.e., the political will, for a more assertive foreign policy in 
favor of human rights while avoiding cynicism and disillusionment. The result would 
be small but realistic intrusions against suffering that are not possible by the use of 
force. In this way, Americans can use the only viable option for strengthening the 
international human rights regime, which is the incremental infusion of individual 
11Micbael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics 
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), 95-9; Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic 
Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993):134-5. 
13 
justice into international politics. For Americans, a stronger, international human 
rights regime consistent with our political values and the world's realities is necessary, 
with the hope that one day there will be knowledgeable and moral change which 
ends structural violence. It must be a regime which allows us to cope with the world 
as it is but motivates us to pursue the world as it might be. 
Chapter II 
Social Science and the Rule of Law: 
Ineffective Sources of Humanitarian Intervention 
The transition to a new configuration of international politics is difficult for 
Americans because two of their most important societal values, the belief in science 
and the rule of law, provide no immediate answers to genocide and oppression. 
Consequently, the debate on humanitarian intervention is, by default, based on 
ideology, intuition, moral reasoning, and emotion. More specifically, there is a 
problem with the epistemological weakness of international relations. None of the 
field's major approaches to theory resolve the fundamental issues of international 
politics to the extent that an intellectually sound basis for the moral and political 
justifications of military humanitarian intervention exist. 
The Failure of the Legalistic-Moralistic Approach 
The rule of law's application to international relations is termed the legalist-
moralistic approach and is the product of America's great legal tradition and 20th 
century idealism. Its legal, positivist principles assume that the law can be shaped 
auspiciously through scientific rationalism to resolve humanity's serious social 
problems, including those of international politics. Hence, the central idea of the 
legalistic-moralistic approach is that rules, norms, international altruism, cooperation, 
14 
15 
and collective security can replace power politics, expand the international human 
rights regime, devise a world of states under the rule of law, and infuse international 
politics with humanistic values.1 
The influence of these principles on international relations can be seen within 
the academic literature of the American legal community where legal scholars have 
searched for the appropriate legal and moral norms to achieve these goals. Even 
before, but especially after the Cold War's end, law review articles have proposed the 
use of force within the territory or against the sovereignty of another state to protect 
its population against genocide and mass atrocities. Most recently, these writings 
proposed legal theories for enlarging the legitimate targets of intervention to include 
human rights denied by ordinary oppression.2 
The legalistic-moralistic approach, however, despite contributing an 
intellectual history of idealistic thought to the study of international relations, denies 
the realities of conflict and power, even when viewed from a non-realist perspective. 
Ignored are all the complex paradoxical problems of international politics, such as 
the conflicting values of different cultures, the fanaticism of political extremists, the 
relative power of states, the lack of a centralized restraint on states, the unfinished 
business of nationalism, the many meanings of self-determination, and the heavy 
burden of responsibility placed on both states and citizens to protect themselves. It 
1Hans Morgenthau terms the rule of law idealism in international relations as the "legalist-moralist 
approach." Hans Morgenthau, "Political Power," in John A. Vasquez Classics of Intemational Relations, 
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1990), 34. 
2Guenter Lewy, "The Case for Humanitarian Intervention," Orbis (Fall 1993): 62-7. For a 
reasonably comprehensive list of law review and other articles on the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, see David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," 
University of Toledo Law Review 23 (Winter 1992): 254, n.3. 
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is an idealistic approach which, if viewed as the primary path to justice m 
international relations, is a passion for scientific law and ethics without acceptance 
of the realities of political power. As a result, legal theorists concentrate passionately 
and idealistically but seldom pragmatically on the problems of genocide and other 
atrocities, which is evidenced by the words of law professor Arthur Leff concerning 
aid to those suffering in Biafra: 
I don't know much about the relevant law. My colleagues, here, who 
do, say that it's no insurmountable hindrance, but I don't care much 
about international law, Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in 
Biafra ... We still have food for export. Let's get it to them any way we 
can, dropping it from the skies, unloading it from armed ships, blasting 
it with cannons if that will work. I can't believe there is much political 
cost in feeding babies, but if there is, let's pay it; if we are going to be 
hated, that's the loveliest of grounds. 3 
Whether Leff is naive about the realities of international politics or a moral 
dissenter against a world of amoral power politics is an open question and one that 
gets to the heart of the humanitarian intervention debate. It is a conundrum 
especially for legalist-moralists because they have no reality-based prescriptions for 
resolution of the complex, paradoxical problems of international politics which 
precipitate the complex relationship between justice and order and provoke the 
conflicting visions betWeen realism and idealism. Instead, legal scholars either ignore 
or poorly refute them, although they must be resolved before the law can become the 
main pillar of international order and justice. As a result, the legalist-moralist 
approach, other than in law journals, is conspicuous by its absence from the 
3Yale law professor Arthur Leff quoted in Michael J. Bazyler, "Reexamining the Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia," Stanford Journal of 
International Law 23 (Summer 1987): 570, citing the New York Times, 4 Oct. 1986, sec. A, p.46. 
17 
humanitarian intervention debate and receives limited attention by international 
relations scholars and foreign policy practitioners. Its unpopularity reflects the 
conventional thinking that laws and norms are effective in assisting those already 
interested in peace but not those on whom peace has to be imposed. But, as will be 
seen later, the outright rejection of such idealism is the cynical acceptance of power 
at the expense of achievable moral goals in foreign policy.4 
The Failure of Social Science 
The other field ·to which scholars and practitioners alike look for answers is 
social science. Unfortunately, intervention faces the same limits of theory, or 
"conceptual jails" as Rosenau calls them, that restrict the whole field of international 
relations. As a result, the field has not developed operational and measurable 
concepts capable of providing a predictive theory of humanitarian intervention.5 
Just as happened during the Vietnam War, the issue of intervention has again 
become a compelling issue, this time on matters of genocide, at a time when social 
science offers little predictive theory. In fact, social science has been receiving 
increasing criticism for its failure to discover any intersubjective laws of political 
behavior. Adding to the doubts about the ability of social science to verify theories 
4Guenter Lewy, "The Case for Humanitarian Intervention," 628. 
5James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Tlico1y of Change and Continuity (Princeton, 
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5, 22, 37-44. 
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and to provide prescriptions was the recent failure of political science to predict the 
Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's demise.6 
According to John Lewis Gaddis, the efforts of behaviorists to proceed "from 
a determinedly inductive 'bottom-up approach,' deferring the construction of theory 
until they have collected, measured, and compared as much observable evidence as 
possible ... " in order to verify the results, failed. Unfortunately, political science is not 
past the deductive, intuitive stage of reasoning, with its endless heuristic theorizing 
as a substitute for valid and reliable empirical studies. Thus, scientific forecasting is 
not able to assist with the problem of humanitarian intervention. Although the basis 
of Western thought is scientific rationalism, those suffering today's atrocities cannot 
afford to wait for behaviorists to collect data for replication and verification through 
their inductive '"bottom up' approach"' with the hope that one day scientific laws of 
international politics will be discovered to better their lot.7 
The unfulfilled promise of political science is indicated by the field's inability 
to find a consensus approach to the systematic study of humanitarian intervention. 
&rhe last great intervention issue of Vietnam foreshadowed for Americans the disillusionment of the 
1960s about the relevance of political science. In the 1980s, the field's general advancement was 
questioned. Now the relevance of political science to post-Cold War problems is being raised. Recently, 
Ferguson and Mansbach concluded that "... the nature of theory in international relations and the 
manner in which it evolves, along with the subjectivity in the field, make progress in theory construction 
difficult, at best, and, at worst, improbable." Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive 
Quest: 171eory and Intematio11al Politics (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 
8-9; Similarly, a recent article by John Lewis Gaddis provided a comprehensive review of international 
relations theory in light of its failure to forecast the Cold War's end. Gaddis noted that behavioralism 
and quantification have " ... produced neither theory nor forecasts, nor usable policy recommendations." 
John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations and the End of the Cold War," Intemational Secun'ty 17 
(Winter 1992/93): 20. 
7John Lewis Gaddis, Ibid., 13, citing J. David Singer, "The 'Correlates of War' Project: Interim 
Report and Rationale," World Politics 14 (January 1972), 249-51. The many defects of social science do 
not mean, however, that it should be fully discounted in political studies such as that of humanitarian 
intervention. Quantitative and behavioral studies can inform the moral questions of politics but not to 
the extent suggested by Rosenau. 
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Over two decades ago, James Rosenau decried the absence of scientific explanations 
as to what conditions make intervention legitimate and maximize its probabilities of 
success. He argued that an overemphasis on normative, legal and strategic studies 
and the infusion of a " ... vast array of unrelated matters ... " confused the study of 
intervention, which was dominated by " ... the common discourse [of] common sense, 
general understanding, and metaphoric suggestion ... " instead of science. Major 
problems to be overcome in devising a systematic study of intervention were the 
difficulties in defining the national interest, measuring motivation, i.e., the 
fundamental goals of the intervenor and the attitudes of the target state's citizens, 
and influence, i.e., the degree of effect the intervenor's intentions had on the target 
state.8 
At the core of the problem, according to Rosenau, is intervention's morally 
neutral nature, which he hoped to escape by clarifying its meaning within a boundary 
appropriate for scientific study. Intervention as a concept represents acts that may 
be either good or bad depending upon one,s view of desired ends. The same act of 
intervention often represents a "double standard," i.e., it could be argued as being 
both desirable and undesirable by the use of opposing but equally compelling moral 
reasoning because of the diversity of values among states. Nevertheless, subjective 
thinking about intervention could be reduced if the individual case studies were 
analyzed and compared according to a common standard of scientific inquiry using 
8James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Co11flict Resolution 23 (1969): 
150-1; James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," Joumal of lntemational Affairs 22 (1968): 173. 
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a common basis of communication. He thought that intersubjective rules might be 
discerned to assist intervention in achieving desirable goals.9 
Other scientific disciplines, charged Rosenau, had separated values and 
opinions from the technical meaning of empirical observation. In political science, 
however, the subjective conceptions of the public and the politicians substituted for 
concepts specifically designed for operationalization. Because of the numerous 
definitions of intervention, there was a confusing mix of approaches to its study. 
Rosenau's response was to propose a definition of intervention which he argued 
allowed for its operationalization. Rosenau's hope was that subsequent studies would 
uncover patterns and theories of behavior capable of informing what Rosenau 
referred to as intervention's moral question, i.e., the determination of intervention's 
desirable ends. Though science could not define these ends, he claimed that it could 
assist humanity in this area by providing greater knowledge about " ... the sources, 
processes, and consequences of interventionary behavior ... "10 
To Rosenau, intervention constituted certain human activities which could be 
measured to determine whether they were achieving their intended results. Hence, 
he proposed a set of operations to identify intervention's existence and suggested two 
generally accepted universal characteristics of intervention that are manifested by 
human behavior. First, there must be a flagrant break with conventional behavior 
lasting until the unconventional acts cease or become conventional over time. 
Intervention, thus, is finite and transitory in nature. Second, intervention is aimed 
9James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 150-2. 
10lbid. 
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at the target state's authority structure, its leaders, bureaucracy, etc., as opposed to 
its policies or capabilities. This characteristic gives intervention its political 
component because the authority structure is the source of the target state's political 
control over its civil population. According to Rosenau, the target state's source of 
political authority is the political leaders and/or the political processes, e.g., the 
bureaucracy, through which the decisions binding on society are made.11 
Essentially, Rosenau views the process of directing intervention at the target 
state's authority structure as any convention breaking activity by another state 
designed to alter in any significant way the farmer's authority structure. Rosenau 
cites examples, such as outside influence on elections and pressure for human rights 
which challenge the target state's authority structure. On the other hand, the 
bolstering of an oppressive regime or countering its foreign policy is not intervention 
since the activities involved are conventional. Similarly, colonialism and imperialism 
involve a continuing control or occupation of the target state which is essentially 
conventional behavior outside Rosenau's conception.12 
Rosenau claims that the ambiguity of meaning is greatly resolved by his 
definition. The study of intervention is made manageable by eliminating many 
interventionist activities irrelevant to operationalizing the subject. Eliminated as 
intervention are a lot of foreign policy activities which may break convention but 
11Ibid., 161-2, 164. According to Richard Little, Rosenau's definition met an unfavorable response 
apparently because it did not fit either the traditional thinking or ideological preferences of the attending 
scholars; Richard Little, "Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention," in Ian Forbes and 
Mark Hoffman, eds., Political Theory, Intemational Relations and the Ethics of /11terventio11, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 16. 
12James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 161-2, 164-5. 
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seldom are aimed at another state's authority structure. Also eliminated is equating 
ideology with intervention. The problem of the national interest, though difficult to 
solve, is reduced by improved empiricism. The unmeasurable factor of motivation 
can be avoided in determining interventionary phenomena. Neither the intentions 
of the intervenor nor the attitudes of those within the target state need to be 
examined to identify behavior composing intervention. As a result, with 
unmeasurable factors, such as motivation, eliminated and the focus placed more 
narrowly on the casual connection between sharp changes in behavior, i.e., 
intervention, and the changes in the target's state's authority structure, measuring 
influence is made easier.13 
Because intervention is defined in terms of its operations, Rosenau argues that 
behavior can be observed systematically. Thus, statements by the intervenor's 
political leaders hostile to the target state's authority structure could be observed as 
evidence that intervention is aimed at the target's political system. Dictatorial 
interference could be measured by the visible protest in the target state against 
intervention. The change in the target state's authority structure could be observed 
during the intervention process. In this way, imprecise terms and normative concepts 
could be avoided while observable criteria could be discovered to measure 
intervention's success in terms of whether it achieved what it intended. More 
specifically, an observer could develop operations to determine if a particular military 
action was serving its intended purpose.14 
13Ibid., 155-6. 
14lbid., 155. 
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Although Rosenau's writings provided valuable material on intervention, the 
boundary between science and the moral question has yet to be found. Subsequent 
studies failed to fulfill his hopes that scientific analysis would one day inform the 
moral complexity of intervention. Today, normative theory still dominates 
international relations as well as intervention. Richard Little recently surveyed the 
literature on intervention and concluded that "The research required to develop a 
general theoretical understanding of intervention ... is simply limited."15 Similarly, 
David A. Welch, in his generally favorable review of one of the more recent and 
informative anthologies on intervention, wrote about the problem of definition: 
... although a number of essays note that the concept of intervention 
can refer to a wide variety of acts and relationships (and, in its most 
liberal interpretation, is coextensive with international politics as a 
whole), no two essays seem to use the word in precisely the same way. 
It is therefore often difficult to know exactly what problem the book 
is seeking to explore. This indeterminacy raises particular difficulties 
for the authors of the case studies, all of which are interesting and 
informative, but none of which is truly a "hard case" in the absence of 
a clear definition of the phenomenon.16 
The Moral Issue of Intervention 
The problem that Rosenau and other behavioralists could not transcend is the 
inability of social science to grasp the non-measurable components of intervention, 
i.e., those related to values, ideology, power and motivation. Rosenau's reasoning is 
15Richard Little, "Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention," 14; also see Richard 
Little, "Revisiting Intervention: A Survey of Recent Developments," Review of Intemational Studies 13 
(1987): 49-50. 
16David A. Welch, Review of Political 171eory, Intemational Relations, and the Ethics of Interve11tio11, 
by Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffmann (eds.) in American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994); 
799-800. 
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mistaken in the assumption that observable acts constituting intervention can be 
separated from the motives, i.e., the values, which inform intervention. As a result, 
social science cannot satisfactorily overcome the problem of measuring influence. 
Political behavior within the target state, or more specifically the behavior of its 
authority structure, still cannot be linked causally to intervention by empirical study. 
That the behavior in the target state may have occurred anyway or was caused by 
factors other than intervention cannot be disproved by empirical observation. 
Rosenau's definition of intervention is also disadvantaged by being limited to 
conventional behavior. Such conventional acts as bolstering an oppressive regime or 
exploiting other states politically and economically are generally considered 
intervention, but even if Rosenau is correct that such acts should not be included in 
an operational definition, he still has the problem of separating their capacity to 
precipitate and generate the impulse for intervention from the operational behaviors 
he designated for study. By defining intervention as unconventional behavior, 
Rosenau gained some operationalization but dismissed other important 
interventionary factors which still must be studied as part of the whole picture. 
Rosenau is a social scientist who accepts the improvement of the human 
condition as a primary goal of social science,17 and he has demonstrated in his own 
preferences for order and moral imperatives that there cannot be any analysis of 
intervention without prior assumptions of what are desirable ends. Empirical data, 
in fact, is of little help in resolving intervention's moral issue concerning which ends 
17James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 49; James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific 
Concept," 149, 169. 
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are desirable because data and any resulting intersubjective laws are of little help in 
resolving moral conflicts. For example, the increasingly accepted and scientifically 
validated principle, at least according to Western thinking, that democracies do not 
go to war with each other does not solve the problems of moral and cultural 
relativism among states.18 Rosenau's analysis cannot help but fall into the logical 
paradox of assuming certain desirable ends of ultimate good that cannot be 
scientifically demonstrated, e.g., international order and a world devoid of atrocities 
and racism, as part of his behavioralist goals. Further, he would not likely abandon 
these desirable ends even if empirical findings were to bring them into question. 
Rosenau's analysis of intervention showed him feeling seriously constrained 
by the moral problem involved. This constraint was reflected in his acceptance of 
normative studies on moral, legal and strategic issues as important to the study of 
intervention. Obviously, his inability, and reluctance, to escape intervention's moral 
significance, despite his desire for an operational definition, was influenced by the 
controversy of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, which was one of the 
great political issues of the day and one to which political science was accused of 
being irrelevant. Thus, Rosenau wrote at the time that intervention is the political 
community's most pressing moral issue involving " ... the human spirit, the liberty of 
18American Political Science Review, which presents few articles on foreign affairs, nevertheless, from 
1992 through 1994, published the following articles of quantitative research, of course, on the 
relationship between democracy and war: David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifist: Democratic States and 
War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 
"Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 
87 (Sept. 1993): 624-38; William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Conflict," American Political Review 88 (March 1994): 14-32. For the argument that the period of 
transition prior to reaching a mature and peaceful democracy is often a prolonged period of war, see 
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 
79-97. 
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individuals, the structure of groups, [and] the existence of order," which affects the 
dignity of people and the amount of control they have over their destinies.19 
Rosenau attempted to separate science from values with the noble aspiration 
that the former would inform the latter. In the final analysis, however, he could not 
resolve the problems of moral and cultural relativism. He could not help but retain 
certain core values, such as international order and the evil of genocide. Rosenau 
assumed the necessity to condemn intervention generally for the sake of international 
order while allowing for appropriate exceptions for the sake of morality. His 
acceptance of nonintervention as a norm implied order as a desirable end. He based 
exceptions to the nonintervention norm on the assumption that some acts against it 
preserved international order and human rights. Rosenau's examples of the U.S. 
intervening in Latin America as "unwarranted" while intervening against Hitler's 
Germany as "justified" implied certain moral imperatives for the international 
community, such as the need to stop and punish genocide even at the expense of 
state sovereignty and the risk of international disorder.20 
Neither could Rosenau escape the ethic of consequences, i.e., the demands of 
the real world. He assumed the need to avoid the harmful effects of intervention 
and that there are situations in which the preservation of international order must 
supersede a generally perceived moral imperative. To Rosenau, sometimes a leader 
must place prudence above principle. For example, he agreed with the failure of the 
West to intervene in Hungary's 1956 revolt against the Soviet Union for fear of a 
19James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 149. 
20Ibid. 
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nuclear holocaust. As a result, he ultimately relied on the same utilitarian reasoning 
and ethic of consequences that realists adhere to. He returned to thinking in terms 
of preferred ends and the national interest.21 
His assumption of desirable ends proved that he could not get past social 
science's inability to find which ends are the more desirable and which actions are 
in accord with them. Hence, the inability of human observation to separate political 
values from political behavior left all politics in the realm of moral and cultural 
subjectivity. This situation is manifested in the recent return to the forefront of 
intervention issues involving nationalism, self-determination, and ethnic conflict. 
During the Cold War, they were considered in decline in the face of cosmopolitan, 
social progress brought about by science and universal values, such as democracy and 
Marxism. The only question was whether Western or Marxist universalism would 
prevail. However, ethnic nationalism and self-determination, even in the West, 
intensified with a vengeance to the extent that humanitarian intervention was 
contemplated and found wanting. Exacerbating the problem was the admission by 
scholars that they could not identify a clear set of factors for making reasonably 
certain predictions on where ethnic conflict would strike next, on the degree of 
popular support it would receive, on the intensity it would possess, and on its 
probable duration.22 Such unexpected changes in international politics served to 
21Ibid., 152. Hans Morgenthau, in discussing what is the moral significance of political action, argued 
that it is not the pure ethics of conforming to moral law but rather the political ethics of the demands 
of the real world, i.e., the ethics of consequences. Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Political 
Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991), 5-6. 
22Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 59. 
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illustrate that it was precisely because Western thought had no effective method of 
comprehending the complexities of societies with different political and cultural 
values that it substituted theorizing on political and moral philosophy for predictive 
theory. For Americans today, the lesson is that there is no systematic and reliable 
method of determining the consequences of humanitarian intervention. 
Humanitarian Intervention: 
Intrusion into the Unknown 
Another way to view the problem of intervention not being susceptible to 
scientific measurement and predictive theory is to recognize that intervention 
produces local undulations which can never be separated in any clear way from the 
periodic outcomes of the local political process. For instance, Michael Walzer and 
his critics during the late 1970s debated the efficacy of possible U.S. intervention in 
Nicaragua between the time of the Sandinista defeat in 1978 and Somoza's ouster in 
1979. To Walzer, the efficacy of nonintervention was shown by what he saw as the 
internal adjustments of self-determination and local responsibility leading eventually 
to Somoza's defeat. Luban, on the other hand, saw these factors as being neutralized 
by oppressive force in 1978, making nonintervention immoral, as the Nicaraguan state 
made war on its own people who, he alleged, suffered needlessly and irretrievably for 
another year. As it was, who could have foreseen the def eat by ballot of the 
Sandinistas? Who could have seen, and even today say, at what point intervention 
would have worsened or relieved the suffering of the Nicaraguan people? The 
complexity of the political process and the denouement in Nicaragua since Somoza's 
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defeat makes the intervention issue of 1978 appear insignificant.23 Unfortunately, 
a state's internal, political conflict is difficult to analyze in a systematically empirical 
manner at the international, state, and individual levels except in studies of limited 
historical context because, as Walzer argues, self-determination is an open-ended, 
historical process. 
The Delusion of Scientific Prescription and 
the Hope of Vision 
The refusal to recognize the limitations of social science has serious 
implications for both the study and practice of international relations and 
humanitarian intervention. The belief in science can be seductive, such that 
normative theorists might mistake their approach as scientific in nature and 
behavioralists might see their limited quantitative studies as supportive of their 
ideological positions. Thus, by self-deception either might mistake their ideology for 
scientific findings about international relations based on behavioral studies. Those 
desiring progress might become so convinced of the righteous nature of their cause 
that they imperceptibly manipulate quantitative studies in the pursuit of normative 
goals, i.e., the masking of idealism with scientism. 
Contemporary evidence that ideology is susceptible to being mistaken as social 
science and behavioralism is presented in the ideas of the recently defunct World 
Order Models Project (WOMP). During the 1980s, it was an approach to 
23See Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980): 218-9; David Luban, "Just War and Human Rights," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (Winter 1980): 170-1; David Luban, "The Romance of the Nation-State," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (Summer 1980): 396. 
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international relations by a number of highly respected scholars who used statistical 
and empirical data to compare past, present, and future international systems. The 
goal was to develop projections and trends that could be analyzed for remedies to 
approaching world catastrophes. Starting with a worldwide group of scholars and 
tentative conclusions general enough for consensus, WOMP advocates sought to 
develop "a framework of world order values," which over time would raise the 
consciousness of the elite of international society. The idea was that eventually new 
values of international politics would be accepted by states, international 
organizations (10s) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional, cultural, 
and ethnic groups. As a result, international politics would progress toward a world 
order absent the direct violence of killing and the indirect violence of social, 
environmental and political oppression.24 
Richard Falk envisioned WOMP as a world order of minimal collective 
violence and maximum economic and environmental well-being, social and political 
justice. The values of the international system of states would in effect be 
transformed with NGOs acting as interest groups for the people and not their abusive 
24See Samuel Kim, Toward A Just World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 95, 294-5; 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in Wodd Politics (New York: Columbia university 
Press, 1977), 303; Richard Falk, "Contending Approaches to World Order," Journal of International 
Affairs 31 (Fall/Winter 1977) : 172, 175, 187-8: Patrick M. Morgan, 17ieon·es and Approaches to 
International Politics: What Are We To 171ink, 4th ed., (Newbrunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 293-
300. WOMP may be viewed as a hybrid between science and ideology. Claimed to be non-ideological 
in the sense that world systems are analyzed statistically and empirically to develop a consensus of 
logical inferences of values needed to avoid world disaster, WOMP, nevertheless, evokes populist 
tendencies and views elites as suspect. According to Kim, the national security state militarized its 
political system around a ruling elite who have a vested interest in the status quo. Therefore, the 
modern state, regardless of ideology, is centered around its military establishment. Hence, the state and 
its military are ends unto themselves rather than tools to preserve societal and cultural values. Before 
humanity can be made whole, the values of the status quo that make the state the raison d'etre of the 
international system and of the ruling elites must be changed. Sec Richard A. Falk, Ibid., 188-9; Also 
see Samual Kim, Ibid., 98, 133, 334. 
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governments and elites. WOMP, however, was susceptible to the same criticism 
placed upon the current trend of multicultural education, i.e., that its goal of 
consciousness raising was designed '"to give an academic gloss to an implied power 
struggle and to organize ... on a political basis without seeming to do so."' 25 Thus, 
WOMP advocates could have it both ways. They could become political activists 
without forsaking social science. 
On the other hand, WOMP's ideas helped create a vision of global problems 
that, as will be seen later, developed a new appeal after the Cold War. In addition, 
its emphasis on justice is part of the same idealism that is behind the ideas of the 
post-Cold War interventionists. Yet that military humanitarian intervention other 
than other than very limited actions appears to be a failure is no reason to become 
cynical, for it is the very Western idealism of the rule of law and the belief in 
scientific progress which, while failing to stop structural violence, provides the hope 
for incremental advances in the protection of human rights. 
25Richard A. Falk, "Contending Approaches to World Order," 179; James Davison Hunter, Culture 
Wars: 11ie Strnggle to Define America, (np: Basic Books, 1991), 219, citing Thomas Short, "A New 
Racism on Campus?" Commentary 86 (1988): 50. 
Chapter III 
The Conflict Between International Order and Justice 
Three Kinds of International Justice 
Justice, as the goal of humanitarian intervention, is clearly described in the scholarly 
and popular literature in terms of justice for the individual. Yet, in international politics, 
justice has three conceptual meanings. Initially, Hedley Bull gives its fundamental 
meaning, which is as applicable in the international arena as it is within states, as " ... the 
class of moral ideas ... which treat human actions as right in themselves and not merely as a 
means to an end." Bull, however, in writing about international justice, further divides it 
into three categories, interstate justice or the reciprocal recognition by states of each other's 
rights and duties, human justice or the respect shown for the rights and duties of individual 
human beings by the state, and cosmopolitan justice or the rights and duties people and 
their states owe each other for "the world common good" as members of a global 
community. I 
I See note 11 below on the issue of individual justice as the core value ofhmnanitarian intervention; 
For a discussion of the different concepts of international justice, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: 
A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colmnbia university Press, 1977), 78-86. It must be 
remembered, however, that Bull is a realist. 
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Individual Justice: Obstacle to International Order? 
But the traditional view within the field of international relations is that the 
pursuit of individual justice by states conflicts with international order, because the 
latter cannot exist without a state-centric international politics based upon interstate 
justice. As the idea goes, some minimum degree of international order is considered 
a precondition to all the other desirable goals of international politics, including a 
reasonable degree of international justice, but the pursuit of individual justice 
conflicts with international order and interstate justice, and therefore, threatens all 
forms of justice.2 The question then for humanitarian intervention is whether the 
international community is willing and able to balance individual justice more 
equitably with international order and interstate justice for the purpose of reducing 
human suffering and atrocities? The outlook for the foreseeable future is not 
optimistic. 
The role of order in international politics is complex and often vaguely 
alluded to, but its general acceptance as the framework within which international 
relations is studied makes it important to the analysis of intervention. It is an 
important theoretical concept because it is viewed as both the objective behavior of 
international politics and the ideological aspirations and accomplishments of a state 
or a concert of states.3 
2As will be seen, the literature of international relations and foreign policy, including that of many 
of the foremost thinkers in both fields, is replete with the assumption that international order and 
individual justice conflict. See Hedley Bull, Ibid., 86-98. 
3As will be seen, RJ. McKinlay and R. Little have a very subjective view of international order in 
contrast to James N. Rosenau's objective view. 
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The Definition of International Order 
In its normative sense, international order is the world which states view as 
most closely reflecting the attainment of their desirable goals of foreign policy. 
It is an ideological interpretation of international order. That is to say, states desire 
their core values to have as much influence over the world as possible. The closer 
the world approaches each individual state's ideal world order, the more it feels 
secure, self-fulfilled, and confirmed in its core values. In this way, a state's view of 
world order structures its foreign policy choices. The goals and the methods for the 
achievement of international order are, therefore, a matter of the state's political and 
cultural values. In this respect, it is difficult to dismiss the ideological aspects of 
international order. This is why American exceptionalism plays an important role 
in U.S. efforts for a liberal world order.4 
In its empirical sense, international order, as aptly described by James 
Rosenau, is the impersonal, causative forces of world politics whose reoccurring 
patterns of individual and collective human behavior are molded by cultural, 
environmental, situational, and historical factors. Rosenau assumes order to be an 
objective reality. There is a cause for every effect. Nothing happens at random. 
World order and intervention are empirical phenomena. At present, however, 
4McKinlay and Little have a subjectivist view of world order as constituting goals, structural 
arrangements, and belief systems. They analyze these components in three world order models which 
they term liberalism, socialism, and realism. They also assume that, since these models have different 
goals, world order is naturally contentious. R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World 
Order (Frances Pinter: London, 1986), 2, 4, 9, 21-3, 263. 
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humanity does not have the skills and scientific tools to observe the underlying causes 
of international political behavior and must take them on faith.5 
International order is also thought of in a far deeper philosophical sense as 
a precondition to all the other desirable goals of international politics. Just as 
domestic order is a societal arrangement which minimizes violence and lawlessness 
and assures the basic goals of organized social life within the state, the same is true 
for international order except that states which are in a contentious decentralized 
world must limit their competition to protect those goals.6 As a result, international 
politics utilizes different mechanisms than domestic politics to keep order. 
Accordingly, Hedley Bull defines international order " ... as patterns or dispositions of 
human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among 
mankind as a whole." These "common goals of all social life," in Martin Griffith's 
words, are security of human life, sanctity of contract and stable possession of 
property. As John Vincent notes in discussing Bull's definition, states attempt to 
secure these goals in order to assure human existence, cooperation and economic 
development.7 Obviously, international order is a valued entity not to be put at risk 
except for the most compelling reasons. 
5James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Co11flict Resolutio11 13 (June 
1969): 23; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence i11 World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 50. 
6James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 13-15; Patrick M. Morgan, 
Theories and Approaches to Intemational Politics: U!lzat Are We To Think, 4th ed., (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1988), 261. 
7RJ. Vincent, No11i11terve11tio11 and !11tematio11a/ Order (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
1974), 329; Hedley Bull, 171e Anarchical Society, 4-5, 20; Martin Griffith's, "Order and International 
Society: The Real Realism," Review of i11tematio11a/ Studies 18 (July 1992): 237. 
The Status Quo of International Order 
Over Individual Justice 
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Because it is so highly valued, there is no mystery as to how states currently 
act, both individually and as an international community, in balancing international 
order with individual justice. That genocide is a byproduct of the state's protection 
of order is evidenced by the strength of the nonintervention norm even when its 
violation could stop atrocities by other states and political groups. Not even 
unconscionable atrocities stop individual justice from receiving mostly formal 
recognition while the threats, if not the acts, of power politics still control the pursuit 
of world order. This priority is evidenced from the general condemnation by the 
society of states of the interventions in Kampuchea, Uganda and Bangladesh, despite 
their humanitarian results and by the lack of collective sanctions against most of the 
acts of genocide subsequent to the Second World War. Clearly, a certain sacrificial 
level of structural violence by states against each other and their civilian populations 
is perceived as necessary to the maintenance of international order.8 
In addition, the nature of justice itself prevents it from becoming a highly 
desirable goal of foreign policy. To begin with, justice means many things to many 
8Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 96-7; R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order, 
310; also see Samuel Kim, Toward A Just World Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 239; 
Tom J. Farer, "An Inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention," in Lori Fisler Damrosch 
and David J. Scheffer (editors) Law and Force in the New Intemational Order (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991), 193-4; The noxious but difficult to refute idea of structural violence, as an 
explanation of the base cruelty of international politics, holds that the existence of genocide and/ or other 
forms of violence are a necessary part of the development of the state system and the maintenance of 
world order. RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and I11tematio11al Order, 332; Barbara Harft Genocide and 
Human Rights: Inaction and Political Issues, Monograph Series in World Affairs, ed., Karen A. Feste, 
Vol. 20 (Denver: University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1984), 12-13. 
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people and is often subject to double standards, which presents an insurmountable 
problem in its enforcement for world leaders.9 As a result, justice is generally 
accepted not as a universal truth but either as the aggrieved wrong or the preferred 
set of values held by a people within a particular political subgroup. That it is 
"universal" only within the political subgroup is expressed in the hackneyed Cold War 
expression that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Put another way, 
people tend to be realists concerning their own interests and moralists concerning the 
interests of others. Consequently, social scientists devalue its usefulness in the study 
of political behavior just as practitioners do in the formulation and implementation 
of foreign policy.10 
But humanitarian intervention is usually discussed in terms of human or 
individual justice and, to a lesser extent, in terms of cosmopolitan justice or the 
common good. It is usually defined in terms of remedying mass and flagrant 
violations of human rights, stopping and preventing outrageous, mass atrocities, acts 
of oppression, and unnecessary suffering, and, more recently, in terms of protecting 
basic political, cultural, and economic human rights. The goals of humanitarian 
intervention are based on the idea that the inherent value of the individual human 
being is not negated by the exigencies of international politics. The meaning of 
9Compare the double standards of justice with those of intervention, the latter which James Rosenau 
attempted unsuccessfully to ameliorate by developing an operational definition for intervention. Both 
justice and intervention are burdened by their subjective natures which necessitate disagreement by 
people and political communities over the choices of desirable ends. See above, p. 12. 
10Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical Inter-
national Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 31, 196; Geoffrey Stern, Morality and 
International Order,"in Alan James (ed.) The Bases of lntematio11al Order (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 144. 
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humanitarianism is the sole concern for the welfare of the human race, which is 
primarily based on cosmopolitan morality or the common good, derived from that is 
the idea of individual justice.11 
The Desire for Justice and 
the Values Distribution Among States 
The various meanings of justice and the difficulties of applying them to ideas 
such as humanitarian intervention do not, however, negate the omnipresence of the 
desire for justice in international politics. As Bull points out, the actors in 
international politics hold specific values and beliefs on justice which affect the 
course of events. According to Oran Young, the structure of the international 
political system is characterized by motivational, systemic factors or variables such 
as ideological and conceptual norms of order. There is in effect a "values 
distribution" within the international system which influences political behavior 
including intervention.12 
For examples of the "values distribution" among states, Young points to the 
historical tension between radical and status quo states and competing visions of 
world order including the interventionary propensities of the "crusading or 
usee Jack Donnelly, U11iversal Huma11 Rights in T71eory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 260; Thomas Weiss and Thomas J. Watson, "Tangled Up in Blue: Intervention and 
Alternatives," Harvard intematio11al Review 26 (Fall 1993): 31; Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: 
Military Intervention and Human Rights," /lltemational Affairs 60 (July 1993): 445; Charles A. Beitz, 
Political 171eory a11d /lltemational Relatio11s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 181-2; 
See the definition of humanitarianism in T71e Random House College Dictionary. 
12Hedley Bull, T71eA11archical Society, 78; Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems," 
Journal of /11tematio11al Affairs 22 (1968): 182-85. 
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proselytizing syndrome" of states. Such norms may relate to a state's internal factors 
such as its form of government and ideology or to international factors such as the 
values of the international community, e.g., toward conservative or revolutionary 
intervention.13 
Cultural Relativism and the Lack of Consensus on Justice 
The distribution of values within the international system of states, however, 
is a function of cultural relativism. States, consequently, are in conflict over 
interstate, individual, and cosmopolitan justice. Each of the culturally distinct 
political communities constituting the subcomponents of states possesses a collective 
sense of justice based on its own referential experiences. Hence, the community's 
cultural history determines its political values, including its collective sense of justice 
which may exist at the state or substate level depending upon the state's degree of 
political homogeneity. Yet, paradoxically most states are part of larger socio-political 
cultures, while domestically they are often not culturally homogeneous. 
Consequently, socio-political conflict of varying degrees between and within states, 
which is justice based and culturally induced, is not uncommon.14 
This collective sense of justice, is a source of both unity and conflict. It draws 
the culturally distinct political community together against outsiders but also incites 
ethnic and other group identity conflicts, especially within states, because the 
130ran R. Young, Ibid. 
14These observations are supported by arguably strong theories about the issues of state legitimacy, 
the nature of the state and its subgroups, the conflict of cultures within and among states, and how the 
ideas of justice relate to these questions, which are dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
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differing perceptions of collective justice among groups result in an enduring feeling 
of deprivation and the desire for retribution of an aggrieved wrong. Hence, the 
festering of ethnic groups' resentments is explosive and is a fomenter of violence. 
The implication for those attempting to balance justice and order is that the 
analysis of other political communities is made difficult by the fact that the bonding 
of values of the civil populations within states both promotes and disrupts order. The 
sense of collective justice held by communities encourages a form of nationalism in 
the West based on the rule of law and individual and cosmopolitan justice that 
discourages local conflict and disunity within states, but the sense of collective justice 
also provokes an ethnic variety of nationalism which is a cause of unusually 
malevolent civil war making the moral discrimination between victim and culprit 
difficult for outsiders.15 In addition, the desire for justice encourages moralism or 
the group's belief that it possesses the sole truth on its particular issue or issues of 
grievance. As Hedley Bull argues, it is the uncompromising pursuit of justice which 
provokes arbitrary interventions and displaces those devices necessary to the 
preservation of order, and hence leads to disorder and paradoxically to greater 
injustice. 
With its lack of consensus on meaning, valuing justice equally with order is 
seen as a threat to stability by state and world leaders, whether in terms of ideology, 
self-determination or human rights. Bull points out that the lack of consensus by 
states concerning the desirable ends of foreign policy makes international politics 
15Hedley Bull, 171e A11arcltical Society, 87-90. 
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"inhospitable" to the idea of the world common good or cosmopolitan justice.16 
For the same reason, international politics is inhospitable to the idea of human 
justice as well. With the incongruity of justice, it is order, Bull states, that is the 
precondition for the existence of the "selective and partial" justice, which is the 
maximum that humanity can achieve in the world of politics as it is today.17 Indeed, 
a main argument against humanitarian intervention is that states cannot give 
individual justice priority over international politics without producing disorder from 
the many resulting conflicts and interventions. 
Another reason for the preference of order over justice in international 
politics is the traditional, philosophical presuppositions about the nature of 
international politics held by political leaders and scholars derived from how they see 
human nature and behavior. Scholars and practitioners, arguably through no fault 
of their own, view international relations in a way which makes them justice 
agnostics. World leaders assume that nonintervention protects state sovereignty 
which protects world order. The pursuit of universal individual justice, on the other 
hand, is seen as an impossible task, which would violate state sovereignty and the 
nonintervention norm to the detriment of international order. International order 
is associated with security and stability for the state both at home and abroad. To 
scholars in particular, order must exist as an "initial premise" to the scientific study 
of international relations. Scholars see international order as a behavioral entity 
16RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order, 387; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global 
Problems and World Order, 8-9; Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 151; Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, 87-90. 
17Hedley Bull, 17ie Anarchical Society, 86, 93. 
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existing in a different domain than international justice. Since values and science 
supposedly are separate entities, scholars think in terms of theories about structure 
and order. They see international politics in terms of the big picture and see the 
pursuit of individual justice at best irrelevant to and at worst conflicting with the 
maintenance of order because of the structure and nature of the world of states. 
Because practitioners and scholars alike work from theory, whether it is working 
theories like appeasement and deterrence or structural theories such as neo-realism, 
they tend to see the preservation of international order in dispassionate and 
utilitarian terms.18 
The Dispassionate Mindset on International Politics 
With this dispassionate macro view, disorder within and among states is quite 
logically susceptible to being viewed as an observable, impersonal political event 
demanding analysis rather than as acts of cruelty against large numbers of people 
deserving of a humanitarian response. According to Rosenau, disorder, which he 
terms turbulence, results from the impersonal forces of the human interaction of 
many actors in a complex process, which has an emerging behavioral pattern. Some 
of the reoccurring patterns and responses of individual and collective human 
behavior, when isolated and viewed at any particular point in time, involve conflicts 
18As to order as an initial premise to make the systematic study of international politics possible, see 
James N. Rosenau, Turbulence, 50; This observation of the distraction by international relations' 
theorists and policy makers away from the principles of individual and cosmopolitan justice is similar 
to the argument that the principles of group morality, i.e., the morality of political communities and 
states, sanitizes the standard morality generally accepted by individuals. It is the idea that the conscience 
of the individual dissolves into the amoral, opportunistic political goals of the group. See Mary 
Maxwell, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View, IO, 23-5, citing Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man 
and Immoral Society (New York: Scribners, 1932), 84-5, and 123-6. 
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and fluctuations, which are normally perceived as disorder. However, Rosenau 
argues that they are actually adjustments in the international system in transition 
from an old to a new order.19 
Rosenau's dispassionate response to today's turbulence of premising order out 
of disorder does not lend itself to ideas about humanitarian intervention. This is not 
to criticize Rosenau's level of compassion in any way but rather to demonstrate the 
mindset of those attentive to international relations, which, regardless of whether a 
justifiable view or not, is a barrier to the political will needed for effective 
humanitarian intervention. 
Realism and Justice 
Another barrier to thinking in humanitarian terms is the mindset and 
influence of realism. Few practitioners and scholars deny that relative power, 
cultural and ideological diversity, and the national interest are indispensable factors 
of international politics. The problem with realism, however, is not that it has been 
a predominant part of American foreign policy since the Second World War but 
rather that, no matter how strong idealism penetrates its theories, the realities of 
power and self-interest, at least through perception, remain with us. That realism 
cannot be fully excised from international relations implies serious limits on the 
ability of states to end structural violence. 
19James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 23; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in 
World Politics, 50. 
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According to realists, based on the presupposition that human nature is self-
aggrandizing in a world unconstrained by any central authority, states are egoistic 
entities of varying degrees of power trapped together in a "security dilemma" of 
mutual fear of aggression. A current example of this dangerous game is the 
thousands of nuclear warheads still available even after the Cold War to the U.S. and 
Russia which, though not currently targeted at each other, can be retargeted in about 
thirty minutes. The only effective response by states to the "security dilemma," 
according to realist theory, is the rational and measured use of force on issues either 
of survival or of vital interests and, otherwise, the mutual restraint of force through 
the international structuring of certain stability devices, which are the balance of 
power, diplomacy, world leadership by powerful states, international law, negotiation, 
interstate justice, and at times, when necessary, war.20 
Structuring this equilibrium of relative peace against the vicissitudes of 
international politics, realists believe, is a matter of skill. Since power and interest 
are objective realities self-evident from the nature of international politics, they can 
be discerned in the real world, albeit imperfectly and too often unskillfully, but, 
nonetheless, the opportunity is there for pursuit of an effective foreign policy. By 
skillful and objective threat perception, the focus and expenditure of state power can 
20Kenneth Thompson, Traditions and Values In Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 89; Hedley Bull, Tlze Anarchical Society, 91-3, 101, 
127, 162, 184, 200; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 74-7, 78-80; The balance of power 
is an alliance of states with similar interests counterbalancing a threatening state. The natural response 
in a decentralized world of relative power, according to realists, is for states to align themselves in blocks 
so that no one state becomes predominate enough to threaten others and world order; Philip Wiener, 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1973), s.v. "Balance of Power," by Herbert Butterfield; J. Hare and Carey Joynt, Ethics and 
International Affairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 48-9; sec George F. Kennan, "Morality and 
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985/86): 206, 207. 
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effectively protect the state's national interest. The inescapable implication of this 
theory, however, is that, between fortuity and blunder, the world, imperfect as it is, 
allows for structural violence.21 
Realist theory favors interstate justice over individual and cosmopolitan justice 
because the state is assumed to be the only political entity capable of structuring an 
equilibrium of relative peace by a moderate pursuit of the national interest. It is 
considered the most capable instrument to use the stability devices needed to 
maintain international order. The state, therefore, is seen as having a special 
fiduciary relationship with its citizens, like that between agency and principle, to 
pursue the national interest.22 
Although the national interest is criticized for being almost infinite in 
meaning, realists view it as an elastic concept similar to the general concepts of 
American constitutional law, which grows and changes with the demands of 
international politics. For realists, the indefinite nature of the concept does not 
negate its reality. Elasticity of concepts is part of the nature of politics. For 
example, survival, like free speech, remains a core value, though how it is defended 
changes with history. Therefore, an effective foreign policy adapts its threat 
perceptions realistically and skillfully as time and circumstances change. State 
21Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 1710ught from Weber to Kissi11ter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986), 154-5; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest 
of the United States," 171e American Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 972. 
22George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign policy." Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985/86): 206; 
Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 17wught, 155-6. 
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leaders are accountable for pursuing the national interest skillfully.23 Realists admit 
that concepts like the national interest and power may be ambiguous but nonetheless 
represent the reality of political behavior. 
At the core of the national interest are the state's survival interests around 
which its citizens coalesce in support and for which they are willing to die. Survival 
interests are the "irreducible minimum" of the state's physical and moral integrity in 
contrast to the state's historically variable wish list of non-survival interests advanced 
by the conflicting desires of its special interest factions, political elites, and publics. 
In addition to domestic pressures, there is also the influence of supranational 
organizations. Supporters of particular variable interests, claiming economic benefits 
or affective sympathy abroad, often attempt to elevate their agendas to survival 
interest status. Variable interests, argue realists, are highly susceptible to negative 
factors such as moralism, arrogance of power and egoism. An obvious variable 
interest, according to realists, is human rights. Under these circumstances, the state's 
moderate pursuit of its survival interests maximizes interstate justice which also 
obtains the greatest possible justice for its citizens. Since survival interests include 
the state's moral integrity, the national interest relates to more than physical survival. 
It is also a matter of protecting a state's core values, which includes the state's 
political institutions and cultural values. It is these core values that give the state's 
political community its sense of meaning, self-identity and self-fulfillment, and feeling 
of virtue along with its sense of physical well-being. Thus, within that "irreducible 
~ee Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate," 972; George F. Kennan, "The National Interest 
of the United States," Illinois Low Review 45 (January-February 1951): 730, 736, 738; Kenneth 
Thompson, Traditions and Values, 81. 
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minimum" of survival interests are those core values which give moral self-fulfillment 
to the state's political community and which are worth the costs in lives and money 
to defend, even overseas in intervention, as exemplified by the willingness of the 
American people to defend their democratic institutions by interventionist policies 
during and after the Second World War.24 Clearly, under this reasoning, the state's 
protection of its moral integrity by realist principles provides its citizens the optimum 
satisfaction of their collective sense of justice. 
Realism also serves justice, claim its advocates, because the moderation it 
requires for a rational determination of the national interest also protects the 
diversity among states. According to Morgenthau, the citizens and leaders of the 
world's states prefer their policies to be consistent with a reciprocal respect of each 
others cultural and political values. Thus, they recognize that the respect of diversity 
is pragmatic and a matter of enlightened self-interest. Although realists do not see 
the protection of diversity a desirable end unto itself, its protection, nonetheless, is 
an important ingredient of international order because it is consistent with 
moderation and compromise among states.25 
When, however, the collective perception of justice, whether in a state as a 
whole, e.g., Nazi Germany, or within the subgroups of a state, e.g., the former 
Yugoslavia, takes precedence over the pursuit of interstate justice, rational thinking 
24Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate," 972, 973, 977; Sissela Bok who is anything but 
a realist nonetheless refers to survival in terms of preserving " ... as much as possible of all that one 
values ... " See Sissela Bok, A Strategy for_Peace: Human Values and the Threat of War (Pantheon 
Books: New York, 1989), 64. 
25Kenneth Thompson, Traditions and Values, 136, 137; Michael Joseph Smith, Ibid., 45-8; See 
Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate," 977. 
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on the use of power and the pursuit of the national interest is disrupted. Realists 
claim that the tenets of realism encourage the mutual trust and respect among states 
needed for peace and discourage the state's corrupt, unbridled pursuit of its self-
interest through either moralism or moral skepticism. Realists like Hans Morgenthau 
reject the criticism that their theory of international politics is amoral and a form 
moral skepticism. To the contrary, they claim that realism, by avoiding the irrational 
zeal of moralism, prescribes an effective, moderate structure of equilibrium for peace 
which maximizes the influence of morality and justice in international politics.26 
The danger of moralism and moral skepticism is that either can easily erupt 
in many states and their political subgroups. The earnest pursuit of justice can 
change with political conditions into either deceptive moralizing to rationalize 
egoistic policies or delusional thinking to affirm fanatical beliefs. The result is a 
radicalized, and often violent, policy toward those with different interests and values 
which works against the trust required between states for peace and international 
order. As either moral hypocrisy or fanaticism displaces the national interest, the 
survival of the state and, consequently, the maintenance of world order are put at 
unnecessary risk.27 
~ee Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and I11tematio11al Relations, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 15-17; also see Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International 
Relations," in Charles R. Beitz, et. al. (editors) l11tematio11al Et/tics: A Pltilosoplty and Public Affairs 
Reader (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 4. 
27Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," 434; Moralism is the belief in a morally 
superior truth so deserving of universal acceptance that its dissemination is justified by any means. 
Moral skepticism is the belief in the amorality of international relations. See Kenneth Thompson, 
Traditions and Values, 135-7, 136, 174-5. 
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Because of the state's importance, strong international norms in its favor, 
including one of nonintervention, are seen as necessary to international order. 
Because realism is a state-centric theory, some violence is morally defensible as a 
tool for structuring stability devices, and a high degree of noninterference in favor 
of the state is necessary to keep it viable enough to play a positive role in the 
structuring. As bluntly put by Hedley Bull, violence is traditionally used in power 
politics as a stabilizing device for the maintenance of world order.28 
Yet it is the nonintervention norm that allows the state to abuse its citizens 
with impunity. As a result, realism's assumption that the state is the rightful and 
most efficient political unit to protect the world's civilian populations presents a 
serious obstacle to the development of human justice in today's world. The price 
that humanity pays for an orderly world of states is a reluctance of the international 
community and its most powerful states to interfere in a serious way, and especially 
militarily, not only against ordinary oppression but also against atrocities and severe 
human rights violations.29 
28Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 91-3, 188. 
29R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and Intematio11a/ Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 83; RJ. Vincent. No11i11te1Ve11tion and Intemational Order, 329, 330-32; R.J. Vincent, 
NoninteNention and Intemational Order, 307, citing Julius Stone, "Approaches to the Notion of 
International Justice," in Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black (editors) 171e Future of the Legal 
International Order, Vol. 1, Trends and Pattems (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1%9), 425-
6; James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Conflict Resolution 13 (June 
1%9): 152; Thomas G. Weiss, "Triage: Humanitarian Intervention in a New Era," World Policy Journal 
11 (Spring 1994): 59; Kishore Mabbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the 
West," Foreign Affairs 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993): 10. The international community is the society of the 
world's states formed voluntarily with common rules and institutions to reflect their areas of common 
interests and values. Their purpose is to put limits on those qualities of international politics such as 
power that are only efficacious to humanity when exercised in moderation. See Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, 13. 
50 
Bull admits that this state-centric conception of justice does not conform to 
the popular individual and cosmopolitan connotations of justice. He accepts that the 
stability devices violate the ordinary sense of justice held by many people, groups, 
and even states, because they depend upon the use of violence, power, and the 
pursuit of the national interest, but sometimes violence must be used to save a viable 
state and hence to maintain order. Accordingly, Bull writes that " ... war ... plays a 
central role in the maintenance of international order, the enforcement of 
international law, the preservation of the balance of power, and the effecting of 
changes which a consensus maintains are just."30 
This tradeoff of some violence for order, which supposedly maximizes peace 
in an imperfect world, is the core of realist morality, although Marshall Cohen argues 
that it is no morality at all. Paradoxically like the strategy of setting a fire to fight 
one, a controlled disorder of violence is thought to be sometimes useful to prevent 
a disorder of much greater magnitude. Because the success of the stabilizing devices 
requires some war or what Bull describes as " ... organized violence carried on by 
political units against each other," it is generally accepted that the greater good of 
social order among states allows for some unjust, in the popular sense, and violent 
behavior .within and between states. This use of violence to defend the "islands of 
order" that constitute international order maximizes world justice by, as Vincent 
describes it, the " ... the laying down of life to protect life." Because of the importance 
of the stability devices in maintaining order, it is paradoxically their displacement by 
30R.J. Vincent, Noninterve11tio11 and Intemational Order, 330, 341; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical 
Society, 91-2, 184. 
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the foreign policy goals of individual or human justice, which, because of the its 
inherent divisiveness, would cause greater disorder and, consequently, greater 
injustice.31 
Violence as a Stability Device in a State-Centric System 
This morality is a utilitarian perception of the moral dimensions of world 
order, which assumes that the maintenance of the appropriate general rules, i.e., the 
nonintervention norm and the stability devices of realism, despite the cost of some 
structural violence maximizes world order because there are no alternative, effective 
restraints on violence and power. The moral thinking is that the nonintervention 
norm cannot prevent individual acts of violence and injustice, but, instead, it can 
keep the lid on the greater, potential injustice of widespread chaos and war. This 
view of the relationship between international order and individual justice prevails, 
though unspoken, within the American foreign policy establishment.32 However, 
once violence is accepted as a stability device, the distinction by states between just 
and unjust war, although intellectually and philosophically established, is in practice 
blurred because of the subjective nature of justice. 
The state-centric nature of realism causes a mindset among state leaders and 
their loyal citizenry that encourages international resistance to fighting genocide. 
Historically, states assumed the power to take lives for their own purposes just as 
31Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," in Charles R. Beitz, et. al. 
(editors) International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), 5; Hedley Bull, 171e Anarchical Society, 86, 91-3. 
32Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, "Nonintervention and Human Rights," Joumal of Politics 48 
(February 1986): 86. 
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today the civilian populations who identify with and want the survival of their states 
fear loosing their monopoly over violence, which they see as necessary to meet the 
exigencies of power politics, to preserve international order, and to satisfy the appeal 
of nationalism. The effect is, to some degree either surreptitiously or subconsciously, 
the acceptability by most states of genocide. The inaction of states to stop genocide 
within some of their peers indicates the importance to them of their sovereignty. 
Hence, the fear of states that intervention, even in countries committing the most 
offensive atrocities, is a precedent against the authority and sovereignty of the state 
in general. Under such circumstances, a reasonable argument can be made that 
states view genocide as one of the more extreme forms of their authority to take lives 
in the defense of the state and to use systematic and deliberate violations of human 
rights as an integral part of the governing process under the veil of realism. In this 
regard, the evidence is strong that states fear an international norm of humanitarian 
intervention as a threat to their authority to use violence in their behalf, even to an 
extent as extreme as genocide.33 
~his argument is presented by Irving Louis Horowitz in Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power 
(New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1989), xiii, 10-13; Horowitz defines genocide as the state 
sanctioned and legalized political assassination of large numbers of political opponents. Realism makes 
it convenient for leaders to accept what he describes as the criminal transformed into the political. The 
classical definition of genocide, which was coined during the Second World War, is less broad than the 
definition by Horowitz. It is the intentional destruction of all or part of " ... a national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group" by the state or another group. Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An 
Introduction to Public Intemational Law, 6th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 
354; for a discussion of the theory that states accept genocide as necessary to their development and 
to the maintenance of world order, see Barbara Hariff, Genocide and Human Rights: I11actio11 and 
Political Issues, Monograph Series in World Affairs, ed., Karen A. Feste, Vol. 20 (Denver: University 
of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1984), 7-8, 12-13, 65. Hariff argues, however, that 
life is of such value that it should not be a negotiable entity which can be traded for order and 
development of the state. The problem here is bridging the gap between her abstract argument and the 
reality of the world; also see Barbara Hariff, Ibid., 7; for an overview of the weak international and 
regional human rights regimes among states, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 205-28; Richard Falk, Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty (New York: Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981), 53, 154. 
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State-centric thinking that the state possesses the special abilities and holds 
the unique position to protect and represent its citizens' political interests and values 
in international politics clearly ignores the irresponsible behavior of the ruling 
factions of many states toward their citizens.34 The idea that the state is the main 
provider of justice to its citizens is a theory giving the state inherent moral value, but 
implicit in the actual behavior of states is that the majority of them are oppressive 
and many commit atrocities because both their leaders and citizens are conditioned 
to the realist view of international relations. At the same time, factions and elites 
in control of the government use the state's fiduciary responsibility to its citizens as 
a justification for pursuing their own interests. It follows then, as WOMP advocate 
Samuel Kim argues, that the political and economic exploitation of people results 
from state-centric assumptions about international relations. Separate moralities 
exist for states, subgroups, and individuals which are constantly in international and 
domestic conflict through socio-political grievances and the struggle for rights. 
Essentially, the cost of assuming that the state is the most realistic protector of its 
civilian population and the most moral, because it supposedly protects the greatest 
number of individuals from the violence and chaos of international disorder, is the 
high level of human suffering and oppression.35 
34Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), 53-5, 60; Gerard Elfstrom, "On Dilemmas oflntervention," Ethics 93 (July 
1983): 714-15; George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," 205-6. 
35Sarnuel Kim, Quest for a Just World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Wcstview Press, 1984), 242. 
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Walzer's Legalist Paradigm and State-Centric Violence 
The Right to Moral Autonomy 
In addition to the realist arguments in favor of the state, there is the rights 
based argument of Michael Walzer whose legalist paradigm holds that the rights of 
state sovereignty and political association are derived from the citizens' right, more 
in a collective than individual sense, to moral autonomy. These rights are best 
protected in a stable world order upheld by the states' structuring of the appropriate 
stability devices, despite some sacrificial events of injustice. Walzer's "legalist 
paradigm" presents the most widely discussed theoretical basis for the traditional 
post-World War II relationship between order and justice and the international 
community's prohibition of aggression. In so doing, he presents a strong theoretical 
argument in support of a state-centric nonintervention norm based on a preference 
for world order as the optimum assurance of international justice. Accordingly, the 
one essential exception to the nonintervention norm is the state's right to self-defense 
against aggression, but because the legalist paradigm accepts the necessity of the 
state to assure international order, it also accepts tradeoffs of individual justice and 
the use of violence to ·maintain realist stability devices. As a result, the legalist 
paradigm generally prohibits intervention and protects state sovereignty. Its purpose 
is to preserve international order and the citizens' right to moral autonomy. The 
objective is to balance order and justice at the optimum point of the least sacrifice 
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of human rights under the imperfect conditions of international politics by providing 
an accommodating definition of legitimate interventions.36 
The Theory of Aggression 
The primary exception to the legalist paradigm's strong intervention norm is 
Walzer's theory of aggression that the state has the right of self-defense against an 
assault on its territorial and political sovereignty. The prohibition of aggression is 
based on the right of the state to protect the communal and individual rights of its 
citizens. Walzer's legalist paradigm and theory of aggression present the moral basis 
for the protection of the "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of states by 
the United Nations Charter and its accompanying international legal precedents. 
Consistent with Walzer's ideas, aggression is outlawed by the United Nations 
Charter's prohibition on the use of force by states except for self-defense. The 
Charter's bias against intervention except in self-defense reflects the international 
community's view that state sovereignty and international order have priority human 
rights and individual justice. The state's right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter is 
described by Fernando Teson as a "quasi-absolute prohibition" on the use of force, 
which proscribes its use in support of human rights.37 
36According to Walzer, "Though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be 
challenged in the name of life and liberty by any other states. Hence the principle of non-intervention. 
[Other than aggression] Nothing ... warrants .. force in international society ... Domestic heresy and injustice 
are never actionable in the world of states: hence, again, the principle of non-intervention." Walzer, 
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), 58-9, 61, 62, 89. 
37RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order, 331; Fernando Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), pp. 
24-5. 
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The Morality of States 
The legalist paradigm balances order and justice by presenting philosophical 
arguments for a proposed threshold of intervention claimed to maximize both, but 
in doing so, it of necessity presents a state-centric position. Like realists, Walzer 
assumes that the state is currently the best instrument to achieve the goals of world 
order, security, self-determination, and the wishes of its citizens. The state is 
assumed to provide the best environment within which the struggle for liberty and 
self-determination can take place and to be the only instrument of international 
politics powerful enough to pursue effectively the goals of its political community. 
These assumptions provide a tilt toward the state and against international justice 
known as the "morality of states." According to Charles Beitz, the morality of states 
is the product of the "modern natural law tradition" that accepts " ... moral judgment 
[as] appropriate in the global state of nature, but that the standards to which moral 
judgment should appeal are relatively weak ... [in particular, that justice holds an 
inferior position to international order]." Because the power and expertise to make 
foreign policy is seen as natura1ly gravitating to the state, the individual has limited 
empowerment in the conduct of foreign affairs. States, acutely aware of the lesser 
role of the individual in international politics, regard each other as the primary 
sources of power in their relations.38 
38Charles Beitz, Political 171e01y, p. 181; Michael Walzer, Just and U11just Wars, 59; Michael Walzer, 
Just and Unjust Wars 61, 89; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four 
Critics," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980): 210; Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of 
Morality in International relations," Philosophy a11d Public Affairs 8 (Fall 1978): 9; R.D. McKinlay 
and R. Little, Global Problems, 71. Walzer's ideas on intervention arc supposedly different from those 
of realists because he views the nonintervention norm as a principle of justice ultimately protecting the 
rights of individuals while realists view intervention in terms of the national interest and the uses of 
power. See Leo McCarthy, "International Anarchy, Realism and Non-Intervention," in Ian Forbes and 
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The Conflict Between the Goals of 
the State and Ending Structural Violence 
That the moral reasoning of the legalist paradigm is dependent upon the 
sanctity of the state makes Walzer look like a closet realist. The state's special 
abilities and unique position in international politics is a fiduciary position of moral 
and legal responsibility to its citizens. The state, therefore, has the right of 
sovereignty, to protect the rights of its citizens to their autonomous, culturally distinct 
political communities. In addition, the existence of the citizens' right to a state 
reflecting their political, cultural and economic interests requires universal respect 
for interstate justice. This "formal sovereign equality between[ sic] all states," called 
the equality of states, is deemed necessary to protect interstate justice, although 
Walzer's critics see its purpose as more to validate statim.39 
Mark Hoffman (editors) Political Theo!)~ Intemational Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 82. Concerning the idea of the state as the best representative 
of its culturally distinct political community, Gerald Elfstrom argues that states traditionally treat each 
other as individual entities and that the international community views the relationship between the state 
and its citizens like a guardian relationship between parent and child. The position of Elfstrom that the 
elements of this relationship include a "genetic bond" between citizen and state appear to equate with 
Walzer's ideas of the culturally and politically cohesive community, of the natural dependence of the 
citizen on the state, and of the citizen's inability to pursue his international interests as effectively as the 
state. Elfstrom claims that this paternal idea of the state is in accord with the international community's 
assumptions that the rights of the state are derived from either the actual or passive consent of its 
citizens and that the state is in the best position to pursue the interests of its citizens. Only the state 
possesses the power, the unity, and the machinery to pursue its citizens' interests in international 
relations. This representative superiority of the state is in part due to the failure of its citizens to 
recognize that some of their most important international interests are of greater than indirect concern 
to them. The state also is in a superior position to play the role of final arbiter on issues of foreign 
policy which greatly divide its citizenry. Gerald Elfstrom, "On Dilemmas of Intervention," Ethics 93 
(July 1983): 714-16. 
39Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 75, 134: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5; RJ. Vincent, 
Nonintervention and International Order, 41-4, 345-46; Gerard Elfstrom, "Dilemmas," 713; Caroline 
Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (editors) 
Political Titeory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
Inc., 1993), 91; Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5, 60; Gerard Elfstrom, "Dilemmas," 714-15; 
George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985): 205-6; Walzer's 
original idea of the legalist paradigm implies that interstate justice, i.e., the fair treatment that states owe 
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It is because realism and the legalist paradigm emphasize interstate justice and 
view the pursuit of individual justice as deleterious to international order that no 
strategy and set of institutions capable of ending structural violence can be devised. 
Humanitarian intervention essentially is limited by the paradox of international 
morality that cultural relativism cannot be resolved by international politics. 
Humanity can generally make the rightful condemnation of genocide, but it cannot 
convince large numbers of its species not to take such depraved action in conflicts 
perceived as matters of collective grievance and survival. 
George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985): 205-6; Walzer's 
original idea of the legalist paradigm implies that interstate justice, i.e., the fair treatment that states owe 
each other, is derived from human justice, i.e., from the rights of the individual, because the state's right 
of sovereignty is derived from the individual right to moral autonomy, but later his derivative basis of 
state sovereignty, as a result of coming under attack for logical inconsistencies, evolves toward a 
collective right of moral autonomy. Walzer's writings subsequent to Just and Unjust Wars abandon the 
individual's right of moral autonomy as the basis of the state's right to sovereignty and simply makes 
it a collective right of people to form their own political community in preservation of a common way 
of life; Michael Walzer, ''The Moral Standing of States," 212, 225; Sec Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars, 98-9; For a short, concise discussion of the equality of states, see Gerhard von Glahn, Law 
Among Nations, 127-9. 
Chapter IV 
Humanitarian Intervention and the People's 
Right To Their Own State 
A significant part of the tension between order and justice which influences 
the intervention threshold of states, both individually and communally, involves the 
nature of the relationship between the state and its people. Most states claim to 
represent the will of their people and to be democratic in some fashion. Many claim 
representative status, with the apparent approval of their civilian populations, without 
democracy, but, in any event, the official acceptance by states of republican principles 
seems to be nearly universal. Hence, those debating humanitarian intervention 
generally assume that a state's legitimacy is most accurately determined by its high 
degree of responsiveness, though not necessarily in democratic terms, to the socio-
political aspirations of its people. In this regard, intervention is generally considered 
legitimate when directed against a state whose government no longer represents the 
desires and aspirations of its people. Questions then arise, however, as to who are 
the people, what are their desires and aspirations, and what are the rights of 
dissenters against the majority? In most cases of internal conflicts over justice 
grievances, these questions cannot be answered adequately enough to justify 
humanitarian intervention. 
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Walzer's Representative Fit and 
the Debate Over State Legitimacy 
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Even describing the relationship between a state and its people is problematic. 
Michael Walzer thinks that the legitimacy of the state in a world of diverse, non-
democratic political communities is too complex to explain other than in terms of a 
metaphor for consent, which he calls "representative fit" between a state and its civil 
population. Accordingly, he defines representative fit as the " ... degree to which the 
government represents the political life of its people" who claim through their state 
a right of sovereignty against all other states and " ... govern in accordance with their 
own traditions."1 Walzer's definition, however, presents a "black box" model which 
never makes clear just what type of political community is legitimately derived from 
either individual or communal rights, but neither do his critics. This impasse is not 
surprising since it involves the traditional conundrum of whether self-determination 
equates with democracy and human rights or other forms of national and civic self-
fulfillment for political communities. 
Walzer's legalist paradigm, on the one hand, is based on the culturally distinct 
political community's rights of self-determination and moral autonomy which do not 
necessarily include democracy. Walzer's critics, on the other hand, contend that a 
state cannot be legitimate without protecting the political and economic rights of its 
citizens. Walzer's assumption that the state's right of sovereignty is derived from 
1Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," A Response to Four Critics," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980): 212; also see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Af8Ument 
with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 54. 
61 
either the individual's or the citizens' rights of self-determination and moral 
autonomy is challenged on the basis that most state leaders, in fact, fail to protect 
their citizens' human rights. Instead, they value sovereignty's rights based rationale 
in international relations to hold power against other states but devalue it at home 
to hold power against their citizens. Thus, states ignore their domestic 
responsibilities towards human rights which accompany sovereignty. As a result, 
critics charge that the individual right of moral autonomy is a contrivance to protect 
the state for realist more than moral reasons. Charles Beitz argues that many states 
currently deny their citizens the rights of association that rational citizens free to do 
so would demand, which he claims is proof of the Jack internationally of the 
individual's rights of moral autonomy and self-determination.2 
The Culturally Distinct Political Community 
The culturally distinct political community, according to Walzer, is the social 
bond citizens form over several generations because of their peculiar historical and 
cultural conditions which becomes a "common life" for them and their government. 
Past, present and future generations are connected by the social, economic and 
cultural history of their political process. The reification of the people's historical 
political process is their contemporary political community. As. a result, the right to 
2Charles Beitiz, the idealist who advocates reform intervention interprets Walzer to say that " ... war 
cannot be justified as a means to destroy, conquer or reform a regime ... " but only to restore it to the 
status quo ante; Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics." 
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 412, 414; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and 
International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 80-1, 82; Gerald Doppelt, 
"Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (Fall 1978): 
8. 
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sovereignty is based on the right to self-determination which does not necessarily 
include democracy.3 
Walzer's critics, however, see his idea of representative fit as legitimizing 
oppressive states. For instance, Beitz argues that people in the real world are not 
bound to their states by choice. Rather, the organization of the state's "common life" 
and the citizens' participation in the national defense are often involuntary, and 
Walzer's horizontal contract of a people bonding into a political community over 
time is in contrast to reality.4 Indeed, Beitz has a strong argument in that the 
history of a state's origin and growth is a complicated process. Often, the 
development of a state involves much greater oppression than the building of 
communal integrity. Instead of people developing a common bond, states often 
develop through conquest and inadvertent political events that throw people 
together.5 
The Horizontal Contract 
Walzer and his critics have different conclusions about what is representative 
fit based on their differing views of the nature of the consent of the people. Walzer's 
idea of state legitimacy is based on a horizontal social contract among the people 
which emphasizes a set of values not always consistent with democracy. Hence, 
Walzer marks the boundary between sovereignty and intervention such that citizens 
3Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 224-
5; Also see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 94, where he states that " .. .it is not our purpose in 
international society .. .to establish liberal or democratic communities, but only independent ones." 
4Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 413. 
5 Any doubt on this point can be resolved by reading any reliable history on Russia, India, and Africa. 
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have a right to possess a loyalty to an "inherited culture" of values inconsistent with 
Western democracy.6 Walzer's critics respond by charging that he is confusing the 
horizontal contract among the people of a state with the vertical contract between 
a state's citizens and their government. The horizontal contract is a multi-
generational process in which the people are voluntarily brought together into a 
political community. The vertical contract is a process of consent by the people to 
their rulers' authority. Walzer confuses the mutual consent of the people among 
themselves to form a political community with their consent to be governed, which 
ignores the possibility that the people who formed their political community may, 
nevertheless, be oppressed by their state. By Walzer's reasoning, the state derives 
its right of sovereignty from the very people it oppresses. Walzer's theory is accused 
of accepting the mere existence of a sovereign state as proof of a vertical contract 
while denying the proof of a state's abusive behavior against its citizens as proof of 
its absence. A broken vertical contract, say his critics, makes the state illegitimate. 
Hence, Charles Beitz and others mark the boundary between sovereignty and 
intervention, including the legitimate use of force, such that the status quo of 
oppressive states can be rightfully changed by reform and human rights intervention.7 
6Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 211-12, 214; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars, 54; The social contract is termed a "procedure of collective choice," which has become one 
political theory legitimizing the idea of social justice. The theory is that the people in creating their state 
agree to the political and social values to be transferred to their institutions and political process. These 
values thereafter remain the foundation of the state's legitimacy. David R. Mapel, "The Contractian 
Tradition and International Ethics," in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Editors) Traditions of 
Intemational Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 181. According to David Luban, 
under social contract theory, a horizontal contract voluntarily binds the people into a community prior 
to the state, and a vertical contract gives the consent of the people to a government over them. Luban, 
David. "Just War and Human Rights." Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 167. 
7David Luban, "Just and Unjust Wars," 167, 169-70. 
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Walzer's Indicators of Representative Fit 
Much of the debate between Walzer and his critics involves his three 
indicators of representative fit presented as proof of its existence. They are, first, a 
citizenry's mental preparedness to defend its state, i.e., its desire to resist invasion; 
secondly, the state's very ability to remain stable and to control its own citizens, i.e., 
its ability to survive; and, thirdly, the state's maintenance of enough political 
consensus such that there is an absence of rebellion, civil war, and atrocities. 
Essentially, Walzer argues that a legitimate state is managing a stable society, 
satisfying coexisting groups of citizens, and reflecting its citizens political desires and 
aspirations, not-withstanding any lack of democracy and human rights.8 
Those prepared to defend their state, Walzer believes, by standing in readiness 
to protect their consensual relationship with their government and their common way 
of life, are exercising their right of moral autonomy. They see their government as 
the protector of their rights. They are prepared to risk their lives because they value 
the right to their own culturally distinctive political community within the context of 
their state. In fact, the readiness of citizens to risk their lives to keep what they 
rightfully possess and value is implicitly recognized as an indicator of representative 
8Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 212, 213, 215, 216-218; Also see Gerald Doppelt, 
"Statism Without Foundations, "Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (Summer 1980): 399; Lawrence 
Mayer writes that " Legitimacy does not refer to dissatisfaction to specific performance ... Rather, it 
connotes a feeling of being part of and perceiving that one has a stake in the well-being of the system 
itself, irrespective of one's satisfaction or lack thereof with specific output or performance. The idea 
is that legitimacy enables a system to withstand the inevitable performance failures and citizen 
dissatisfactions faced sooner or later by all systems without losing the level of support necessary for the 
maintenance of public order." Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Ver.ms 
Perfomiance, Sage Library of Social research, Vol. 173 (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 
1989), 135. While Mayer is writing about democracy in "demand overload" from its citizens, his 
definition of legitimacy appears relevant to issues of survival within non-democratic states. 
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fit by the international community when it legally confirms the state's right of self-
defense against aggression.9 
In addition, for states to respect equally each others rights, they must presume 
that citizens are prepared for whatever reason to defend their state whether or not 
this is actually true. Of course, citizens may not desire to defend their state, but 
outsiders cannot make this judgment for them and act on it without demeaning the 
right of moral autonomy of the target state's citizens. Citizens may choose to defend 
their state's oppressive government for a varied and complex number of reasons, but 
only the citizens of that state have the right to determine the legitimacy of their 
representative fit. It is this "expectation of resistance" from the right to defend that 
Walzer claims makes aggression immoral and illegal. 10 
Walzer is challenged here, however, on the basis that the citizens' 
preparedness to defend their state should not be assumed to reflect their desire to 
protect their right of moral autonomy. That the preparedness to defend implies 
choice is often in conflict with reality. Instead, the real test is the deeper question 
of whether or not citizens are free to choose to defend their state, i.e., the citizens 
actual motivation for resistance. Participation in war by oppressed citizens is argued 
to be so common as to make it a meaningless test of moral autonomy. Further, for 
there to be real choice, there must be some form of democratic process within the 
9Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 54-5; "The Moral Standing of States," 212-13. Charles Beitz, 
"Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," Plti!osoplty and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 388. 
1°Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 212-3. 
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citizens' state. Citizens of authoritarian states cannot defend individual and 
communal rights which are denied them in the first place.11 
Even if the preparedness to defend has the element of choice, however, the 
citizens actual decision to defend may be related to matters other than consent. 
They may be protecting their families, local communities, homes, property, 
independence, and economic well-being. Citizens may reject their own government's 
legitimacy but clearly see that defending their state is necessary to their physical and 
cultural survival. Often, oppressed citizens may have to choose the lesser of two 
evils.12 
The Soviet resistance to German aggression during the Second World War 
shows the complexity of consent. The Soviet people were caught between two 
oppressors raising doubts about the legitimacy of Stalin's government, although large 
numbers of citizens eventually rallied to its defense. Both nationalism and Hitler's 
cruelty probably rallied the Soviet people, but the facts make the determination of 
motivation difficult. The Soviet people reacted to the German invasion by what can 
be termed political schizophrenia. The large number of Soviet prisoners taken, 
especially at the beginning, was, in part, the result of a lack of will to defend a 
harshly dictatorial government. Soviet citizens in many areas, .including some Great 
Russian populations, welcomed the German invaders until the full force of their 
11Charles Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," 388-89; also see Michael Walzer, 'The 
Moral Standing of States," 223, n.26; Gerald Doppelt, "Statism Without Foundations," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (Fall 1980): 400. Gerald Doppelt, Walzcr's Theory of Morality in International 
Relations," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (Fall 1978): 8; David Luban, "Just Wars and Human 
Rights," 179-80. 
12Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," 14-15, 17-18; see also 
David Luban, "Just Wars and Human Rights," 172. 
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cruelty was felt. And the Russian Liberation Army, aided by the Germans to fight 
the Soviets, did not find a shortage of recruits and could have been of more use to 
the Germans if they had provided earlier support. Some Russian guerrillas fought 
both the Nazis and the Soviets, but Nazi atrocities eventually mobilized most of the 
Soviet people around Stalin. In fact the heroic resistance, great suffering and 
disloyalty in the same citizenry led one historian to write that "Seldom did a country 
and a regime do both so poorly and so well in the same conflict."13 
Walzer's other two indicators are also criticized on the basis that a stable 
society whose citizens are under state control is as likely to be the result of the state's 
ability to master its population through intimidation than through representation and 
that the lack of rebellion within a state is just as likely to reflect the citizens' lack of 
power to change their political system as their satisfaction with the status quo. Many 
states today rule by power and intimidation rather than by consent and loyalty. 
Certainly, actual consent and participatory democracy exist only in a small number 
of states. In the Third World, many states are governed by indigenous elites who 
represent industrial interests instead of their citizens and who are propped up by 
foreign capital, technology and weapons.14 
13Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
524-6; Richard Wasserstrom, "Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument," 542, 544. 
14Richard Wasserstrom, Review of Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
I/lustratio11s, by Michael Walzer, in Harvard Law Review 92 (December 1978); 542, 544; Gerald 
Doppelt, Walzer's Theory of Morality," 16, 20-1, 22-3; Gerald Doppelt, "Statism Without Foundation," 
399; Charles Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," 385-6. 
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The Value of Diversity 
Walzer's representative fit is also founded upon the value of diversity. 
Walzer, in effect, believes that to direct those of an alien political culture toward any 
universal political truth is often another form of authoritarianism.15 Intervention 
is an assault upon the right of moral autonomy, according to Walzer, because the 
contrast in cultures is sharp enough to prohibit serious transcultural understanding. 
Outsiders, therefore, have neither the right nor the intellectual understanding to 
judge the peculiar "loyalties and resentments" of another state's culture and political 
process. The scholarly and popular literature of politics, which is replete with 
examples of the gulf of understanding between cultures, provides much support for 
this argument. According to Edward Said, outsiders often have simplistic views of 
other cultures.16 The American media and academia, he writes, paint a false 
impression of the Middle East, especially concerning the divisions of fundamentalism, 
modernism and the authoritarian state. He notes that most of the Moslem world is 
a secular and multi-layered culture of worldliness, ordinary life and adaptation to 
Western technology. He also describes the Egyptian government as oppressive, 
corrupt and overburdened economically and, consequently, very unpopular. 
However, the Islamic terrorists who kill indiscriminately are more unpopular than the 
government and are finding little support among the Egyptian people. In addition, 
15Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 89; Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States," 211, 
217-19; It must be pointed out, however, that his denial that representative fit exist in those states 
committing " ... massacre or enslavement of its own citizens ... and the expulsion of very large numbers of 
people" implies that he sees genocide and genocide-like acts as universally abhorrent to states, at least 
officially if not in practice. 
16David Luban, "The Romance of the State," Philosophy and Public Alf airs 9 (Summer 1980): 395; 
Edward Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," New York Times Magazine, 21. 
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Said charges that the U.S. interpretation of Egyptian political conflict is ruled by a 
sense of self-interest which results in aid to the corrupt ruling elite who in response 
make an ostensible show of democracy. 
The Western fear that Islam is a monolithic contender for power misses the 
crucial point, claims Said, that societies, including the U.S., involve a competition of 
ideas on the meaning of national identity. In the contemporary climate of the Arab 
world, the contention of ideas and factions represents a form of self-determination, 
which is the process of the people coming to terms with what they are, though 
certainly not in the Western democratic sense. Therefore, in the Middle East as 
elsewhere, there is a gray area in politics concerning representative fit between the 
extremes of unconscionably harsh dictatorial rule and liberty in which people learn 
to balance the imperfections of their government with their loyalties to their culture. 
The idea that oppressive states have some form of legitimacy is indicated by the 
common observation that a dictatorial or totalitarian state's government fell because 
it lost the support of its people. For example Pearson, in analyzing the reasons for 
the Soviet Union's demise, alluded to the eventual " ... universal belief in the moral 
bankruptcy of the supranational state authority" in the Soviet Union because of 
official corruption and incompetence which gave the moral . high ground to the 
liberals and the nationalities.17 
Strong advocates of diversity see representative fit as a morally necessary 
presumption to prevent uninformed, moralistic interventions against the sovereignty 
17Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power: The Pursuit of the Nation State in East 
Central Europe," Joumal of Intemational Affairs 45 (Winter 1992): 509. 
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of the state and to protect the right of the people to make judgment on when and 
if to rebel for their own practical and moral reasons.18 Otherwise, outsiders would 
presumptuously think they know enough about the "loyalties and resentments" of 
other socio-political communities to judge the righteousness of their values and 
politics and to think themselves capable of effectively intervening in their complex, 
political processes. 
Walzer's gulf of understanding between cultures, however, is taken by his 
critics to mean that only those having a deep and enduring experience with another 
culture can provide the knowledge needed for determining which states are 
legitimate. The implication is that, for outsiders, perhaps only a T.E. Lawrence can 
truly understand other cultures, but Walzer's critics argue that there are many 
traditional ways of studying other cultures, such as scholarly research, intelligence 
gathering, and travel, which are adequate for judging the moral legitimacy of other 
states.19 
Democracy and Representative Fit 
The crux of this debate, however, is the disagreement between Walzer and his 
critics concerning whether self-determination and representative fit equate with 
political freedom or include non-democratic political arrangements. The existence 
of an "unfree" state in and of itself, Walzer argues, is not a reason to deny the 
existence of representative fit. The initiative of citizens to change their political 
system rightfully remains with them and not foreigners. While Walzer's critics claim 
18Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 212. 
19Michael Walzer, Ibid. David Luban, "The Romance of the Nation-State," 394-5. 
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his argument to be one of might makes right, Walzer contends that there are a 
number of legitimate reasons for not rebelling against an oppressive state, including 
too high a cost in lives and domestic order, special social and political loyalties by 
the majority to the state, and the biding of time by citizens for the right moment to 
rebel. Other ideas such as ethnic nationalism may be valued by citizens over 
democracy and human rights.20 In accord with Walzer, and despite the suffering of 
the Arab people, Said implies, that most Arabs would reject intervention for social 
justice. Arab nationalism is a powerful force, and Islam, including for non-Muslims, 
is at the center of Arab identity. Instead of a desire for rebellion, there is an Islamic 
way of life, i.e., another reality of life if you will, of tradition and conformity which 
acts for the people as a retreat from oppression and economic deprivation. 
Essentially, religious observance acts as an alternative life to the reality of oppression 
and as a realistic alternative to the costly struggle for the alien concept of democracy. 
Interstate and Individual Justice 
Walzer's critics see his representative fit as displacing individual justice with 
interstate justice and as valuing the nonintervention norm and the right of self-
determination "above all else," including freedom. Therefore, Walzer's conception 
of consent is criticized as unrealistic and thus as a false foundation of state 
sovereignty. His alleged preference for self-determination over democracy is seen 
as giving the state the twin rights to abuse its citizens and to be left alone. In 
addition, if, contrary to Walzer's position, representative fit cannot exist in 
20Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 89; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 214. 
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combination with oppression, Walzer's theory of aggression fails to differentiate 
external from internal aggression. His critics argue that there is no moral difference 
between assisting those being abused by their own state, which they term internal 
aggression, and those being abused by another state, which is the traditional 
definition of external aggression. Both types of defenders are forced by the aggressor 
to defend their individual and communal rights. If, as Walzer's critics argue, his 
theory of representative fit confuses the horizontal contract with the vertical contract, 
then his theory of aggression only deals with half the problem. Not only is there 
external aggression justifying a state's self-defense and the aid of others against the 
aggressor but also internal aggression against a state's oppressed groups deserving of 
humanitarian intervention when the citizens' vertical contract is broken by human 
rights violations.21 
Minority Rights 
One of the most serious weaknesses of Walzer's representative fit is his failure 
to appreciate minority rights. In Walzer's words, " .. .individuals are sometimes 
sacrificed ... " to protect the independence of political communities. The problem of 
minority rights is an egregious divergence of values between Western and non-
Western values, for democracy and human rights cannot exist without rights both for 
minorities and the powerless, and even actual consent by the majority, according to 
Western values, confers no legitimacy upon the state unjust to its minorities. In 
21Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 10; Richard Wasserstrom, Review of Just and 
Unjust Wars, 540; Internal aggression, writes Doppelt, is the government's oppressive assault on its own 
citizens in contrast to the traditional definition of external aggression which involves one state assaulting 
another. Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 8; Also see David Luban, "Just War and 
Human Rights." Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 167, 169-70. 
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addition, state's often commit gross, human rights violations against minorities in 
accord with the popular will of their civilian populations. Most glaring were the 
policies of Nazi Germany, more specifically the Holocaust, which were representative 
of its citizens' anti-Semitism and repressed nationalism. In other cases, a state's 
minority, ruling subgroup may be legitimate among its members while committing 
atrocities and other human rights violations against a powerless majority, as in the 
South Africa case of apartheid. According to Walzer's critics, state sovereignty 
cannot be based on either individual or communal rights which the state is 
suppressing. 22 
The Right of Moral Autonomy and Actual Freedom 
The overall failure of representative fit is seen by Beitz as mistakenly equating 
a state's mere autonomy from foreign interference with the rights of its citizens to 
articulate their interests and to approve their government. Walzer's metaphor of a 
contract for consent, he argues, fails to dispel the obscure description of the 
" ... process of association and mutuality ... [which the state protects] ... against external 
encroachment." The problem is that few civil populations are free to form or to 
terminate their states. · Walzer's test of legitimacy, Beitz argues, is suspect because 
of the state's coercive nature. Legitimizing the state by such an abstract test as 
representative fit is really an attempt to transform the reality of state coercion into 
the sham of voluntary association. The authoritarian state suppresses actual consent 
22Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 54; Charles Beitz, Political 17zeory, 78; Charles Beitz, 
"Bounded Morality," 414; Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 8; David R. Mapel, ''The 
Contractarian Tradition and International Ethics," 192; Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, 
"Nonintervention and Human Rights," Joumal of Politics (February 1986): 89-90. 
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but is excused by the artifice of tacit consent. Consent, argues Beitz, to be valid must 
come from people really free to give it.23 
The Doctrine of Self-Help 
Also part of Walzer's idea of representative fit is his adoption of John Stuart 
Mill's doctrine of self-help that citizens are wholly responsible for their political 
destiny. Self-determination is a corollary to the citizens' right of moral autonomy and 
consent. According to Walzer, respecting the right of others to determine their own 
political system is a way of treating them as equals and of honoring their reasons, 
whatever they are, for how they relate to their state. As Walzer states, 
" .. .intervention is not justified whenever revolution is." Representative fit then is 
mostly an internal affair. This citizens' right to moral autonomy leaves people with 
the responsibility to earn their own preferred, political arrangement, which Walzer 
terms "freedom," although he actually is referring to self-determination that may not 
include political freedom. That is to say, Walzer interprets Mill to mean that people 
essentially get the government that they deserve. Mill and Walzer view self-
determination as the right and the necessity of a political community to earn its 
freedom.24 
But self-determination is more than the group's final, political arrangement 
of national self-fulfillment but is also an open-ended and historical political process 
23Charles Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," 387; Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 
413, 415; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and I11tematio11al Relations, 77-9. 
24Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 214; John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on 
Nonintervention," in Richard Falk (ed.) The Vietnam War and Intemational Law (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1968-76), 36. 
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whose structure, stability and degree of freedom are endogenous in nature. As 
already mentioned, a people reject or endure their government for their own reasons. 
A dictatorial government may be popular or unpopular and also tolerated, but 
achieving a free government takes a special commitment during the process of 
striving, usually over a long period of time, and keeping it takes special qualities. 
Therefore, freedom, like virtue, according to Mill, must be cultivated from within. 
The test of a political community's commitment to freedom is its ability to throw off 
its oppressors, and the likelihood of its having enduring, popular, and hopefully 
democratic, institutions is based on its commitment to freedom. 25 
The self-help doctrine's implication for intervention, according to Walzer, is 
that those ready to undertake the arduous task of earning their freedom should not 
be impeded by outsiders. Accordingly, outsiders must not alter the state's balances 
of forces. As to those not willing and able to earn their freedom, they cannot be 
helped by intervention because outsiders cannot replace the commitment needed to 
earn and sustain their freedom, and although not every self-determined state is free 
in terms of democracy, self-help is the only arena within which to reach that point.26 
Walzer's critics, however, see his adaptation of Mill's self-help doctrine as 
logic carried too far. Mill's assumption that the balance of domestic forces when left 
alone results in an autonomous representative fit between a government and its 
people is questioned when applied to contemporary international politics. It is 
25John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Nonintervention," 36; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 87-8; 
Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 214, 220, 221-2; Charles Beitz, "Bounded 
Morality,"414, 415. 
26Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 87-9. 
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admitted that Mill is correct in the sense that members of a popular rebellion must 
develop the "political capacities" for the establishment of popular, stable, and 
hopefully democratic institutions after achieving freedom, but it is not true that 
intervention is a natural inhibitor of the will to self-determination and democracy. 
For instance, those who would otherwise win their freedom on a level playing field 
but who are oppressed by governments of powerful minorities and elites assisted or 
propped up by foreign states are rightfully due outside assistance. Yes, Mill and 
Walzer allow for intervention to counter such assistance, but intervention is so 
prevalent and circuitous in international politics that legitimate counterintervention 
loses its meaning, but even without outside help to the oppressor, Walzer's critics 
charge that the culmination of domestic, political struggle, which is based more often 
on the skillful and advantaged use of force rather than the strength of the people's 
will, makes indigenous freedom fighters deserving of outside help.27 
To Beitz, self-help is not the protector of those fighting for freedom, but 
rather of those fighting against social justice. Beitz takes the view that self-help lacks 
relevance to those state populations today suffering life threatening poverty and 
27Walzer's two additional exceptions to the nonintervention norm, which he calls his revised legalist 
paradigm, are, first, intervention on behalf of a secessionist movement which through struggle bas 
formed its own internal representative fit in place of the one it bad with the old regime and developed 
a viable set of governmental institutions, and, second, counterintervention to restore the internal balance 
of forces disrupted within a conflicted state by another's intervention. Walzer, like Mill, also favors 
counterintervention as an exception to restore the target state's disrupted balance of forces to their pre-
intervention position. Maintaining the domestic balance of forces in a civil war, however, is essentially 
an extension of Walzer's moral theory of aggression and a reflection of Mill's assumption that such 
conflicts form the only arena for the struggle for democracy. However, counter-intervention's general 
acceptance and abuse makes it mostly irrelevant to the issue of humanitarian intervention. The 
secessionist standard, as will be seen later in reference to the struggle between secession and the 
preservation of states of the Third World and the former Soviet Bloc, is obviously highly susceptible to 
moralism. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 90; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of 
States," 216-17; Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 11-13. 
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systematic racial discrimination. Unfortunately under the self-help doctrine, those 
so disadvantaged that democracy is incomprehensible would, nevertheless, be 
required to earn their freedom. The contemporary application of Mill's doctrine is 
also seen as a blame the victim mentality. Here, Walzer's critics have a strong 
argument against the self-help doctrine's circular reasoning, which holds that those 
who fail to earn their freedom do so because they do not have the desire or will to 
throw off their oppressors, contrary to those who are successful. Also, the question 
arises as to why those who make repeated, valiant but unsuccessful attempts at 
freedom must continue to suffer oppression without intervention? The self-help 
doctrine's harshness, say its critics, means that even those severely disadvantaged by 
oppression must look to their own efforts.28 Certainly, the doctrine of self-help has 
discomforting implications, which support the idea of injustice as a by-product of 
world order. 
Representative Fit and the Intervention Threshold 
The nature of representative fit is important to the issue of humanitarian 
intervention because the assumptions of the two applicable political philosophies 
suggest different intervention thresholds or standards for infringement of the 
nonintervention norm. If representative fit is indeed a matter of the collective 
consent of culturally distinct political communities, regardless of the degree, other 
than genocide, to which they are oppressive, then states abusive of their citizens' 
28Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 415; Charles Beitz, Political 171eory, 82, 86. David Luban, 
"Just Wars and Human Rights," 179-80; Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 10; Richard 
Wasserstrom, Review of Just and Unjust Wars, 540. 
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human rights are protected by the nonintervention norm. But if representative fit is 
valid only in Western style democracies, then most states, and especially those of 
non-Western cultures, are subject to legitimate intervention. 
Walzer's Unconscionable Acts Standard Versus 
the Ordinary Oppression Standard 
According to the legalist paradigm, in a world of little moral and political 
clarity, intervention in the complex problems of other states even to enforce human 
rights and social justice, other than when representative fit is clearly broken by 
genocide, is immoral because it undermines the struggle for self-determination and 
freedom. Thus, the intervention threshold is set high. For Walzer, without a clearer 
understanding of the reality of representative fit by humanity, intervention is 
susceptible to arbitrary use, which threatens state sovereignty and, consequently, 
international order. This situation can be avoided only by the presumption that there 
is a legitimate representative fit between a state and its citizens justifying most acts 
of the state, even those generally considered oppressive, as consistent with the 
traditions of its people until the fit is radically broken by the state's massacre or 
expulsion en masse of its people. Hence, Walzer's intervention threshold is an 
unconscionable acts standard, i.e., one that, in his own words, "shocks the conscience," 
allowing intervention against genocide and genocide-like acts, such as ethic cleansing. 
Here, Walzer believes himself more attune than his critics to political reality since 
he sees his standard as both pragmatic and moral, for he argues that an international 
moral consensus for humanitarian intervention against unconscionable acts is easier 
to obtain than one against ordinary oppression. His message to Americans today is 
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that the complexity of representative fit requires them not to be so judgmental and 
not to view it unrealistically in terms of democracy but instead to concentrate on its 
violation by mass slaughter and expulsions.29 
Walzer's critics, on the other hand, accuse him of setting the intervention 
threshold too high, allowing self-determination and diversity to outrank liberty. They 
also reject the idea that a broad nonintervention norm allowing some oppression and 
atrocities is necessary to minimize disorder, especially when based on the rationale 
that doing so maximizes the achievement of individual justice in an imperfect world. 
Instead, they argue that reform and human rights intervention can be used to change 
the status quo of oppressive states. This argument is strengthened by the world's 
traditionally weak response to genocide.30 
Reform Intervention 
With genocide still taking place, it is no surprise that, shortly after the Cold 
War, the idea of reform intervention or nation-building, including the use of force 
if need be, came into vogue among a number of foreign policy intellectuals. 
According to these new interventionists, because of internal conflict, refugee flows, 
natural disasters, environmental degradation, and other causes of political instability 
and anarchy, which cross borders and are inclined to expand, the many emerging 
failed and failing states, once propped up by the superpowers but now unable to take 
care of themselves, are becoming a threat to international order and the West. The 
29Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 212, 214-18; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars, 90. 
30Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality," 10; Charles Beitz, "Nonintervention and 
Communal Integrity," '387. 
80 
result is that traditional approaches and conventional remedies such as bilateral and 
international aid no longer work. Instead, there is a need for the West and the U.N. 
to go further, such as voluntary conservatorship of failed or failing states, or in the 
case of major human rights violations, genocide, and impending regional conflict, 
forced conservatorship. In addition, there is the need to globalize democracy since 
democratic states are believed to stay at peace with one another.31 
Reform intervention has important implications concerning the validity of the 
legalist paradigm. Representative fit equates with democracy and human rights and 
is hindered by the oppression of people worthy of freedom. The political philosophy 
of reform intervention directly contradicts the self-help doctrine by assuming that the 
civilian populations of states, despite their intense desire to be free, are too burdened 
and intimidated to earn their freedom. Clearly, reform intervention is a political 
vision of cosmopolitan morality which equates individual justice with international 
order as well as the individual national interests of the world's states. 
The fundamental political philosophy of reform intervention, even as it is 
suggested today, is presented by the earlier writings of Charles Beitz. He bases 
reform intervention on the core value of cosmopolitan morality that all humanity is 
31Nation-building is intrusive intervention requiring defeat of the status quo government to rebuild 
a state's political process and institutions. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Miitary 
Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1994), 61, 134; See generally Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign 
Policy No. 89 (Winter 1992-93): 3-20; Barbara Harff, "Bosnia and Somalia: Strategic, Legal, and Moral 
Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention," Philosophy and Public Policy 12 (Summer /Fall 1992): 6; 
Larry Diamond, "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order," Current History 93 
(January 1994): 2, 6; also see Stephen John Stedman's criticism of reform intervention; Stephen John 
Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72 (America and the World 1992/93): 1-2. 
81 
of equal worth and dignity.32 Beitz turns realist assumptions about human nature 
on their head to present an ideology of social justice in international politics. He 
rejects Walzer's representative fit as statist and argues that the state's right to moral 
autonomy is secondary to individual justice. Faith in interstate justice based on the 
state's duty to its own citizens and the idea that the welfare of the people equates 
with the welfare of the state Beitz sees as misplaced. Instead, justice is a duty that 
all people owe each other. Thus, the purpose of reform intervention is to achieve 
social justice.33 The assumption is that international politics can be transformed by 
incremental changes in humanity's social consciousness and conscience from a 
preference for power to one for socially just political and economic structures. 
32According to Mary Maxwell, Beitz " ... holds that the social contract approach to distributive justice, 
as now practiced in domestic societies, should be extended globally, since the actual economic 
interchanges of the contemporary world are international." Mary Maxwell, Morality Among Nations: 
An Evolutionary View (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 36-7; According to Beitz, 
the lack of distributive justice worldwide is the result of social injustice based on the 
inherent moral value of the state as opposed to the individual human being. One way 
to correct the injustice is by ref onn intervention. Charles Beitz, Political Theory. 181-2; 
Charles Beitz, Political Theory. 128, 134-5; Mary JVfaxwell, Morality Among Nations. 
pp. 36-Z 
33Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 181-2; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits 
and Possibilities of Ethical Intemational Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 57, 74, 76; 
David R. Mapel, "The Contractarian Tradition," 192; Beitz bases his idea of "reform intervention" on 
John Rawls' hypothetical contract. When applied to international politics, Rawl's philosophy and his 
concept of the hypothetical contract, which some intellectuals might call recondite but most people 
would call incomprehensible, basically involve an elaborate rationale for global distributive justice. 
According to Mapel, Rawls essentially makes certain assumptions about how people determine what 
is fair. Contrary to Hobbes, he presents a state of nature in the first position in which individuals in a 
veil of ignorance about their social position come together to make rational collective decisions about 
social justice, i.e., their social rules. As a result, members of the group, being aware of their own 
individual vulnerability, choose principles of justice that assure the least advantaged member of the 
group a minimum share of its goals Rawls rather esoteric political theory expresses one of the more 
recent versions of the enduring desire from antiquity for an ideology of social justice; David Mapel, 
"The Contractarian Tradition," 192-3; James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: The Free Press, 
1993), 73, 78. 
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Eventually, this progression toward individual justice is seen as having longrun, 
positive consequences for humanity. 
Criticism of Reform Intervention 
Yet, the U.N.'s tentative and unsuccessful efforts in Somalia and failure to act 
in Rwanda show the world not ready for such an ambitious form of humanitarian 
intervention. This moral failure exists because achieving social justice faces 
tremendous barriers, is time consuming, and requires worldwide cooperation. 
Reform intervention, as proposed by Beitz, is based on theories of change similar to 
those of WOMP. The intellectual argument in favor of such major changes in the 
intellectual and popular thinking on international politics would have to erode the 
traditional, realist intellectualism, still dominate after the Cold War, which holds that 
cosmopolitan morality and justice are, for the most part, unrealistic, utopian 
aspirations for the conversion of states from egoism to cosmopolitanism with its 
deleterious impact on international order.34 
Beitz in discussing distributive justice admits that there is at this time no 
global community capable of confirming a worldwide sense of justice, but he argues 
that what is impossible today is still possible tomorrow as long as the impediments 
to individual justice are alterable over time. With this argument, Beitz is back to the 
ultimate plea of idealism that change is possible. He is dependent upon the same 
vague idea held by WOMP of consciousness raising incrementally transforming the 
34For a discussion of theories of change in international politics, see Thomas G. Weiss, David P. 
Forsyth and Roger A. Coate, 171e United Nations and Changing World Politics (Lincoln, Neb.: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 164-8. Especially appropriate is the discussion concerning the 
distinction between "moral knowledge" and "scientific knowledge." 
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international system into a new international politics of justice. Like the architects 
of WOMP, who see no other way to change the world's violence and oppression, he 
is left to believing in and to actively pursuing an evolution of values over time that 
theoretically will result in global justice.35 But the slow evolution of an idea is not 
a basis for reform intervention, and, based upon the current mass loss of life and 
suffering because of international and domestic politics, is of little relevance to the 
problem of structural violence, at least for the foreseeable future. In this context, the 
ideas of Beitz and WOMP are arguably extreme forms of idealism based on a 
problematic theory of change. 
Beitz betrays his utopianism by setting difficult conditions on the use of reform 
intervention. To make social justice its sole goal, the curse of power politics must 
be excluded from the motivations of interventionists. Therefore, despite the natural 
inclination of states to pursue their own interests, he requires the target state's 
protection from selfish intervention and does not allow for mixed motives on the 
intervenor's part, although the few of true humanitarian results during the Cold War, 
e.g., Vietnam in Cambodia, India in Bangladesh, and Tanzania in Uganda, involved 
primarily selfish political motives. Beitz misses the point that the survivalist nature 
of the state obviates the political will needed, either individually or collectively, to 
designate and to reform socially unjust states. In addition, Beitz responds 
unrealistically to the conflict between individual justice and order by placing 
restrictive preconditions on the use of reform intervention which would make 
35Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: 011 the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical Intemational 
Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 57; Charles Beitz, Political 17ieory, 155-7. 
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intervention rare. Despite the low degree of predictability in international politics, 
he requires the probability of achieving social justice. Although, in almost every 
case, the costs and risks of intervention are high and moral behavior degenerates 
quickly in combat, he requires the costs in lives and immoral behavior to be low.36 
Beitz's arguments also fall into some of the traditional traps of contemporary 
liberal idealism. His belief in purely altruistic motives is dependent on his faith in 
collective intervention by international organizations, despite the proven inadequacy 
of the U.N. in this area, and the lack of a coalition of states having the moral 
consensus and political will to commit to humanitarian intervention. Successful 
reform intervention and nation-building requires an international standard of 
substantive justice which states both individually and communally do not have. The 
cooperation and consensus among states needed to build such a standard is 
nonexistent today. This set of affairs is evidenced by the weak international human 
rights regime and the inept response of states to acts of genocide.37 
Beitz also cannot produce another political entity to replace the state's role 
in providing justice. The lack of will and consensus among states needed to reform 
unjust states points out their importance in providing justice-- the reality which 
36David Mapel, "The Contractarian Tradition," 192; Stanley Hoffmann, Ibid., 57, 74, 76; Charles 
Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 415; Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 89-90, 181-2; See Stanley Hoffmann, 
"Out of the Cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s," Han'ard Intemational Review 26 (Fall 
1993): 8-9, 62-3; Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 90, 92; On a discussion of multilateral human rights 
regimes, see Jack Donnelly, Intemational Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), 57-79, 141-45; On the international human rights regime, see 
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 201-13. 
37David Mapel, "The Contractarian Tradition," 192; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders, 
57, 74, 76; Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 415; Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 89-90, 181-2; See 
Stanley Hoffmann, "Out of the ·cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s," 8-9, 62-3. 
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Beitz's critics claim he too easily dismisses in his insistence on cosmopolitan morality. 
Because international politics and justice grievances are contentious, states still 
constitute the main instruments of what little individual justice there is 
internationally. Humanity's sense of justice, although arguably subject to distorted 
values, is often invoked through the state, especially when it involves the desire of 
people for their own culturally distinct political community. There is in effect today 
little capacity for individual justice and cosmopolitan morality in international 
politics. For these reasons, the state is still the principal, political entity capable of 
achieving a modicum of social justice. 38 
It is questionable that citizens any time soon are going to abandon the state 
as the vehicle for their interest and sense of justice. In fact, the trend seems to the 
contrary. As the recent upheaval of ethnic nationalism indicates, today's citizens in 
areas of unresolved ethnic conflict equate their destiny with that of either preserving 
the old or finding a new state in disregard of any concept of universal justice or 
desire to end structural violence, and those particularly obsessed with achieving their 
own ethnic state perceive themselves as seeking social justice no matter the atrocities 
which accompany it.39 
~tanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders, 57. 
39por a discussion that nationalism may be the dark side of idealism which works against a 
progressive view of history and in favor of criminal behavior, see William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations: 
Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 232-8. 
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Intervention for the Enforcement of Human Rights 
Other scholars, however, attempt to avoid the pitfalls of utopian idealism 
while fashioning a supposedly more realistic form of humanitarian intervention. In 
this regard, Terry Nardin and Jerome Slater propose the less ambitious and idealistic 
exception to the nonintervention norm of intervention to enforce human rights as 
prudence may allow, which they claim is more in tune with the reality of 
international politics than both the reform intervention of Beitz and the 
unconscionable acts standard of Walzer. First, they argue that mass atrocities may 
mean something other than Walzer's assumption of a radically apparent violation of 
representative fit. In fact, they argue to the contrary that atrocities can be an 
indication of a totalitarian representative fit in which it is the people's collective will 
to commit genocide and mass expulsions against a minority. They cite as an example 
the support and acquiescence of the German people to the Holocaust. To Nardin 
and Slater, intervention against all human rights violations is legitimate, regardless 
of the idea of representative fit, because the emphasis should be on the acts 
themselves and because any substantive distinction between unconscionable acts and 
lesser abuses is arbitrary.40 
Nardin and Slater argue that separating those human rights violations that 
shock the conscience from those that merely offend the intuitive sense of justice 
negates the credibility of the whole human rights regime since there is no way to 
rank a moral hierarchy of human rights transgressions. Their response to Walzer is 
40Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, "Nonintervention and Human Rights," Joumal of Politics 48 
(February 1986): 89-91. 
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that "substantial and systematic" violations of human rights, which they define as 
"massive" but less than genocide, must share equal moral condemnation with 
unconscionable acts from the international community and, like genocide, cannot be 
excluded from intervention where practical. Nardin and Slater recognize, however, 
that the worse the violations, the less claim the offender has to sovereignty and 
legitimacy, and, therefore, it follows that force, but not moral censure, is more 
justified the greater the severity of the human rights violations. This allows for a 
proportional response which increases the justification for military intervention as the 
severity of human rights violations increases. Thus, military intervention would in 
most cases still be limited to those rare occasions of genocide but also would be at 
least theoretically legitimate against significant but less than genocidal violations. In 
essence, they place the average authoritarian state on notice that it risks the 
possibility of intervention and loss of legitimacy and sovereignty, where practical, as 
a result of its human rights violations.41 
A lower intervention threshold means that all human rights violators are at 
risk to lose the nonintervention norm's protection. The goal is greater opprobrium 
for them from the international community, despite military, humanitarian 
intervention to enforce human rights remaining rare. The goal of a general human 
rights exception to the nonintervention norm is the strengthening of the international 
human rights regime by the avoidance of wasteful, harmful interventions, the 
incremental increase in non-violent pressure on violators, the selective use of force 
41lbid., 92-94. 
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when plausible, and a more liberal interpretation of Article 2, Section 7 of the 
United Nations Charter.42 
International order is protected by subjecting intervention to the pragmatic, 
as well as moral, restraints of the just war doctrine. Force is not used until less 
drastic remedies are tried without success. The purpose of the intervention must be 
to protect human rights, although the sometimes positive results of mixed motives are 
acceptable as a reality. There must be a high probability of obtaining the moral 
goals of military intervention and a low probability of force harming the peace, 
security, and stability of all the states involved, the practical effect of which would 
be the rare use of force only in those cases where armed resistance is minimal.43 
Slater and Nardin's reasoning is that their exception by not recognizing a 
hierarchy of moral accountability for human rights violators and by putting them on 
equal moral footing gives greater credibility to diplomatic and nonmilitary 
interventions by states and the international community against such acts. This 
argument is in accord with the idea that small, incremental changes in the 
international human rights regime will gradually erode realism's amorality and will 
eventually lead to a seachange in international politics in favor of justice for the 
individual. The will of those enforcing human rights by aggressive military 
intervention may still be weak, but the will of those pursuing the meaningful, little 
victories, like Helsinki, may increase, leading to eventual, drastic changes like the fall 
of the Soviet Union. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
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In attempting to equalize the moral culpability of all human rights violators, 
however, Slater and Nardin place a premium on practicality and the ethic of 
consequences. They acknowledge intervention's harmful potential by recognizing a 
gap in its use between practice and principle, which they say increases with the 
intervenor's increased use of violence. In other words, the dangers of acting both 
immorally and unproductively increase as intervention becomes more a matter of 
violence. They also assume that international order is less threatened if oppressive 
states are pressured nonviolently to liberalize, which is the reason that they combine 
the moral imperative of stopping human rights abuses with the ethic of consequences 
or the practical limitations of intervention. Thus, arbitrary interventions would still 
be rare, thereby safeguarding order, but also lesser forms of intervention against the 
more prevalent, less severe human rights violators would be more acceptable and 
effective. With a reduced fear of humanitarian intervention's negative repercussions, 
states and international organizations supposedly would focus on violators over whom 
they have influence. Raising the moral ante against oppression in general, and not 
just atrocities, is argued to encourage diplomatic and other nonviolent pressures 
against human rights violators, while military humanitarian intervention would be as 
rare as under Walzer's unconscionable acts exception.44 
Criticism of Intervention for Human Rights Enforcement 
Nardin and Slater's rules on the interventionary use of force, however, may 
be a distinction without a difference. Determining what conditions actually meet 
44lbid., 92-3, 95. 
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Slater and Nardin's "massive" human rights violations required for military, 
humanitarian intervention against ordinary oppression seems almost as obscure as 
Walzer's unconscionable acts standard. The use of military force against structural 
violence will still be rare because of their highly restrictive pragmatic limitations on 
military intervention while their idealistic theory of incremental change, though 
certainly a reasonable longrun aspiration, will be of little help to the suffering for the 
foreseeable future. Although they envision their lower intervention threshold as 
providing a greater opportunity than Walzer's to intervene against ordinary human 
rights violations, they fail to resolve what Walzer has indicated is the major obstacle 
to intervention against ordinary human rights violations, namely the substantive 
weakness of the international consensus on human rights.45 Also, the argument that 
nonmilitary intervention against ordinary oppression is less risky than military 
intervention against atrocities is suspect. The dangers of using force have a more 
visible and immediate appearance of danger, but the complex value tradeoffs relating 
to matters of ordinary oppression are as difficult, and may be as costly in the longrun, 
as those concerning force, e.g., a U.S. denial of China's most favored nation status 
in response to its human rights violations may be riskier than the ill-fated 
intervention in Somalia. 
45Michale Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 107; also see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 210-13. He pretty much sums up the 
generally accepted view of the international human rights regime as a strong declaratory one which is 
weak on enforcement. 
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Representative Fit and the Limits of Understanding 
The problem, however, iri determining an appropriate intervention threshold 
is that neither Walzer nor his critics provide clear criteria for determining 
representative fit. The best that can be said is that the evidence presented by both 
sides is circumstantial and inconclusive. The idea of the social contract, which is an 
important part of the theory of democracy and the debate on representative fit, 
appears to be more myth than reality even in the West let alone the Third World. 
Nor is democracy a concrete reality. Few governments today are consensual in 
nature, and historically, states by Western, democratic standards have been 
illegitimate and oppressive. In addition, democracy is an important but not universal 
value in international politics. The civilian populations holding political and cultural 
values different than the West have focused on demands having nothing to do with 
democracy. Instead, nationalism and self-determination are currently the powerful 
ideas of local politics. Both produce contentious grievances for justice, which have 
come to the surface with the breakdown of the old international order and which are 
beyond the understanding of states with a tradition of civic nationalism.46 
The idea of representative fit also evokes the insoluble problem of self-help. 
During the Vietnam War, liberals used the idea first to support intervention as aiding 
a people struggling for freedom and later opposed intervention as aiding a corrupt, 
authoritarian regime's opposition to the people's nationalistic desires. In the late 
~ee Michael Walzer, ''The Moral Standing of States," 211-12, 218; Richard Wasserstrom, Review 
of Just and Unjust Wars, 539; Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35 
(Spring 1993): 56-9. 
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1970s, Walzer's critics presaged the reasomng of Post-Cold War liberal 
interventionists by rejecting self-help as blame the victim and might makes right 
social Darwinian excuses not to intervene on behalf of the oppressed. Now, self-help 
is largely ignored as a test for humanitarian intervention while suffering and 
practicality are important considerations. The Bosnians, who have proven their 
political endurance, have received no help while the Somalis, who have proven little 
politically, have. Self-help is an ideological dispute rather than a concept of 
systematic study.47 
Finally, those on all sides of the humanitarian intervention debate merge the 
moral and the practical arguments such that force to stop structural violence is 
seldom used. All see military interventions as risky behavior and a threat to 
international order. Despite their fundamental disagreements, because of the 
practical limitations of prudence by Walzer, of the ethic of consequences by realists, 
and of pragmatic constraints by Beitz, Nardin and Slater, all of which could easily 
support national interest reasons for not intervening, the intervention threshold is 
drawn at a point that makes intervention seldom useful for humanitarian purposes, 
including the cessation of structural violence. 
In a sense, representative fit is the right of a state's citizens to participate free 
of outside interference in the pursuit of self-determination. Walzer views 
47Concerning the change on support of the Vietnam War by liberals, see David Halberstam, The 
Best and the Brightest (New York; Penquin Books, 1983), 9-15, 776-8; Now many liberals seem to see 
the Bosnian conflict similarly to how they first viewed intervention in Vietnam as the need to help an 
abused people desiring freedom. Nonetheless, the principle of democracy and the opposition to 
genocide have not received priority in such decisions by the West. Certainly, the Bosnians through three 
years of resistance and atrocities have met Walzer's secessionist and unconscionable acts standards of 
broken representative fit with the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the clans of Somalia have not. 
Yet, humanitarian intervention was tried in Somalia only. 
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representative fit as a long-term, open-ended process as well as a final, political 
arrangement. When his view is joined with Rosenau's recent theorizing that world 
politics involves an unexplained and spontaneous, political turbulence, there are 
compelling arguments both that protecting the moral autonomy of a state's citizens 
maximizes individual justice internationally and that states, which are not really 
representative of their people, unnecessarily accept structural violence as a buffer 
against international disorder. The problem is that the political philosophy which 
makes a state's civil society most nationally complete and representative of its 
citizens has never been agreed upon by the world's political philosophers, national 
leaders, and people. As a result, the idea of representative fit, its attendant issues, 
and the arguments of its critics do not provide enough systematic knowledge about 
the nature of the relationship between states and their civilian populations to support 
the moral and political will needed for successful humanitarian intervention. 
Chapter V 
Humanitarian Intervention, Self-Determination, and 
Nationalism in a World of Failed States: 
Aspirations without Solutions 
The issue of representative fit is embodied today in the problems of self-
determination and nationalism taking place in the world's many nonviable, multi-
ethnic states. The dissolution of these "dysfunctional" or "failed" states is more than 
demographics influenced by the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War. Also 
involved are the ramifications of the introduction in Eastern Europe and Africa of 
the Western ideas of self-determination and nationalism, which unfortunately are 
aspirations for justice without solutions. As a result, the West perceives that 
providing justice by humanitarian intervention in states with the demographic 
problems of ethnically intermixed populations separated by intense hatred and with 
non-democratic cultures is too costly in lives and money and not likely to be 
successful. The result is the lack of political will on the part of the West and the 
international community to stop genocide and relieve suffering and a distrust of 
Western purpose on the part of Third World leaders. That the West resolved its 
moral dilemma by not intervening militarily leaves it wondering whether its inaction 
is the rightfully prudent avoidance of quagmire or the wrongful acceptance of 
genocide. 
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The Meaning of Self-Determination 
To begin with, it is not unreasonable to see intervention in another state's 
conflict over self-determination as promising little success because the grievances 
involved are aspirations for justice with their many meanings. Self-determination, 
therefore, is one of the great problems of international justice. Among its many 
meanings, its most generic is the group's desire for cultural, social, political and 
economic self-fulfillment. In its more specific, political meaning, it merges with the 
idea of nationalism and approximates the desire of a people to achieve a sense of 
group identity and self-worth, which is most often actualized by either the desire or 
the development of preferred political institutions and statehood. Consequently self-
determination can be viewed in one of two ways; one, as the process of achieving 
these institutions, and the other as the arrangement of the institutions itself. While 
Mill and Walzer see it as the group's right to pursue whatever arrangement it desires 
and to achieve whatever arrangement it deserves, others see it as the end result of 
the achieved institutions. Thus, to liberal internationalists, it is a capitalistic 
democracy. To Marxists, it is a classless, socialist society. To Wilsonian idealists, it 
is a state with a democratically chosen civil society which is composed of harmonious 
groups satisfied by their participation within the state's political process. To ethnic 
groups holding grievances, it is the achievement of retribution and freedom in regard 
to other groups, out of which they hope to find their own social, cultural, political, 
and economic arrangement, but it is not necessarily freedom of the individual in the 
Western sense. In parts of the non-West, or what is the traditionally perceived as the 
Third World, it is the right of the group to be left alone even if political necessity 
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requires violence abhorrent to the West. Therefore, for many, contrary to the ideas 
of Wilsonian idealism, self-determination equates democracy with the communal 
rights of the ethnic group to the exclusion of minority rights.1 The danger of self-
determination then is that it is an idea of feeling with little intellectual consistency 
and no guarantee of democracy. Yet that feeling is also a real sense of justice held 
1Wilson's idea of self-determination naturally divided into two conceptions. One was external self-
determination from foreign control and the other was internal self-determination to provide citizens 
the right to choose their civil society. Unfortunately, self-determination came to mean equating ethnicity 
with statehood and democracy. Today, the prevalence of ethnic nationalism in the Third World directly 
contradicts Wilson's original idea that the self-determined state would be a democratically chosen civil 
society of harmonious groups satisfied by their participation within the state's political process. Morton 
H. Halpin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Detemziantion in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 16-8. For other perspectives on self· 
determination, see the following: John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk 
(editor) The Vietnam War and Intemational Law (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76) 
36; Michael Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen 
R. Graubard (ed.) The State (New York: W .. S. Norton & Company, Inc., 1990), 113-14; Ibid., n.6; 
For more specific definitions of self-determin-ation, see the following: Alexander Deconde ed. The 
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principle Movements and Ideas (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), s.v. "National Self-Determination," by Betty Miller Unterberger; Kevin 
Ryan, "Rights, Intervention, and Self-Determination." Denver Jounzal of Intenzational Law and Policy 
20 (1991): 60-6; The most violence over self-determination is found in the former Soviet bloc and the 
Thirld World. However, the Cold War definition of the Third World of economically and politically 
backwards states not aligned with either Cold War superpower is obviously obsolete. The Third World 
is no longer unrealistically considered a monolithic entity playing the superpowers against each other 
for advantage. Many states of the former Soviet Bloc have Third World problems. They now join the 
formerly non-aligned states to be described as "failed" or "dysfunctional." It is more accurate to see the 
Third World as those states threatened with disorder and dissolution as a result of a multitude of 
overwhelming social problems, including the newly profiled global emergencies, such as poverty, 
overpopulation, environmental degradation, political instability, ethnic nationalism, and social injustice. 
The Second World can be accurately described as those states in reconstruction after loss of the Cold 
War and former Third World states which have accomplished some measure of the prosperity and 
security of the West. See Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much About Geography: Everything You Need 
to Know About the World but Never Leamed (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,1992) 
248-50; for other perspectives on self-determination, see the following: John Stuart. Mill, "A Few 
Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk (editor) Tlze Vietnam War and Intemational Law 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76) 36; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A 
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The 
State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen Rher perspectives on self-determination, see the 
following: John Stuart. Mill, "A Few Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk (editor) The 
Vietnam War and Intemational Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76) 36; Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen R Denver 
Joumal of /ntemational Law and Policy 20 (1991): 60-6. 
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by members of groups which cannot be ignored by the international community. 
Unfortunately, it is a sense of justice based on localism instead of universalism. In 
sum, the intractable complexity of local conflict is derived from the fact that self-
determination is the justice the group feels it is due. 
State Versus Secession Oriented Self-Determination 
Self-determination presents one of the great paradoxes of international 
politics. Because states are made of subgroups often with conflicting senses of 
justice, states are paradoxically both based on and threatened by the idea of self-
determination. Further, the desire for self-determination becomes explosive when 
merged with the desire for national self-fulfillment. Because of self-determination, 
ethnic and religious secessionist movements are still seeking their own states. The 
result is conflicting groups clashing over how to define the self in terms of the state. 
States desiring the status quo accept the self as a state-oriented self-determination 
based on the civilian population's loyalty to a unified state in lieu of loyalty to any 
particular group. On the other hand, those against the status quo of the state see the 
self in terms of a subgroup, which is often in terms of ethnic nationalism, with self-
determination based on an unqualified right of statehood for nationalities. This 
secession-oriented self-determination is based on group loyalty superseding loyalty 
to the state. Internal conflicts within the state, many of which divide along ethnic 
lines, result.2 
2Alex Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination, and Non-intervention: In Quest of a Norma- tive 
Symbiosis." Joumal of Intemationa/ Affairs 45 (Winter 1992): 399-420. 404-6; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic 
Conflict and Intemational Relations (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 28-9; 
Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, F/asltpoints: Promises and Peli! in a New World. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 221. 
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Nationalism 
Nationalism is another great problem of international justice which exacerbates the 
divisions of self-determination and ethnic identity. As an important part of 
international politics since its inception in its modern sense in Europe in the early 
1800s, it also is a Western idea of unfinished business in much of the world. 
Essentially, it is the idea that nations have both the right and the duty to become 
states. Consequently, it naturally appeals to those holding ethnic grievances. 
Nationalism is especially a serious problem today because of its strong potential to 
fill the power vacuum within those post-Cold War, fragmenting and moribund states 
engulfed in ethnic battles over self-determination.3 
Nationalism also represents one of those gaps in understanding between the 
West and other political cultures, emphasized by Walzer, which calls into question 
the morality and practicality of intervening in another state's political issues. In the 
West, civic nationalism--which is based on a community of a shared civic culture, the 
rule of law, and the idea of territorial citizenship--developed. Western states have 
been reasonably successful at transcending internal ethnic divisions by substituting 
a less obsessive form of nationalism. Essentially, conflict is constrained in a 
relatively successful manner in societies built on pluralism, consociationalism, 
Conflict and Intemational Relations (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 28-9; 
Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, Flashpoints: Promises and Pe1il i11 a New World. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 221. 
3Sills, David L. ed. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. np: The MacMillan Company, 1968. 
S.v. "Nationalism," by Hans Kohn; Deconde, Alexander. ed. The Encyclopedia of American Foreign 
Policy: Studies of the Pniiciple Movements and Ideas. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. S.v. 
"National Self-Determination," by Bettey Miller Unterverger; William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations: 
Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 14, 21-3. 
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multiculturalism, human rights, and the acceptance of dissent. As a result, the 
priorities of Western states are a liberal world order of economic interests, 
democracy, and regional and cultural identity as the desire for national self-
fulfillment has taken hold in a civic form. Unfortunately, many non-Western 
multinational states have failed to develop the unifying values of a civil society As 
a result, nationalism in such states has developed along ethnic lines based more on 
a common language, genealogy, and group loyalty in lieu of loyalty to the state's civic 
culture. Festering grievances and ethnic resentments result. Often, a conquered or 
expelled nation has feelings of unfinished busines and a deep sense of grievance. 
People see themselves as morally deserving of a denied national self-fulfillment, 
which can only be satisfied by national independence. The result today is an 
surprisingly malevolent ethnic nationalism of secession.4 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that foreign policy practitioners and scholars reject humanitarian 
intervention as a solution to one of history's most difficult and enduring political 
problems. 
In fact, post-World War II foreign policy practitioners and scholars have 
already been disillusioned on the issue. The legacy of the European state system and 
4Smith, Anthony D, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 55. 
Consociationalism ... refers to regimes in which internal accommodation is negotiated by party leaders 
[such as in] the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon ... " Gabriel A. Almond, A 
Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage publications, 
Inc., 1990), 281-3: George Schopflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central 
Europe," Jouma/ of Jntemational Affairs 45 (Summer 1991): 54, 58; Donald M. Snow, Distant 
Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New Jntematio11al Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 
46; Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power: The Pursuit of the Nation State in East 
Central Europe," Journal of Intemational Affairs 45 (Winter 1992): 505-6, 514; Astri .S. Suhrke and 
Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in Intemational Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 6; Anthony 
D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 57, 60; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and Intemational 
Relations, 59; George Schopflin, "National and National Minorities," 62-5. 
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Communism's consolidation policies were expected to resolve the conflicts of ethnic 
nationalism and grievances within emerging, troubled states, but, once the Cold War 
was over, such conflicts reemerged, proving that they were dormant rather than dead. 
This phenomenon has led to a certain disenchantment in the West with ethnic 
conflict and has reduced the will of outsiders to become involved.5 
Ethnic Conflict 
Ethnic conflict is a merging of the struggle for power, the drive for survival, 
the search for justice, and the quest for national self-fulfillment, i.e., self-
determination and nationalism. Therefore, it involves a history of violence, festering 
grievances for justice, feelings of group survivalism, and the fundamental collision of 
nationalistic secession against preservation of the state. It, therefore, gives the 
impression of being solvable only from within but draws outside, affective sympathy 
for a number of reasons. In addition, ethnic nationalism, because it is historically 
resilient, is ready to erupt when the configuration of international politics can on 
longer constrain the search for justice, as happened in the Balkans and the former 
Soviet Union after the Cold War.6 
5See Stephen Ryan, Etlmic Conflict and Intemational Relations, 56-7, 59, 64-5; according to Anthony 
D. Smith, the ethnic community is composed of " ... a named human population with a myth of common 
ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with a historic territory or homeland and a 
measure of solidarity. Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 49; James Q. Wilson 
suggest that the human tendency to limit ones moral sense to the group illustrates separatism of the 
ethnic community. James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 192, 194, 
197.Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not To Intervene." Foreign Affairs 45 (April 1967): 435. 
6Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, eds. 77ie Social Science Encyclopedia (Henley on James: 
Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1985) s.v. "Nationalism," by Kenneth Minogue; Also see David L. Sills, ed. 
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (np: The MacMillan Company, 1968) s.v. "Nationalism," by 
Hans Kohn; Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power," 510. 
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Survival Nationalism 
The conflict between status quo and secession is a quintessential struggle for 
justice in its most subjective sense. To supporters of the status quo, state unity is 
viewed as both necessary and convenient for the government under the authority of 
the traditional dominant group to maintain continued subjugation over the state's 
other groups. The dominant group desires its unity to save its advantages and itself 
while the seceding nation, which feels oppressed and alienated from its culture, 
desires its own nationally inclusive state. The subgroups and nationalities of the state 
see themselves as victims of tyranny and want the same justice and right of self-
determination as the dominant group. As a result, the dominant group adopts 
whatever means necessary to survive and maintain control of the state. The 
secessionist group also sees its independence as a matter of survival and acts in the 
same manner. Both unity and independence become core values for which people 
are willing to die. Consequently, ethnic conflict is often a violence of unsurpassed, 
savagery.7 
Survival nationalism, as it is termed by Anthony Smith, with its high stakes, 
develops its own malevolent kind of political morality. One aspect of its special 
savagery is that groups which see themselves as conquered o.r expelled nations seek 
retribution for perceived past wrongs. Members of the group holding this sense of 
grievance then justify in their own minds their atrocities. Such conflicts are resistant 
7David L. Sills, ed. T71e Encyclopedia of tlze Social Sciences (np: The MacMillan Company, 1968) 
s.v. "Nationalism,' by Hans Kohn; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and Intemational Relations, 34; 
Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power," 514; Astri .S. Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, 
Ethnic Conflict in Intemational Relations, 38-9; Donald now, Distant 17umder: T71ird World Conflict 
and the New /11tematio11al Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 46. 
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to compromise, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. The respect for the rule of law 
is already weak in such states, which seldom have a democratic tradition to begin 
with, and only worsens as the conflict intensifies. Any sense of fair play is lost to the 
exigencies of the moment. Compromise among the warring parties is a necessary 
component to an orderly and just peace but is disparaged by the group's 
militarization for survival. Essentially, survival nationalism takes priority over the 
target state's progress and the suffering of its civilian population. The idea of 
reciprocity, i.e., the belief in the give and take needed for an orderly society, fades 
before the dogmas of nationalism and self-determination.8 
Of course, the sense of grievance leads to a cycle of unconscionable violence 
and exploitation of the people's fears by local leaders. Because the conflict is over 
core values and physical survival, victory becomes a moral imperative resulting in the 
group's defense mobilization. The warring parties become militarized into garrison 
communities of zealously and fanatically loyal populations seeking revenge for past 
blood invested, which leads them down a spiraling path of hatred and revenge of 
unrestrained destructiveness. The violence is both random and controlled but takes 
on a life of its own in a seemingly meaningless, reciprocal spiral of atrocities, 
although it is seldom without political purpose.9 It is the perceived intensity and 
8Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 57, 59-60. 
9Astri .S. Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in I11temational Relations, 6; Hedley 
Bull, The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," 113-14; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Co11f/ict a11d 
International Relations, 38-9, 54-5, 56-7, 59; Donald M. Snow, Distant 17umder, 46. According to 
Anthony Smith, it is doubtful that Western social scientists, who are products of scientific rationalism, 
can grasp in any helpful way the strength of feeling of ethnic nationalism. Scholars accordingly have not 
been able to identify a clear set of factors to make reasonably certain predictions about where ethnic 
conflict will erupt, to what degree it will be popularly supported, at what level of intensity it will be 
pursued, and for what duration it will continue, but research into the biology of the brain may provide 
answers, although perhaps not solutions. Neuroresearch is finding that emotions are an integral part 
103 
irrationally of it that discourages the West from intervention. It is this intensity of 
ethnic conflict and its accompanying fears which are susceptible to elite manipulation. 
The discontent, the zealousness, and the strong group loyalty of the alienated masses 
create fertile ground for manipulation by nationalistic demagogues like Serbia's 
Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnia's Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who exploit ethnic 
hatred to consolidate power. Leaders such as Somalia's Mohammed Farah Aideed 
command significant support because of the deep domestic grievances within their 
own societies.10 
The Threat to International Order and the 
Fear of Infinite State Dissolution 
In addition to the negative characteristics of ethnic conflict perceived as 
barriers to humanitarian intervention by the West, there is also the view by states 
that self-determination, nationalism, and ethnic divisions are serious threats to 
of human reasoning and that emotions such as fear are deeply ingrained in brain circuits through 
evolution. This leads to the hypothesis that the group's desire for justice manifested in the lingering 
grievances, the historical resilience, and the malevolent proclivities of ethnic conflict is an emotion like 
fear, hate, love, and jealousy, which would account for the illogical, self-destructive behavior and 
protracted nature of ethnic and other emotionally charged political conflicts. Of course, even if brain 
biology is verified as the culprit, there would seem to be no cures for ethnic hatred other than placing 
the latest version of prozac in the drinking water of the warring parties. Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic 
Sources of Nationalism," 59; Sandra Blakeslee, "The Biology of Emotions," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
19 January 1995, sec. E, p. 2; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and I11temational Relations, 38-9, 54-5, 56-7, 
59; George Schopflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities," 54, 58; Donald M. Snow, Distant 
Thunder, 46; Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power," 505-6, 514; Astri .S. Suhrke and 
Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in lntemational Relations, 6; Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic 
Sources of Nationalism," 57, 60; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and llltemational Relations, 59. 
1
°The historical record on this matter is replete with examples of dictators capable of organizing the 
masses to ferment atrocities in the name of group identity and loyalty; A contemporary example is 
Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia; See Alexia Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," 72 
Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993); 81-96; Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: 111e Third Balkan War 
(Penguin Books: New York , New York, 1993), 36; Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghost: A Joumey 
Through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 39-40; Tom Farer, "From Warlord to 
Peacelord?" 17te Washington Post 12 Sept. 1993, sec. C, p. 2. 
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international order, which favors the status quo. The logic is that an unqualified right of 
political communities to statehood presents the danger of infinite state dissolution. This 
view was recently made concrete by the Russian attack on Chechnya. Also, a world of 
many small states is seen as incapable of political or economic viability and appears 
destabilizing internationally. An increase in the number of nonviable states would make 
the resolution of the worsening, newly profiled global threats more difficult, and the 
worsening of these threats would further aggravate the nonviability of states. Because of 
the difficulty of obtaining interstate cooperation from a larger number of weak states, the 
nonviability problems of inadequately apportioned resources, environmental degradation, 
overpopulation, disease, crime-causing urbaniz.ation, transmigration and refugee flows, the 
short supply of water, and even the ethnic intennixture of populations would be 
exacerbated, leading to increased suffering and opportunities for conflict. Because the 
nonintervention norm is seen as conducive to state unity and a state-oriented interpretation 
of the right of self-determination, the international community and most states are not 
inclined to weaken it, even to go much beyond officially cond.ernning the genocide and 
oppression within such areas as the former Yugoslavia and sub-Saharan Africa. u 
llAlexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," 407-8; Amtai Etzioni, "The 
Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992- 93): 26, 27-8; Raymond Pearson, "The 
Geopolitics of People Power," 512; James Mayall, "Nonintervention, Self-Determination and the 'New 
World Order,'" Intemationa/A.ffairs 67 (July 1991): 424; Stephen Ryan, Ibid., 28-9; Robert D. 
Kaplan," The Coming Anarchy, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 52-8, 70-2. 
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Similarly, because of all the perceived negative consequences of ethnic and 
survival nationalism and secession-oriented self-determination, the potential for 
infinite state dissolution and disorder, the legacy of colonialism, and the strong hold 
of realism on international politics worldwide, most of the Third World states favor 
a strong nonintervention norm which is not very receptive of humanitarian 
intervention and human rights. Third World leaders see the nonintervention norm 
as protecting their authority to defend the multinational state's unity by dictatorial 
rule if need be, which appears to be most of the time, in light of the potential for it 
to self-destruct from the problems of nationalism and self-determination. Their 
antagonism to intervention and their inclination toward authoritarian rule are not 
only for the selfish reasons of maintaining an elite's power and privileges or a 
predominate group's control over other groups but also because of their states' 
demographic frailties requiring special measures. They are, therefore, especially 
aware that power is necessary to the preservation of the status quo and to meeting 
the exigencies of international as well as domestic concerns. The perception is that 
of realism that the state's unity is equated with the possession of the power necessary 
not only for its survival domestically but also internationally. Therefore, secession-
oriented self-determination is seen generally as a threat to the realist stability 
devices.12 
12Because the historical basis of state sovereignty in the Third World is so precarious and the threat 
of dissolution so great, the Organization for African Unity and the Group of 77, which are the 
international organizations representing Third World sentiments in the international community, strongly 
support a qualified right of self-determination compatible with the preservation of state unity; James 
Mayall, "Nonintervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order," 525. 
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The Realist View of Intervention in the Third World 
According to Caroline Thomas, the Third World is still working on problems 
for the most part already resolved in the West and still is just as influenced by 
realism as are state leaders worldwide. She argues that the Third World is in an 
earlier stage of development involving ethnic conflict, authoritarianism, disorder, and 
great suffering already passed by the Western democracies. These are problems that 
can only be solved through the moral autonomy of the Third World states. In the 
Third World, according to Thomas, "politics must be played out." Therefore, quite 
logically, Third World leaders see the nonintervention norm as assuring the equality 
of states. It helps to assuage their fears that their former colonial masters might 
continue an undue influence in their societies on economic, military, and cultural 
matters. Hence, concentrating power may be a necessary step toward the obtaining 
of domestic stability and legitimacy by dysfunctional states whereas intervention even 
for humanitarian purposes might aggravate indefinite state dissolution. Hence, the 
West needs to accept that failing states may have to go through authoritarianism as 
part of the process of sorting things out.13 
13RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and lntemational Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 83; Gerald Doppelt, "Statism Without Foundation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 
400; Caroline Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffmann 
(editors) Political Theory, Jntemational Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, Inc., 1993), 91-3, 100; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and Jntemational Relations, 28; During 
the U.N. General Assembly debate concerning a safe zone for Iraqis and Kurds in Northern Iraq, many 
Third World states and the Group of 77, along with some developed states, expressed reservations about 
the humanitarian action setting a precedent against the state's right of sovereignty. See Larry Minear, 
"Humanitarian Intervention in a New World Order," Paper of the Overseas Development Council 
(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992 ), 3; Marguerite Michaels, "Retreat From 
Africa: Continent's Momentum for Changing Stalls." 72 (America and the World 1992/93): 97; 
Michael Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 88. 
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As realists, leaders in the Third World and of fragmenting states are also 
skeptical of any professed altruism in foreign policy, especially from the West with 
its colonial and Cold War past. They probably also see it this way from an intuitive 
feeling of the validity of realist thinking. Consequently, the leaders of both the status 
quo states and the secessionist nationalities see intervention as selfishly motivated 
and as an activity ripe for exploitation. For instance, the various factions in Somalia 
attempted to exploit politically the U.S. efforts to find and punish Aideed as a war 
criminal. In Bosnia, the government, which was always at the disadvantage against 
the Serbs, continually called for Western intervention.14 
Humanitarian Intervention and Realism 
Third World leaders also recognize that the problems of realism will arise in 
humanitarian intervention because the intervenor cannot use force without 
influencing or appearing to influence the warring parties' political conflict. Thus, 
leaders of target states will probably act and perceive others as acting in their 
national interests, which translates into their distrust of Western intervention. The 
argument is that the immense power of the West, its high valuation of capitalism, and 
its realist tendencies make it inevitable that humanitarian intervention will eventually 
become a matter of self-interest. Because of the nature of international politics, even 
the sincere desire of the West for altruistic policies cannot escape the pursuit of its 
14See Tom Farer, "From Warlord to Peacelord: Like it or Not, the West Needs to Enlist Aideed---
or Face Disaster," Washington Post, 12 September 1993, sec. C, p. 2; For articles clearly showing the 
partisan views on intervention of the warring sides in Bosnia, see the following: John F. Burns, 
"Bosnian Calls Bush's Plan a Welcome 'First Step,'" New York Times, 12 August 1992, p. A8; Laura 
Silber, "Serb Leader Speaks of Peace, Warns on Intervention," Waslii11gto11 Post, August 12 1992, p. A24; 
John F. Burns, "Power and Water Lost in Sarajevo as Attacks Mount," New York Times, 14 July 1992, 
p. A8; Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Vows to Get Aid to Bosnia," New York Times, 10 July 1992, p. A6. 
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own interests. The Western conception of world order is seen as developed by the 
most powerful states to preserve their interests. Even the supposedly benign 
economic assistance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
appears heavy-handed to Third World leaders.15 
Hans Morgenthau, the preeminent realist, warned that unavoidable 
circumstances arise in international politics forcing the state to attend to its national 
interest. The good intentions of the intervenor have a propensity to turn 
unconsciously toward matters of self-interest as its peacemaking breaks down among 
the complexities of the political conflict. This situation is no less true for 
intervention today. Regardless of the intervenor's quality of leadership, humanitarian 
intervention is at risk of being rerouted from altruistic intentions to matters of self-
interest and power politics. For instance, as the U.N. search in Somalia for 
Mohammed Farah Aideed progressed, U.S. efforts to criminalize and to punish him 
changed the mission from one of humanitarian relief to one of upholding U.S. and 
U.N. credibility in the handling of international problems. At that point of 
international involvement in the local political process, U.S. power and security 
interests became unintentionally, and perhaps unconsciously, entangled in the 
humanitarian mission: Another example is the fall of Bihac, in which NATO's 
credibility, rather than help for the suffering, became the problem.16 
15Caroline Thomas, 'The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," 91-2, 94-5, 98 100; Marguerite 
Michaels, "Retreat from Africa," 98; Cynthia Weber, "Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the 
Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary." Review of lntemational Studies (1992): 202-4. 
16see Hans J. Morgenthau, ''To Intervene or Not To Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45 (April 1967): 
43; See Patrick J. Sloyan, "A Look at. .. The Somalia Endgame: How the Warlord Outwitted Clinton's 
Spooks," Washington Post, 2 April 1994, sec. C, p. 3; Robert H. Reid, "U.N. Peace Effort's Future on 
the Line," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 27 November 1994, p. A4; David Rieff, ''The Peacekeepers Who 
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Thomas argues that states always act in their national interests, that the 
powerful will always exploit the weak, and that intervention will always be 
"predatory." Another scholar has noted the "hypocritical heritage of European 
nations" to proclaim democracy at home while "systematically destroying others." 
That the West is democratic does not negate its susceptibility to power politics. 
Therefore, even in a world of failed, dysfunctional states, state sovereignty and the 
nonintervention norm cannot be relaxed without great caution by the international 
community and the fragmenting states in need themselves. As Thomas sees it, 
altruistic intervention will always be "self-seeking humanitarianism."17 
Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Hobson's 
Choice for the International Community 
The greatest indicator that humanitarian intervention is a nonviable option for 
ending structural violence and finding justice for conflicted, ethnically intermixed 
groups is the hobson's choice that self-determination and nationalism present to the 
international community. Preserving the status quo is not likely to resolve the serious 
grievances of injustice held by those separatist groups which have not achieved their 
national self-fulfillment, but remedying these grievances by an unqualified right of 
Couldn't: The Real Reasons for the U.N.'s Retreat in Bosnia," Washington Post, 11 December 1994, 
sec. c, p. 1. Even the possibility of the U.N.'s withdrawal from Bosnia has become a credibility problem 
for the U.S. concerning its use of airpower and troops for protection of the retreating peacekeepers. 
See Jim Hoagland, "Out With a Bang," Washington Post, 11 December 1994, sec. C, p. 7. 
171rving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ.: 
Transaction Books, 1989), 18-9; Caroline Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," 92, 100; 
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Impen"al Temptation: The New World Order and 
America's Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 62-3; Elfstrom, Gerald. "On 
Dilemmas of Intervention." Ethics 93 (July 1983): 724. 
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self-determination is not likely to end the creation of new grievances by those status 
quo groups who lose power. Under such circumstances, the few options available to 
local and world leaders are either ineffective or morally reprehensible for resolving 
these problems. Three of these options--forced expulsion of populations, dictatorial 
annexation of land, and the systematic killing of target groups--are currently being 
applied in Bosnia.18 
Limited Choices: Expulsion of Populations, Dictatorial 
Annexation of Land, and Systematic Killing Versus Trusteeship 
The morally reprehensible options have worked because of the lack of 
political will on the part of the West and the international community to stop 
genocide. In Bosnia and Rwanda, the lesson has not been lost by ruling elites and 
secessionists alike that ethnic cleansing is an effective tool for uniting the conflicted, 
multi-national state. As a consequence, the genocidal, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is 
less a random violence of hatred and more a tactical genocide of purpose. Its a 
purposeful, controlled hatred which achieves its goal of exterminating and expelling 
political opponents by exploiting the natural tendency of people, when convinced that 
their national survival is at stake, to devalue others. It is a policy which also 
effectively exploits the goodwill of the West as the Serbs continue to make and then 
break promises of peace while incrementally removing their enemies.19 
18Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict," Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 
11; Charles William Maynes, "Learning the Hard Way in Bosnia," New York Times, 5 May 1993, p. 
Al. 
19Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict," 11; Alison DeForges, "The Method in 
Rwanda's Madness: Politics, Not Tribalism, Is the Root of the Bloodletting," 171e Washington Post, 
April 17, 1994, sec. C, p. 2; The situation in Bosnia shows that, with centuries of practice, local forces 
know well the uses of power politics to exploit the involvement of outsiders. The Bosnian Serbs in 
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Because ethnic conflict involves survival nationalism in societies without 
democratic traditions, the prospects for two other options of a moral and peaceful 
character, partition and power sharing, are not promising. They involve either a new 
balance of power between the warring parties or a total victory of one of the parties. 
They are also costly and acquiesce in structural violence since both options usually 
involve intended or collateral atrocities until victory or a new balance of forces takes 
place. A new balance of forces also leaves much unfinished business waiting to erupt 
again into violence, as in Cyprus.20 
Trusteeship 
The remaining option is trusteeship which amounts to nation-building and 
reform intervention by the international community. It involves the establishment 
of Western, political and economic values and institutions reflecting constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, which are anathema to today's typical dysfunctional state of 
survival and ethic nationalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia. The obstacles here 
are considerable since infusing Western values into the political complexity and the 
particular have used U .N humanitarian purposes to their advantage. They have by their '"policy of 
accomplished fact'" alternatively accepted and broken cease-fires as they gradually increased their control 
of territory. Their "fighting and talking, talking and fighting" has worked well against the U.S. and 
Western Europe. Their twin strategy of taking territory while at the same time allowing U.N. shipments 
of food and medicine to besieged Muslim areas has been an effective use of the carrot and the stick 
against U.N. considerations of increased intervention. As of July 21, 1992, there had been 39 cease-
fires. See Peter Maass, "Shelling Halts Sarajevo Airlift; Yugoslavia Could Lose U.N. Seat," Washington 
Post, 21July1992, p. AlO; John F. Burns, "Newest Bosnia Truce Is a Non-Starter," New York Times, 
20 July 1992, p. A6; Stephen Engleberg, "Serbs Following a Twin Strategy," 16 August 1992, p. A15; 
Dan Stets, "Serbia Apparent Winnrer in War," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 21 August 1992, p. A5. 
20lbid. 
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stiff military resistance of the target state's survival nationalism requires a strong, 
political will on the part of a reasonably united international community.21 
Choosing Victims and Culprits 
Also a problem in attempting to provide social justice to another political 
process is the inability to separate the victims from the culprits. Some outrageous 
acts of cruelty, as in Bosnia, when viewed in their longrun, historical context and not 
in their particular point in time, are part of a political process of savagery, mutual 
mayhem, and recriminations in which all are culpable, making a just punishment of 
the guilty difficult. Often, the actions of warring parties are both a matter of just 
grievances and unjust violence. In particular, such judgments are made difficult by 
the effectiveness of propaganda and disinformation, the affective nature of the 
conflict, and the complexity of the reciprocal violence. It is difficult, therefore, to 
judge the fairness of an aggrieved group's proportionality of response to social 
injustice.22 This view is not intended to negate the vile cruelty which takes place 
in structural violence, but rather to point out that the world of states, both as an 
international community and as separate political units, will judge the criminality of 
those committing structural violence like the judges at the Olympics did during the 
Cold War. Regardless of the level of cruelty involved, those to whom the judges feel 
favorably disposed will score a 9.9 moral rating and others will score much lower. 
21Ibid. According to Amtai Etioni, the ethnic based state tends to be more culturally cohesive and, 
therefore, prone to authoritarianism and xenophobia. Amtai Etioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," 
Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/ 93): 33; George Schopflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities," 58. 
22See Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," SuTVival 35 
(Spring 1993); 133, 137; Donald Snow, Distant Thunder, 92. 
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The difficulty of resolving these issues and judging moral accountability 
returns the analyst of intervention to the same, fundamental questions. Of these, the 
most important are what crimes based on what moral standards justify humanitarian 
intervention? The discussion of the difficulties in resolving these issues, however, is 
not an argument to excuse the failure of states to stop genocide and other atrocities 
but rather is a reminder of the difficulty that outsiders have in playing moral referee, 
adjudicating self-determination, gaining trust within troubled states, and overcoming 
their own selfish natures. As a result, the world's states, either in the aggregate or 
individually, seldom have the political will or the legitimacy to use military 
humanitarian intervention against structural violence. 
Chapter VI 
American Perspectives on Intervention 
Without resolution of the issues of cultural and moral relativism, order and 
justice, the legitimacy and the power of the state, self-determination, and nationalism, 
the American foreign policy perspectives of conservatism, neo-isolationism, 
liberalism, realism, and internationalism offer little intellectual and moral vision on 
the issue of military humanitarian intervention. Moreover, two of America's most 
important approaches to studying and analyzing international politics--namely social 
science and the legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations--do not 
provide adequate prescriptive advice on the issue. As a result, with few answers and 
many questions on military humanitarian intervention, Americans cannot reconcile 
their idealism and belief in the rule of law with the ethic of consequences and cannot 
find the political will to use military intervention against structural violence and 
human rights abuses. As a result, its use is likely to be restricted to the most limited 
cases of temporarily relieving atrocities and suffering where little sacrifice is involved. 
But this conclusion is difficult for Americans to accept since, for them, 
international politics has historically been connected to their principles of democracy 
and constitutionalism. Thus, Americans feel a sense of moral obligation beyond the 
responsibilities states normally associate with international politics. In the words of 
Michael Novak: 
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No European nation that I know of feels that its national mission is to 
protect human beings elsewhere, to intervene (like St. George) to save 
innocents from evil dragons. They do not regard other peoples in 
distress as part of their national obligation .... Since World War II, we 
Americans have grown up knowing that we are powerful. We are 
confident (sometimes too much so) that America is good. For 
Americans, it is as obvious as 2 plus 2 equals 4 that power plus 
goodness equals national obligation.1 
American Exceptionalism and the Traditional 
Inner Conflicts of American Foreign Policy 
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Novak's words echo the unique way that Americans define the moral basis of 
their political association. Known popularly as American exceptionalism, it is, 
according to Kenneth Thompson, "the foreign policy corollary of the American 
dream" and the rejection of "power as reality."2 It rejects European power politics 
with its corrupt alliances and balance of power manipulations and is the legacy of 
America's beginning revolutionary commitment to building a liberal world order of 
peaceful republics in the place of war prone monarchies. Its fundamental values are 
commerce, free markets, and limited constitutional government. The resulting self-
perception of Americans is one of moral superiority to European politics and a belief 
that freedom everywhere depends on them.3 But such a burden makes it difficult 
for Americans to reconcile their rejection of power politics with the realities of 
1Michael Novak, "Liberals and Conservatives Share Revulsion at Raw Human Evil," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 14 August 1992, p. A15. 
2Kenneth Thompson, Traditions and Values In Politics and Diplomacy: The01y and Practice (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 143-4. 
3Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Affairs 69 (Spring 1990): 138. 
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power, and this inner conflict of U.S. foreign policy still haunts Americans on the 
issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention. 
Historically, while Americans were idealists abroad, they were nationalist and 
expansionist at home. What came to be called "manifest destiny" brought forth a 
policy of realism and power politics against Indians, Hispanics, and those European 
powers still involved in North America after independence. According to 
Morgenthau, American expansionism on the continent was unbridled realism whose 
history was later suppressed with the illusion that the U.S. was the product of 
idealistic isolationism rather than power politics. Yet Americans remained 
isolationist in regard to Europe for much of the 19th century thanks to Great 
Britain's enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and America's remoteness from a 
relatively stable European political order. America's degree of isolationism has been 
exaggerated, however, as indicated by Paul Johnson's recent argument that America 
has always been internationalist, at least in specific acts if not by general policy.4 
But few would argue that the U.S. view of intervention was historically a narrow one 
directed at keeping markets open and looking out for America's national interest by 
temporary alliances of convenience. Thomas Jefferson summed it up by the phrase, 
"Commerce with all nations, alliance [of permanence] with none." Isolationism and 
American exceptionalism allowed Americans to have it both ways by harsh expansion 
at home, which eventually came to include American imperialism in Central 
4Paul Johnson, "The Myth of American Isolationism," Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 159-64. 
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America, and idealistic detachment from power politics abroad, when it suited 
them.5 
It was near the end of the 19th century when American realism expanded into 
Central America and the Pacific with imperialistic interventions as the U.S. looked 
to expand its markets, recognized the decline of British power, and felt threatened 
by European imperialism and industrialization. As the American desire for a sphere 
of influence in the Western Hemisphere increased and Capt. Alfred T. Mahan's 
geopolitical ideas on naval superiority became popular, economic and then political 
imperialism became more reconcilable with American exceptionalism. Although 
there was considerable domestic controversy evoked over the policies of territorial 
expansion and coercive interference in other countries, most rationalized America's 
new overseas involvement as a continuation of manifest destiny and the frontier ethic 
rather than as a move toward European power politics and imperialism. Except for 
the First World War, when Neo-Hamiltonian realists feared a threat to the national 
interest and neo-Jeffersonian idealists feared that a German defeat of Britain and 
France would lead to a U.S. national security state, America, especially with the 
failure of Wilsonian idealism, remained essentially isolationist until the impending 
5Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and Foreign Policy," 140,142, 
145-6, 150, 155; T71e Encyclopedia of Amen·can Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principle Movements and 
Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), s.v. "Power Politics," by Thomas H. Etold; Hans 
J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States." The American 
Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 964-5, quoting Woodrow Wilson, "Democracy and 
Efficiency," Atlantic Monthly, 87 (March 1901): 293-4; Hugh Brogan, The Pelican History of the United 
States of America (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1985), 450; Robert W. Tucker and 
David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: T71e New World Order and America's Purpose (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 174, 177. 
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threat of fascism, beginning in the 1930s, gradually forced the U.S. towards a new 
internationalism. 6 
The Second World War and the Cold War, of course, changed America into 
an interventionist power for reasons of both idealism and realism. The dramatic 
political changes resulting from the Second World War and its aftermath drew the 
United States by necessity away from any thoughts of isolationism and toward the 
national security state and the realism of European politics, which Jefferson so 
greatly feared. After the Second World War, the idealistic hopes of the end of 
power politics and the beginning of a cooperative and peaceful liberal world order 
became central issues of American foreign policy only to be displaced by the 
exigencies of the Cold War. At the Cold War's end, the same hopes emerged again. 
One issue that struck a cord with most Americans initially was the horrendous 
suffering worldwide, which raised the issue of whether the U.S., as the remaining 
superpower, should intervene for humanitarian reasons. 
While tempting, it is too simplistic to write off American idealism and 
exceptionalism as hypocrisy and utopianism because of America's realist past. Even 
Morgenthau inadvertently provides a defense against the charge of American 
hypocrisy when he argues that idealism is often sincere but delusional and that the 
6Hugh Brogan, Pelican History of the United States, 451-2; Robert W. Tucker and David C. 
Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and Foreign Policy," 177-8; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1994), 39. George Brown Tindall, America: A Narrative History (New York: W.W. 
Norton Company, Inc., 1984), vol. II, 867-70; See Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The 
Imperial Temptation, 179, 182; Alexander Deconde, ed. The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: 
Studies of the Principle Moveme11ts a11d Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978) s.v.; 
"Realism and Idealism," by Paul Seabury. 
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ethic of consequences excuses acts which are popularly seen as immoral.7 Whether 
delusional or not, Americans have earnestly felt the desire to promote their version 
of a liberal world order. 
In regard to European power politics, Americans historically dealt with two 
inner conflicts in their foreign policy. One concerned the desires, on the one hand, 
to reform the world and, on the other, to remain separate from it. The second 
conflict concerned the dilemma of whether to intervene, even to the extent of 
military force to enlarge democratic capitalism--the expansion of which has always 
been seen as a matter of the national interest--or to remain aloof and provide a 
noninterventionary example of America's freedom and prosperity. Indeed, many 
Americans still believe that republicanism will spread throughout the world as the 
fruits of the American experience became apparent. 8 
These conflicts represented the early American battle between the use of 
power and internationalism, on the one hand, and isolationism and the withdrawal 
from power, on the other. Both viewpoints had their advantages and disadvantages. 
An activist foreign policy, though supposedly enlarging democracy, would require the 
very power politics, national security state, large peacetime army, and interventionism 
that republicans like Thomas Jefferson condemned as threatening to democracy at 
home. The other vision of an isolationist and noninterventionist America would 
avoid the European state system's power politics and its corruption of republicanism 
7According to Morgenthau, the Cold War involved ideology as well as interests and was a conflict 
of religion as well as power. Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not To Intervene," Foreign Affairs 
45 (April 1967): 428-9. Also see Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest 
of the United States," American Politica Science Review 46 (December 1952): 982. 
8Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and Foreign Policy," 149. 
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at home but would also mean a dangerously limited American influence abroad that 
was condemned by realists like Alexander Hamilton as a threat to national security. 
To this day, the debate between reformists-interventionists who advocate the use of 
power abroad to enlarge democracy and isolationists-noninterventionists who see the 
use of power as a matter of narrow focus to protect democratic-capitalism at home 
has not been resolved. The reformists-interventionists carried the day against the 
challenges of totalitarianism, but once Soviet Communism was defeated, Americans 
were back to square one on how to promote a liberal world order.9 
With the American national security state a fact since the beginning of the 
Cold War, one would think that interventionism as a threat to democracy at home 
would be a long dead issue. However, with the return of a conservative Republican 
attack on the size of the federal government has come a neo-isolationist fear of the 
U.N. and internationalism as threatening the new shift in American federalism 
towards the states and away from a large central government. Although 
conservatives have certainly gotten past their fear of the national security state by 
their modern acceptance of a large, standing peacetime army, they have been and 
still are skeptical of a large central government unduly influenced by the United 
Nations.10 This resurgence of isolationism indicates that Americans are back to 
square one on the problem of promoting a liberal world order. 
9See Alexander Deconde, ed. 17ie Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy s.v "Power Politics," by 
Thomas H. Etold; Alexander Deconde, ed. 171e Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy s.v. "Realism 
and Idealism," by Paul Seabury; Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial 
Temptation, 169-70. 
10Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, 17ze Imperial Temptation, 54; James Lee Ray, 
Global Politics, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 457-62. 
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Americans have a vision that their fundamental values of peace, commerce, 
free markets, and limited constitutional government are destined to expand 
worldwide into an American liberal world order.11 Today, there are five conflict 
ideological components of the American liberal world order-- namely conservatism, 
neo-isolationism, liberalism, realism, and internationalism--which have evolved from 
American exceptionalism and whose fundamental values currently define the 
philosophical foundations and boundaries of the humanitarian intervention debate. 
Each has implications for the application of morality and justice to international 
politics. While each shares the core value of democratic capitalism, each has its own 
interpretation of the most appropriate American version of liberal world order. Each 
also has been attended by the traditional tension between individual justice and 
international order, i.e., between international morality and realism, and the 
traditional inner conflicts of American foreign policy between isolationist exemplar 
and internationalist crusader. 
The most traditional American foreign policy perspective is conservatism, 
which is a liberal world order view whose core value is individual freedom and 
initiative. It most closely follows the traditional American liberal world order values 
11Alexander Deconde, ed. The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, "Realism and Idealism," by 
Paul Seabury, s.v.; see Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and Foreign 
Policy," 136-7, 138, 155, 167-8, 172-3; Paul Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," s.v.; Alexander Deconde, 
ed. The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy s.v.; "Power Politics," by Thomas H. Etold; R.D. 
McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 29, 
33, 176. 
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of free markets, limited constitutional government, and the individual's right to 
physical safety and property. At the international level, conservative values translate 
into free trade, open world markets, the realization of comparative advantage, and, 
of course, isolationism.12 However, starting in the late 1930s and continuing past 
the Cold War, the threat, first of Fascism and then Communism, led conservatives 
to accept a state-centric view of international relations and to reject their isolationist 
past. As one historian noted, the imperatives of the time changed the conflict from 
" ... between isolationism and internationalism ... " to " ... between weak internationalism 
and strong internationalism."13 One wing of conservatism, however, returned, after 
the Cold War, to the isolationist view of the traditional conservative 19th century 
liberal world order. Their current thinking represents a reversion to a narrow, but 
still statist, view of America's security interest which gives priority to America's 
internal economic and social restoration. It is an America first view whose national 
interest focus is on direct security threats, making it a somewhat more narrow view 
of the national interest than that of realists.14 
Liberalism, on the other hand, places priority on social justice instead of 
individual initiative. It gradually began to take form during the 1930s from the 
American ideals of social justice and democracy, which liberals saw as the primary 
goals of international politics and as achievable through public policy and 
12R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 29-33. 
13Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, Tenth Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), 772. 
14See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 388-9; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 
People, 2, 761-2, 810. 
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internationalism. New Deal liberals responded to what they viewed as the need and 
the equity of providing a productive slot for every person in the modern, democratic 
mass society. They became the first American internationalists in defiance of the 
aggression of the Axis powers. They came to view the welfare and security of the 
United States as connected to that of the Western democracies. As a result, the 
Roosevelt Administration gradually led the U.S. into the Second World War, world 
leadership, and toward internationalism. Liberals modified conservative political 
theory by making government a partner with the private economy to balance 
individual initiative and the collective welfare. Hence, today, unlike conservatives, 
they approve of government regulation in order to control capitalism's tendencies 
toward market concentration and social indifference. Liberal principles translate at 
the international level into global economic management and foreign assistance 
through international organizations. Most importantly, because of both foreign and 
domestic economic deprivation, as well as the prevalence of oppression abroad, 
liberals see the state as an important tool for freedom and social justice. This view 
translates internationally into a state-centrist view of international relations.15 
American realism stays true to its progenitor of European power politics by 
giving priority to the appropriate focus and expenditure of state power in the pursuit 
of the national interest, but develops its own Americanized, intellectual foundation. 
Yet it is not America's historical brand of realism, e.g., its Indian Wars and ruthless 
cultural expansion. America's 20th century realism, unlike its versions of liberalism 
and conservatism, is not a product of American exceptionalism. It is not an originally 
15R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 36-48. 
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American perspective on foreign policy, is not based on traditional liberal world 
order values, and is not representative of the values of democratic capitalism. 
Rather it is primarily an idea of international politics which concentrates on the 
state's security and emphasizes power politics more in the European sense of the 
balance of power. It is also a significant part of the American worldview developed 
as a response to idealism's failure to secure peace in the 1930s and to prevent the 
rise of totalitarianism and harsh power politics during and after the Second World 
War.16 
Like liberal internationalism, realism was a response to the age of 
totalitarianism and the need to defend against the threats of Fascism and 
Communism. Brought to America by German refugees such as Hans Morgenthau 
and Henry Kissinger, the alien ideas of realism were formed from the German 
culture and the horrors of the Holocaust. They contradicted American 
exceptionalism's rejection of European power politics and came to reject both liberal 
and conservative idealism as utopian and isolationism as unrealistic. This form 
realism began to significantly influence American foreign policy at the beginning of 
the Second World War and continued to do so throughout the Cold War. Despite 
its foreign origin, its negative view of human nature, and its emphasis on the state's 
national interest, it was eventually appropriated by the principles of democratic 
capitalism. In this regard, it played a significant role in protecting Western 
16william C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," lntemational Security 19 (Winter 
94/95): 91. 
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democracy and extricating the U.S. from Vietnam by restraining the unbridled and 
moralistic use of power in the U.S. containment of the Soviet Union.17 
American internationalism like America itself, is a melting pot, in this case, 
of the various American schools of thought on foreign policy. It is a 20th century 
creation of American foreign policy leaders and thinkers. It resulted from its 
appropriation of the other American perspectives on foreign policy, except 
isolationism. It is a centrist view of these perspectives and presents a consensus on 
the desirable goals of American foreign policy. It fuses the moderate wings of 
contemporary liberalism and conservatism as well as the more moderate views of 
realism and idealism to form a centrist American foreign policy establishment. The 
Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations are organizations of the 
U.S. foreign policy and business elite that provide, along with their allies, 
internationalism's intellectual and political leadership. 18 
Internationalism may at times waver slightly left or right, but it essentially 
protects against international threats to its two primary interests of Western 
economic well-being and social democracy. Its leaders may talk more left or right 
to please the electorate but, for the most part, come back to the center when making 
policy. Essentially, 'both American realists and idealists have come to see less 
17Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 17zought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986), 1-6; Mary Maxwell, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1990), 13; Walter Isaacsion, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1992), 25-32, 107-8, 653-7. 
18Richard A. Falk, "Contending Approaches to World Order," Joumal of btternational Affairs 31 
(Fall/Winter 1977): 184-6; Liberal internationalism, according to Stanley Hoffmann, emphasizes 
harmony and consensus among like governments but, most importantly, is adept in the use of limited 
war. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 165. 
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conflict between the real world demands of power politics and the core values of 
democratic capitalism. It restrains the intensity of both left and right as well as the 
tension between realism and idealism. 
Internationalism, within certain limits, place priority on a healthy, capitalist 
world economy of social democracies and on their relationship with adjunct, orderly 
non-democratic states. They see a healthy capitalist world economy through 
international trade rather than through internal restoration as the most important 
precondition to international order. Today, American internationalism, according to 
Richard Falk, is the Western foreign policy establishment's world order model based 
on the values of "trade, money, international financial institutions and energy policy." 
As Charles S. Maier remarks of internationalism, "For now a minimal consensus has 
been reached on the primacy of markets with a continuing regulatory role for 
government." Essentially, its primary goals of the survival and growth of democratic 
capitalism, preferably by the expansion and enlargement of capitalist economies, is 
a centrist version of the traditional liberal world order and may be viewed as the 
liberal world order's minimal consensus of values designed for an international 
economy.19 
Internationalism, however, did not develop as part of some grand design of 
world order but rather as a reaction to certain critical points and urgent needs of 
international politics after the Second World War and from the necessities of 
19Richard Falk, Ibid.; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A 17zeory of Change and 
Continuity (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990), .378; See also Walter Isaacson, 
Kissinger: A Biography, 82-6; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, 171e Wise Me11: Six Friends and the 
World They Made, Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Ke1111a11, Lovett, McC/oy (New York: Touchstone, 1986), 
726; Charles S. Maier, "Democracy and Its Discontents," Foreign Affairs 73 (July/ August 1994): 58-9. 
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America's new found power and responsibilities. It adopted realism while 
maintaining the basic values of American exceptionalism. Because of its realist 
component, it willingly accepts political and economic interaction with authoritarian 
capitalist states as well as Communist states to the extent necessary to secure world 
markets and strategic security. While it has made moderate efforts to secure 
freedom abroad, it also recognizes the necessity of protecting the national interest 
and using and focusing power appropriately. One might say that it is the adaptation 
of the ideals and pragmatism of the Founding Fathers to the modern world. 
The Five Components During the Cold War 
America's internationalist foreign policy practitioners and intellectuals, whose 
liberal world order values were mature adaptations and admixtures of conservatism, 
liberalism, and realism, adjusted their principles during the Cold War in favor of 
interventionism to meet the threat of Communism. The Cold War, at least in the 
beginning, was a period of anomalous ideological alignments in American foreign 
policy. Even most conservative isolationists put aside their beliefs for fear of 
Communism. Liberals and conservatives alike were frightened into a unique merger 
of ideologies and a new interventionism, which became the Truman Doctrine. The 
ideas of realism began to influence, perhaps even to dominate, American idealism. 
Until America's involvement in Vietnam, politics did stop at the water's edge, 
although the parameters of containment increasingly became a source of 
disagreement within U.S. foreign policy circles. 
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Conservatives viewed the Cold War as an ideological battle between good and 
evil. They, therefore, not only advocated aggressive interventionism against Soviet 
power, which culminated in the Reagan Doctrine's policy of enlarging freedom 
against communism rather than simply containing it, but also alliances with 
oppressive, right-wing anti-Communist governments, which they later claimed were 
less oppressive and more conducive to democratic reform than totalitarian ones. 
They also came to accept, contrary to traditional American values, a large peacetime 
military and a national security state on the theory that both were preferable to 
defeat by totalitarianism. Paradoxically, people whose core values were individual 
freedom and initiative developed state-centric ideas on foreign policy favoring 
interstate justice over individual justice.20 
Liberals also embraced American interventionism at the beginning of the Cold 
War, in part, from lessons they felt they learned from the Second World War. 
Because of their dislike of isolationism, their fear of appeasement, and their desire 
to prove their anti-Communist credentials, they easily transferred their 
internationalism from Nazi to Soviet aggression but not without eventually some 
controversy within their own ranks. They at first accepted aggressive containment, 
despite their belief iri the social roots of revolution. But, because of the Viet Nam 
War, liberals changed significantly to support a less aggressive form of containment 
20R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 192-4, 195-6; Although more a paper tiger, early 
on, conservative, anti-Communist Secretary of State John Foster Dulles preached liberation of Eastern 
Europe, attacked containment as too passive, and negotiated many anti-Soviet defense treaties. 
Conservative interventionists wanted, in Kissinger's words, "a strategy of liberation" to roll back 
communism. Conservative interventionism became a new form of American exceptionalism and a 
harbinger of the more toned-down Reagan Doctrine; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 470; Seabury, " 
Realism and Idealism," s.v.; Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 17wugllt, 124; see Samuel P. Huntington, 
"American Ideals versus American Institutions," Political Science Quarlerly 97 (1982): 29. 
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and interventionism. After Vietnam, liberals became more conciliatory toward the 
Soviet Union and returned to their roots of social injustice as the cause of revolution, 
especially in regard to the non-aligned states of the Third World. The improvement 
of the economic and social conditions of the underdeveloped states through global 
distributive justice came to be seen as the cure for revolution and Soviet influence 
in the Third World. As a result, liberals broadened their definition of the national 
interest beyond realism's security dilemma to include traditional non-security "global 
threats" such as poverty, famine and disease. Security, distributive justice, and global 
prosperity came to be viewed as interdependent. They also grew to dislike alliances 
with right-wing governments and saw military confrontation and intervention as 
tending to uphold corrupt, anti-democratic governments and to divert resources away 
from the real breeding grounds of communism. Gradually, liberals placed their 
hopes on global, economic management and foreign assistance through international 
organizations. Superpower confrontation was rejected as inflaming East-West 
tensions, exacerbating those social conditions encouraging revolution, and increasing 
the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Instead, they advocated compromise and 
detente as pragmatic and morally compelling alternatives to confrontational policies. 
As their Cold War· reasoning matured, they placed their faith in foreign aid, 
disarmament, collective security, international organizations, cooperative treaties, and 
a little more world leadership by example than by force. 21 
21R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 48, 198-9; Contemporary liberals, e.g., Arthur 
Schlesinger, originally supported the American involvement in Vietnam as a commitment to freedom 
and for authoritarian states the future possibility for reform into democracy. Michael Joseph Smith, 
"Liberalism and International Reform," in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Editors) Traditions of 
Intemational Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 214-5. Also see Yale H. Ferguson 
and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: T/1e01)' and Intemational Politics (Columbia, S.C.: 
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Realism also became influential in American foreign policy as a response to 
totalitarianism. Despite efforts at fidelity to their idealistic roots, Americans could 
not ignore the uses of power and the importance of the national interest in an 
increasingly dangerous world. For the first time, Americans felt that their survival 
and democratic values were threatened, despite the limited, Soviet nuclear arsenal 
in the beginning. Americans felt compelled by these events not only to abandon 
isolationism but also to act in international politics according to the realities of 
power. The result was an American version of realism which began to dominate 
American foreign policy. But realists had complex views about the uses of power. 
They rejected as irrational the aggressive, globalist view of containment accepted at 
first by both conservatives and liberals, which considered Communism a monolithic 
threat to be fought by intervention worldwide. They argued that the U.S. emphasis 
on ideology was a form of moralism which gave America an exaggerated sense of 
power and a self assurance of righteousness that was likely to interfere with the 
realistic assessment of the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and the effective focus 
and expenditure of U.S. power. Morgenthau warned that the superpowers' 
ideologically motivated moralism blinded them to the limits of power. He argued 
that the U.S., by mistakenly acting as if all revolutions were Communist inspired 
threats to its security, was misdirecting its power to areas unrelated to the national 
interest. Hence, his vocal opposition to America's involvement in Vietnam as the 
University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 148-9. 
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moralistic misdirection of U.S. power from areas and issues important to its national 
interest. 22 
Internationalism's role during the Cold War was as important as it was subtle 
in defeating Soviet Communism or, perhaps more accurately stated, in protecting the 
West while Soviet Communism defeated itself. It accepted the national security state 
as a necessity for U.S. and Western security during the Cold War, but it also did not 
devour capitalism and civil liberties, contrary to Jeffersonian assumptions, despite the 
growth of the powers of the federal government and the increasing social problems 
of the Western democracies. Containment was a delicate and painful issue for the 
U.S. and its allies, but, despite the folly of Vietnam, somehow, internationalism 
managed to restrain isolationism, liberal and conservative moralism, and the 
significant but not absolute influence of realism in order to successfully navigate, in 
the longrun, a middle course of reasonable parameters for containment and 
interventionism. Internationalism guided the U.S. successfully between the Reagan 
and Johnson Doctrines and achieved reciprocal restraint between the superpowers 
in the nuclear age. But while internationalism also made important, if limited, 
strides in promoting human rights, it also showed few reservations about using power 
and intervention, regardless of whether or not human rights were advanced, to 
protect its core values of democratic capitalism, world economic growth, security ties 
with Western Europe, and international order. It was successful at making an uneasy 
accord within American foreign policy between realism and idealism to save the 
~ary Maxwell, Morality Among Nations, 13; Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The 
Elusive Quest, 97, 150; Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not To Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45 
(April 1967): 434-36. 
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West, but, as will be seen in regard to the issues of human rights after the Cold War, 
the message of internationalism does not bode well for the future of stopping 
structure violence and other massive, human rights violations.23 
The Five Components After the Cold War 
Once the Cold War ended, Americans and the American foreign policy 
establishment again faced the problems of forming the appropriate inter-relationships 
among liberal world order values, intervention, international order, interstate, 
cosmopolitan, and individual justice, especially in light of the atrocities of ethnic and 
religious nationalism and self-determination. To debate the resolution of these 
problems, Americans went back to their traditional core liberal world order values, 
their particular views on intervention formed from these values, and the particular 
views held by each American foreign policy perspective on the relationship in 
international politics between justice and order. However, these fundamental values 
and assumptions of the various American perspectives on foreign policy could not 
resolve the humanitarian intervention debate--at least intellectually and morally in 
terms of stopping atrocities and mass, human rights violations--and the passivity of 
internationalism in the face of structural violence seems to have decided the issue. 
As representatives of each perspective returned to their roots, the ideological 
alignments on Cold War intervention broke down, leaving a confusing multitude of 
possible options, none of which appeared too promising. Many conservatives and 
2.1See Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 113-30, 
for a discussion on the maturing of the policy of containment as the Cold War progressed. 
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liberals preferred interventionism because of their idealism. Other conservatives 
preferred an updated form of isolationism because they felt that American economic 
and political security could be protected most effectively, despite such a policy's 
inevitable assault on international cooperation, by America's 19th century foreign 
policy traditions, including that of being the world's exemplar instead of crusader. 
Realists, however, rejected conservative and liberal interventionism as utopian 
idealism and neo-isolationism as a modern day head-in-the-sand know-nothingism. 
Instead, they preached moderation and preferred a more traditional view of national 
security, although they began to accept some of the newly profiled global threats as 
possible security issues. But internationalism, as the source of equilibrium among 
America's various foreign policy perspectives during the Cold war, pursued 
moderation in all areas of post-Cold War international politics, including the use of 
military intervention, although it flirted with liberal interventionism in Somalia. And, 
today, internationalism still dominates American foreign policy, represents its center, 
and is the strongest American influence on the evolution of contemporary 
international relations and the future of humanitarian intervention, which, as 
internationalist values indicate, is not too promising. 
Liberalism 
Liberalism today rejects the pursuit of individual justice as conflicting with 
international order and, based on its roots of social justice and Wilsonian idealism, 
advocates reform humanitarian intervention or nation-building. Since social justice 
presupposes all desirable ends in international politics, liberals assume that 
international conflict is minimized by democracy plus Wilsonian self-determination 
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and the end of global, economic deprivation and political oppression. Hence, international 
order is best served in the longrun by a distribution of the world's economic resources such 
that the most disadvantaged of the world's people receive the minimum level of assistance 
needed to assure them a meaningful quality of life. 
In particular, liberals see dysfunctional or failed states debilitated by ethnic conflict and 
nationalism as increasing disorder and global threats and civil war as a siren to other states 
to cause trouble. Liberals argue that U.S. Cold War moralism exacerbated the problems of 
failed states and that such problems as refugee flows and violence move beyond their 
borders to exacerbate the forces of social disorder lurking in other troubled states. And 
now with the Cold War over, they see no reason that states cannot cooperate more fully 
and use their collective power, especially through diplomacy and economic assistance and 
sanctions, to solve the problems of failed states, to stop human rights abuses, and to end 
structural violence. As part of this worldview, liberals also elevate the newly profiled 
global threats to the level of security issues and argue that collective action against these 
threats is in the national interest of states, both collectively and individually. These 
arguments, not surprisingly, are consistent with the position of liberals during the Cold War 
that a society of socially just states presented the best defense against Communist 
revolution, whether domestically grown or imported. 24 
Z4Tue idea of the dysfunctional or failed state and the controversy over whether dysfunctional states are 
a threat to the social order of other states and the international community are not new. The idea of 
dysfunctional states in international politics became evident in the aftermath of the French Revolution. 
Under Metternich's diplomacy, the Concert of Europe pursued intervention against nationalism to protect 
monarchy. Britain's foreign secretary, Robert Castlereagh, on the other hand, was strictly interested in the 
use of intervention to preserve the balance of power for a nonthreatening equilibrium in Europe. To the 
states of continental Europe, order depended upon intervening against revolutionary instability within 
states. To Britain, with a body of water between it and the other states of Europe, order depended much 
more upon the balance of power than upon abstract ideological ideas; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 86-9. 
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Liberal inteiventionists, however, make a radical departure from their mature, Cold War 
non-confrontational view of international politics, reminiscent of their early support for 
intervention in Vietnam, when they support military intervention on behalf of nation-
building to achieve institutional reform of the target state. But in another sense, their 
support of military intetvention is a logical extension of their belief in collective security on 
behalf of the world's peace and security, which they charge is threatened by structural 
violence and other forms of human rights violations. Accordingly, they advocate enlarging 
liberal world order values by a policy of military humanitarian intervention through the 
authority of the United Nations and regional organizations, which they claim to be a 
morally compelling and concrete step toward defying structural violence, both as genocide 
and economic deprivation, as well as protecting U.S. national interests. The American 
foreign policy establishment rejects such views as utopian, at least to the extent that they 
support the use of force. 25 
Conservatism 
Conservative interventionists, on the other hand, base their position on the more 
traditional values of American exceptionalism instead of those of social justice as advocated 
by liberal intetventionists. Accordingly, conservatives want to intervene militarily in non-
democratic and socially dysfunctional or failed states to assure civilian populations of 
25Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists,' Foreign Affairs 72 (American and the World 
1992/93): 2-10. 
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their rights to individual initiative, free markets, and democracy. They see oppressive 
states as destroying the freedoms needed for worldwide individual initiative and 
democratic capitalism. They argue that the change in the nature of the threat to 
freedom does not change American and Western responsibility to preserve freedom 
in a still hostile world of such evils as ethnic cleansing, whose immorality and 
destructiveness equates with that of Communism and, therefore, threatens freedom 
everywhere. They see ethnic nationalists, such as the Bosnian Serbs, as simply 
modern versions of historical aggressors, such as the Nazis and the Communists, 
against the individual and economic rights of the people. In doing so, they view 
intervention in its more traditional sense of aid to help the victims of aggression and 
dictatorship earn their freedom. This view translates into a preference for the 
compellent use of force, i.e.,., the use of force against carefully chosen targets to stop 
the aggression. Two of the most prominent and eloquent advocates of this position 
are former President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher who have called for the 
international community to arm the Bosnian Government and to punish and stop 
Bosnian Serb aggression by carefully selected air strikes.26 
Conservative interventionists reject their 19th century view of isolationism for 
the same reason today that they did during the Cold War, namely the threat of 
totalitarianism. During the Cold War, they came to see the international community 
and the United Nations as useful, if not trusted, instruments against Communism, 
~ee Ronald Reagan, "Why We Should Remember," Washington Post, 5 June 1994, sec. C, p. 1; 
Ronald Reagan, "West's Battle Against Evil Has Not Yet Been Finished." Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
27 December 1992, sec. F, p.1; Margarat Thatcher, "Stop Excuses: Help Bosnia Now," New York 
Times, 6 August 1992, p. A23; For a definition and discussion of compellence, see Richard N. Haass, 
Intervention: The Use of Military Force in tlte Post-Cold War World, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 53-6. 
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and today they also wish to use the U.N. for collective action against aggressors. 
Unlike liberals, who see the U.N. as an instructment to achieve social justice through 
a respect for the diversity of states, they see it as an organization to be dominated 
by American values and power in the crusade against aggression and to be discarded 
if it fails to abide by them. Hence, conservative Republicans showed their disdain 
for the international community by advocating a unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo against Bosnia regardless of whether the U.N. agreed.27 
However, like their fellow liberal idealists, the ideas of conservative 
interventionists are also rejected by the American foreign policy establishment, not 
so much on the basis that they are utopian, but rather because they conflict with the 
"national interest." The disorder in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and Africa 
is claimed by realists and internationalists not to affect the values, security and 
prosperity of the United States, at least not to the degree claimed by conservative 
interventionists. It is true that the accompanying structural violence and human 
rights abuses are an affront to American values, but, according to internationalists, 
the refusal to act against them can be reconciled with American values by 
recognizing that the costs of intervention in lives and money would be too high, that 
the use of force, induding compellence, would likely not resolve the abuses, that an 
overextended U.S. would needlessly be exposed to new dangers, and that the 
nsenator Dole has a bill before the Senate to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians, 
unilaterally if need be, which President Clinton has threatened to veto. The Republicans were reported 
to possibly have the party decipline to override his veto; "Behind the Truce," The Economist, January 
14, 1995, p. 48. 
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unrealistic pursuit of individual justice would harm the maximization of overall justice 
in the longrun.28 
Neo-Isolationism 
Neo-isolationists, unlike conservative interventionists, have returned to 19th 
century traditional, liberal world order values. The current thinking of neo-
isolationists is a reversion to a narrow view of the national interest, a belief in 
America first, especially in economics, a minimalist acceptance of free trade, 
sanctions short of force against remaining Communist states, a rejection of the 
usefulness of the United Nations, and the idea of the U.S. as an example of liberty 
and prosperity to the world. Accordingly, they believe strongly in democracy's 
universal appeal and the doctrine of self-help. They view democratic capitalism as 
attractive enough to the world that many will be willing and able to earn their 
freedom. They assume that the global consumer eventually will demand a liberal 
world order. As a result, they do not see global threats as emergencies in need of 
immediate and drastic action, but rather as problems, which are overstated by liberals 
and internationalists and that the technology and individual initiative of democratic 
capitalism can eventually solve. Consequently, they see reform intervention as a 
wasteful diversion of resources from internal economic and social restoration. In 
fact, they see intervention limited to resolving only direct threats to the physical 
security of the U.S. homeland. Thus, exceptions to the nonintervention norm are even 
28Charles William Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995): 108-13. 
According to Maynes, compellence may not work in ethnic conflict where leaders may have little control 
over or accountability to their followers. They may also have too high a stake in their own 
demagoguery. 
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more narrow for realists. Their exceptions are so narrow that even threats to oil 
kingdoms in the Middle East may not be a matter of the national interest. U.S. 
involvement in power politics without a major enemy and an overwhelming threat is 
seen as a wasteful form of interventionism. Certainly, according to this view, 
individual justice is a low priority in the liberal world order of neo-isolationists. The 
implication is that the pursuit of individual justice is harmful to international order 
and overall justice. As to structural violence and human rights abuses, the victims 
of these, like the poor, will always be with us. Essentially, neo-isolationism is a 
modern faith in American exceptionalism's ability to bring other deserving states into 
line with democratic capitalism, which cannot be bothered with the world's 
imperfections. 29 
Neo-isolationists also reject the idea of the dysfunctional state as a threat to 
international order and the U.S. national interest. Instead, they see international 
order and democracy as dependent upon the economic and political stability of the 
U.S., which is threatened by competition from Europe and Asia and social 
disintegration at home. Therefore, the U.S. needs to severely limit its role as world 
policeman in order to concentrate on building up its social and economic strength. 
While to neo-isolationists the suffering of dysfunctional states is regrettable, the hard 
reality is that the oppressed and suffering who cannot earn their freedom will always 
be with us and will most of the time be only on the periphery of U.S. interest. In any 
29Doug Bandow, "Avoiding War," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/93): 172. Also see Thomas W. 
Lippman, "GOP-Controlled Foreign Policy Panels Would Reverse Several Clinton Stands," The 
Washington Post, May 21, 1995, sec. A, p. 7; Julia Preston, "Blue Hat Blues," The Washington Post, 
February 19, 1995, sec. C, p.1; Thomas L. Friedman, "Dissing the World," New York Times, February 
19, 1995, sec. IV., p. 13; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 29-35. 
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event, their best chance to earn their freedom is in an expanding liberal world order 
led by the example of a healthy United States. 
For a host of reasons, the American foreign policy establishment also rejects 
neo-isolationism. The desirability of democracy abroad, if earned, and the need for 
economic improvement at home becomes a rationale for compromising international 
human rights abuses and tolerating authoritarian states. Liberals do not like the rigid 
noninterventionism of neo-isolationism because it is consistent with that part of Cold 
War conservatism which supported right-wing governments, provided they were anti-
Communist. Because neo-isolationists are minimally critical of human rights abuses 
abroad, especially if they are consistent with U.S. military and economic interests, 
liberals see them as insufficiently protective of American values internationally. 
Theirs been called an extremist and a narcissistic moralism which discounts the 
humanity of others. Their narrow view of the national interest also raises the ire of 
realists. Though realists today, like neo-isolationists, are basically anti-interventionist, 
especially where humanitarian purposes are concerned, realists reject the neo-
isolationist limitation of vital national interests to direct security threats. 
Intervention to them is still a matter of the appropriate focus and expenditure of the 
state's power concerning primary and secondary threats to the national interest, 
although such intervention may, on occasion, incidentally cause the moral dividend 
of stopping human rights abuses, as in Cambodia, Uganda, and Bangladesh.30 
30See Robert D. Kaplan, review of Have A Nice Day: From the Balkans to the American Dream, by 
Dubravka Ugresic, translated from the Serbo-Croatian by Celia Hawkesworth, in The Washington Post 
Book World, March 5, 1995, p. 7. 
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Pragmatic Neo-isolationism 
Other neo-isolationists, termed here pragmatic neo-isolationist, are not the 
refugees of Cold War conservatism. Instead, they are pragmatists and reformed 
realists, rather than ideologues, who argue that U.S. foreign policy should have a 
domestic focus. They show that they are not ideologues by recommending, in 
contradiction to conservative ideology, that some economic nationalism and 
limitations on free trade should be used when beneficial to the U.S. They see 
themselves as new post-Cold War realists who might aptly be described as believers 
in realism-lite or even perhaps as internationalists in a weak sense. They deny being 
isolationist claiming instead that their views allow for a more realistic focus and 
expenditure of U.S. power. Like realists, they reject as utopian the hope of liberal 
interventionists that increasing interdependence and transnational problems will lead 
states into a new cooperation out of enlightened self-interest. They reject as utopian 
idealism both the belief in the ability of the U.N. and individual states to make peace 
and to reform failed states and the ability of neo-isolationism to expand democracy 
by example. While conservative neo-isolationists distrust the U.N, pragmatic neo-
isolationists simply see it as incapable of effective collective security in a world still 
dominated by power politics.31 
Pragmatic neo-isolationists reject the idea of the dysfunctional state as a threat 
to international order and the national interest, which leads to their rejection of 
reform intervention and nation-building. Neither the extinction of disorder nor the 
31Alan Tonelson, "Clinton's World," The Atla11tic Mo11tllly (February 1993), 71 -4; see Doug 
Bandow, "Avoiding War," 169, 172; Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Foreign Policy Team Misreading Threats," The 
Post and Courier (Charleston, S.C.), April 3, 1995, p. 9A. 
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triumph of democracy, according to neo-isolationists, is needed for U.S. security. 
Doug Bandow, who presents the classic arguments of pragmatic neo-isolationism, 
points out that the years of disorder in Africa have had little influence on U.S. 
security. He also points out that Somalia's woes are of little impact on the U.S and 
that even the war in the former Yugoslavia has not spread into the regional 
contagion interventionists predicted. The reality of disorder, concludes Bandow, is 
that it " ... poses little danger to America and can be contained by other states, met by 
more modest steps such as sanctions, or simply ignored." As an alternative to U.S. 
intervention, states can take care of the disorder within their own regions, but if they 
cannot, the U.S. is still at little risk.32 
Pragmatic neo-isolationists, though sti11 holding that power is at the center of 
international politics, argue that the new world order requires a nonconventional, 
restricted interpretation of the national interest, since the U.S. is no longer under 
threat from another superpower but is facing increasing social disorder at home. 
Therefore, the national interest of U.S. foreign policy takes on the different meaning 
of retrenchment, in which the U.S. should concentrate on direct threats to its security 
in lieu of a continuing global mission. For instance, it is recommended that the U.S. 
withdraw most of its forces from Europe to avoid contact with the political instability 
of the former Soviet bloc but intervene to destroy clear security threats such as 
weapons of mass destruction. Bandow opines that most wars are not related to U.S. 
32Alan Tonelson, Ibid.; Doug Bandow, Ibid., 165-7, 173. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Foreign Policy 
Team Misreading Threats," Ibid., where she writes that, "There are some serious problems in some parts 
of the world. They endanger some portions of some populations--especially in Africa. But they do not 
constitute a significant threat to the lives and limbs and the vital interests of Americans or of its allies 
[sic] or the survival of our civilization ... [Nor do] transnational problems ... endanger our survival." 
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national interests, but a globalist attempt to extinguish war would place the U.S. 
under threats otherwise avoidable. Essentially, their position is that economic and 
social challenges at home must take priority subject to the realities of international 
politics.33 
Pragmatic neo-isolationism is rejected by the U.S. foreign policy establishment 
as providing an insufficient rationale for the pursuit of American national interests 
on issues where realists say reciprocity is needed for minimum international order 
and justice. Likewise, their narrow view of security concerns is seen as ignoring 
indirect but serious dangers to the U.S which must be dealt with now if they are not 
~tually to become direct threats. Also, internationalists see such a narrow view 
of the national interest as an insensitivity to human rights abuses which unnecessarily 
dismisses realism's moral dividend of humanitarian assistance incidental to the use 
of power.34 
Realism 
Realists today still see intervention in terms of the appropriate focus and 
expenditure of U.S. power and the idealism-realism dichotomy in terms of 
Morgenthau's attack upon the goals of American exceptionalism, which he saw as 
utopian because they represent "abstract principles" displacing "concrete interests." 
Realists apply Morgenthau's warning against moralism to today's issues arguing that 
it produces an exaggerated sense of state power which encourages unsuccessful and 
33 Alan Tonelson, Ibid.; Doug Bandow, Ibid., 167, 171. 
34See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70 (American and the World 
1990/91): 29; Krauthammer criticizes even the pragmatic neo-isolationalism of realist Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick as oblivious to international politics' permanent state of exigency. 
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morally unconscionable interventions. While policies such as reform intervention 
appeal to the ideals of American exceptionalism, they present the risk of American 
interventionism degenerating into a new form of moralism just as disastrous as any 
of the past. Realists claim instead that maximizing American goals is best done by 
the effective, moderate use of power politics. Realists see intervention in a broader 
context than neo-isolationists but in a narrower one than either conservative or 
liberal idealists. They see the machinations of international politics as too complex 
to view only direct threats as matters of vital interest, but they also see intervention 
for social reform and democracy as another example of moralism's misguided focus 
and expenditure of power. American realists see human rights and global problems 
as constrained by the realities of power and the national interest, but they also 
recognize that a credible, international human rights regime, within realistic limits, 
is becoming a core U.S. value and a part of reciprocity among states. Their view of 
the national interest allows for interventions where the subtleties of power present 
issues of vital interest to the U.S., including human rights, but not solely based on 
human rights. To them, the reform and crusading views of liberal and conservative 
interventionists are viewed as moralism likely to resurrect the moral skepticism and 
disillusionment whiCh followed the Vietnam War's aftermath. Yet, they also agree 
that human rights should be protected where feasible, low in cost, and beneficial to 
the national interest.35 
35Kenneth W. Thompson, Traditions a11d Values i11 Politics a11d Diplomacy, 88, 91-2, 195, 341; Hans 
J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," The American 
Political Scie11ce Review 46 (December 1952): 972; Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Political 
Realism, Respo11sible Power, a11d American C11/t11rre i11 tlte N11clear Age (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991), 5; Leo McCarthy, "International Anarchy, Realism and Non-Intervention," in 
Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffmann (editors) Political TheOI)'. !11tematio11al Relatio11s and the Ethics of 
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The realist general opposition to humanitarian intervention is consistent with 
its Cold War opposition to ideological intervention. Consummate realist Henry 
Kissinger criticizes the interventions in Somalia and Haiti by providing the basic 
realist arguments against the contemporary use of humanitarian intervention and 
equating the past abuses of ideological interventions with today's humanitarian ones. 
He attacks the risk of American causalities in a place where he argues U.S. national 
security is not involved. As in Vietnam, the political will of the American people, 
as they become aware that no direct security threat is involved, will not support the 
level of causalities needed for nation-building. Kissinger also questions reform 
intervention and nation-building in Haiti. He argues that the local political process 
is too complex for nation-building. For instance, the restoration of Haiti means the 
initiation of Haitian democracy which surpasses our military and political 
capabilities.36 
Kissinger also claims that humanitarian intervention is detrimental to a 
desirable reconfiguration of international politics after the Cold War, especially in 
the former Soviet bloc. Despite its good intentions, unilateral U.S. humanitarian 
intervention, according to Kissinger, sets a bad precedent for using moralism and the 
maintenance of order as justifications for expansionist policies and is one which 
Russia and rogue or imperialist states could use to excuse their expansionism and 
aggression. A significant example to Kissinger of using regional order and moralism 
Intervention (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 79. 
~ee Henry Kissinger, "American Intervention: Somalia Reservations, " Washingto11 Post, 13 
December 1992, Sec. C, p. 7; Henry Kissinger, "What Kind of New World Order," Washingto11 Post, 
3 December 1991, p. A21; Henry Kissinger, "Out of Haiti--Fast," Washi11gto11 Post, 25 September 1994, 
Sec. C, p. 7. 
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as an excuse for aggression is Russia's attitude to its near abroad of those new states 
of the former Soviet Union targeted by Russia's renewed but traditional imperialism 
in the region. Russia supported the U.N. resolution authorizing the U.S. intervention 
in Haiti, Kissinger charges, to help set a convenient precedent legitimizing its own 
regional imperialism, which the U.S. is exacerbating by its pronouncements 
supporting the regional responsibility of major powers to maintain peace and 
international and regional order. Thus, the subsequent conflict in Chechya is to the 
international community and the U.S. an "internal affair." For these reasons, the 
American foreign policy establishment does not reject realism and the ethic of 
consequences but instead feels that it must restrain and temper realism in order for 
Americans to maintain a moral vision of their foreign policy and to support a 
moderate, international human rights regime. One significant criticism of realism, 
which is now a major U.S. foreign policy debate, is that the Soviet Union's demise 
resulted from a revolution of ideas, e.g., Gorbachev's reforms, as opposed to changes 
in the relative power of states, with the implication that democratic values can break 
states out of the security dilemma. Hence, human rights advocates, including some 
conservative and liberal interventionists, see internationalism's appropriation of 
realism as really the reverse of the path which led to the Cold War's end. In such 
a case, structural violence cannot be stopped because of a cowardly and selfish U.S. 
foreign policy dominated by realist thinking. 37 
37Henry Kissinger, "Out of Haiti--Fast," p. C7; William C. Wohlfarth, "Realism and the End of the 
Cold War," 108-9. 
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Internationalism 
Contemporary futemationalism's centrist position, with its emphasis on international 
order and the power of the state as preconditions to economic well-being and political 
stability, still appropriates much realist thinking, especially on the effective focus and 
expenditure of power. Also indicative of realism's strong influence on internationalism is 
the political and economic interaction of the West with authoritarian, Communist, and 
other oppressive states in order to enhance the capitalist world economy and international 
order. fu turn, human rights are seen as important but secondary to economic stability and 
a strong nonintervention norm, meaning that military intervention is going to be rare and 
primarily to protect the world economy. Edward Luttwak exemplifies internationalism's 
moral reasoning which defines the national interest in terms of economic well-being. 
futernationalism's primary foreign policy goal is an environment conducive to conducting 
business, which is a peaceful and orderly world without the distraction or disruption of 
either conflict or religious moralism, e.g., the activities of Serbs and Iranians. Activities of 
these miscreants is not seen in terms of human rights but in terms of preserving an 
environment protective of business, such as the secure, constant flow of resources among 
states necessary for the functioning of a sophisticated world economy.38 Human rights 
abuses become significant only once some economic or other security issue forces action. 
Luttwak's argument is that Western access to the oil needed for a viable global economy 
is a matter of self-preservation justifying military intervention to secure embargoed oil 
fields. His moral justification of intervention is based on the ethic of consequences in 
38See Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld.," The Atlantic Monthly (March 1992): 54-5. 
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that there would be great loss of life in both industrial and Third World states were 
the world economy to collapse. While military intervention against embargoed oil 
fields has yet to arise, Luttwak's ideas were prophetic of the Western 
counterintervention against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. His argument essentially is a 
moral one in that the failure of democracy as a result of economic collapse produces 
the greatest degree of individual injustice in the world.39 
Nonetheless, Internationalism, despite its appropriation of realist principles, 
is based on protecting democratic values at home and securing them abroad. But at 
the center of internationalism is the realist-inspired belief that freedom depends upon 
the prosperity of the Western economic system, which cannot safely dismiss the ethic 
of consequences and give priority to individual justice. Therefore, internationalists 
focus and expend U.S. power for the purpose of preserving the global economy and 
the welfare of Western democracies. Humanitarian intervention, therefore, is seldom 
an option unless, in the process of protecting the global economy, the West also 
eases its conscience about masses of starving people shown on television. Hence, 
George Bush, the quintessential internationalist, could base intervention, in part, on 
protecting human rights in Kuwait and easing the suffering in Somalia. Yet Bill 
39Edward Luttwak, "Intervention and Access to Natural Resources," in Hedley Bull (editor) 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), 79-85. On the other hand, Hedley Bull, 
who accepts the basic tenets of realism, charges that intervention to protect natural resources sets a 
precedent of flagrant interventionism, for states may then use the excuse of protecting natural resources 
to pursue a foreign policy of either moralism or egoism instead of the national interests. Bull's criticism, 
however, does not consider the centrist thinking and self-restraint on the part of the Western 
democracies which selectively use intervention to protect the global economy and to prevent state 
hegemony over strategic energy resources. Indeed, internationalism's use of intervention is neither 
unbridled realism nor moral skepticism. See Hedley Bull, "Conclusion," in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention 
in World Politics (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), 190. 
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Clinton, who accepted the mantle of internationalism, could call the Russian assault 
on the civilians of Chechnya an internal affair. Moderation has its price.40 
Internationalism upholds democratic capitalism and encourages a centrist 
political worldview, but it does not guarantee human rights or even minimum human 
decency in many places. Democracy abroad, though desirable, is not necessary to 
world stability and economic well-being. While loss of freedom at home would 
probably be a matter of vital national interest, the lack of democracy in the rest of 
the world, although discouraging to internationalist principles, is secondary to the 
necessities of a healthy global economy. In order to rationalize their actions of 
moral ambiguity on human rights and genocide, internationalists seek a token human 
rights regime of some use to the oppressed, which, depending upon one's political 
perspective, can be seen as the glass half-empty or half-full. This calculated 
ambiguity of international human rights enforcement rationalizes a pragmatic foreign 
policy for internationalists while mitigating the cognitive dissonance between their 
ideals and their pragmatism. Internationalism does little, however, to end structural 
violence and massive human rights violations, and it certainly provides no 
fundamental values supportive of humanitarian intervention. 
40See Zbgniew Brzezinski, "Moscow's Accomplice," 17ze Washington Post, January 8, 1995, sec. c, 
p.7; Semyon Reznik, "Chechnya: Why We Will Regret Our Failure To Act," The Washington Times, 
February 20, 1995, p. A21; Paul Johnson, "Genocide Proceeds in Chechnya as West Slumbers," 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 6, 1995, p. A9; "Yelsin Warns Chechens to End Civil War or Else," 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 11, 1994, p. AlO. Senator Mitch McConnell, one of the more 
authoritative Republicans in the Senate on foreign affairs, calls himself a " firm 'internationalist,"' but 
reportedly " ... believes that 'the Russians have every right to deal with it [Chechya] as they see fit'--since 
it lies within the boundaries of the Russian Federation." Lally Weymouth, "Mitch McConnell's 
Worldview," The Washington Post, January 8, 1995, sec. C, p. 7. 
Chapter VII 
Humanitarian Intervention: 
Critique and Conclusions 
The Limits of Knowledge and America's 
Perspectives on International Politics 
Neither the core values of American internationalism nor the acquired 
knowledge of humanity about international politics provides the basis for the use of 
military humanitarian intervention to end structural violence and other severe human 
rights violations. Still unresolved are those problems of international politics which 
block the transformation of international morality from interstate justice to individual 
justice. Without resolution of the problems of unpredictability, subjectivity of 
judgment, the ethic of consequences, moral and cultural relativism, state legitimacy, 
nationalism, and self-determination, there can be no shift from the preference by 
political leaders and the people for international order to a perference for individual 
justice. And without a strong international committment to individual justice, states 
have no basis on which to develop the political will to act militarily against structural 
violence. That is why the international human rights regime, though greatly 
strengthened since the 1970s, is still weak in comparison to the state's authority to 
take life and liberty from its citizens. 
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For Americans, this impasse is a moral dilemma. Caught between their 
idealistic impusles and these insoluble problems and without the benefit of 
prescriptive theory and the universal application of the rule of law, Americans fear 
that not to intervene is to accept the world's horrific political cruelty but to intervene 
is to make themselves martyrs for an unknown objective. In addition, the television 
pictures of the dead and suffering wear on the American conscience. But, in any 
event, the traditional American perspectives on foreign policy of isolationism, 
conservatism, liberalism, realism, and internationalism provide no answers to the 
problem of structural violence. 
The more historical form of American isolationism certainly is no option in 
today's world since it essentailly writes off those in the rest of the world who cannot 
earn their own freedom, but it is a reminder of the depth of American 
exceptionalism, nationalism, and America's conflict between reform and example to 
the rest of the world. Pragmatic isolationism also writes off those in the rest of the 
world, but it also is a reminder that Americans must concentrate on their 
increaseningly severe social problems at home. Liberal and conservative 
interventionists, on the other hand, want to reform the world, though in different 
ways. Liberals want to empower victims of human rights violations by an American 
foreign policy of nation-building in failed states, while conservatives want to assist 
those worthy of earning their freedom. But nation-building appears utopian in 
concept and cannot get past the ethic of consequences, and the compellence 
suggested by conservatives to arm the Bosnians and to bomb the Serbs, though 
probably the most realistic form of intervention, is a victim of timing and the West's 
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lack of political will. As to realism, it is always a reminder that international politics 
cannot escape the ethic of consequences, but it also is now a component of American 
internationalism and exceptionalism, which means that even realists cannot discount 
international morality, especially involving moral imperatives, such as the goal of 
ending genocide. 
Internationalism and Intervention 
To get the most accurate assessment of the future of humanitarian 
intervention, one must look at American internationalism, which controls the other 
American perspectives, dominates U.S. foreign policy, and possesses those economic 
core values desired worldwide. The priority of American internationalism is on a 
prosperous, capitalistic world economy and the security of democracy at home. Due 
to internationalism's deference to the ethic of consequences and the national interest 
in securing these goals, the commitment to democracy and human rights abroad is 
stronger in theory than in reality. Thus, American foreign policy is often 
incompatible with the goals of individual justice and ending structural violence, 
although reaosnable, or feeble, efforts, depending upon one's perspective, are made. 
These goals also conflict with those of anti-modernest and anti-Western cultures, 
making Western humanitarian intervention suspect in the Third World. Under such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that the national interest still has priority with 
American internationalists and that the thankless task of helping the victims of 
structural violence, other than on a very limited basis, e.g., safe zones, is not likely 
to take place. The same is true for the Third World where many states are internally 
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divided between the desire for Western prosperity and the desires of ethnic and 
survival nationalism. 
Is Economic Prosperity the New Moralism? 
It is obvious from the way that internationalism is evolving that the victory of 
the West over the Soviet Union has not shifted the tension between order and justice 
in favor of the individual enough to end structural violence. With no Soviet threat 
and its primary goal being a prosperous, secure, and competitive world economy, the 
focus of contemporary American internationalism is now more than ever on 
structuring a liberal world order which has little to do with stopping the suffering and 
death of the shortrun losers of the changes in international politics, despite the 
Western desire to enlarge democracy worldwide. Just as internationalist principles 
accept losers in the structural adjustments of world markets for longrun economic 
stability, they also accept the starvation and genocide of the losers in the structural 
adjustments of international politics for the longrun protection of democratic 
capitalism.1 
Because intervention will be limited to those few situations where the newly 
profiled global threats, increasing fragmentation, ethnic nationalism, and failed states 
are seen as threatening the world economy, the question has to be asked if 
preservation of the world economy will become the new form of moralism? One 
distinct possiblity is that the Western propensity to intervene for non-economic core 
values, such as democracy and egregious cases of human rights violations, will be 
1Ronald Steel, "The Bosnia Disconnect," T71e Waslzi11to11 Post, 4 June 1995, sec. C, p. 1. 
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minimal with the end of the intense ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union.2 
The Limits of U.S. Interventionism 
The lack of U.S. political will to end structural violence is demonstrated by 
the imposing preconditions to humanitarian intervention set by American Presidents 
beginning with Reagan. In 1984, Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Casper W. 
Weinberger, prescribed the following preconditions: 1.) the intervention must be 
vital to the national interest. 2.) the U.S. must clearly intend to win the conflict. 
3.) the U.S. must have clear political and military objectives. 4.) the objectives and 
forces used must be capable of doing the job. 5.) the military must have the support 
of the American people and their representatives. 6.) the use of force must be a last 
resort. Similarly, President Bush's five requirements of warranted stakes, obvious 
effectiveness, no effective alternatives, limited commitment in scope and time, and 
a favorable cost-benefit ratio eliminated U.S. intervention in most humanitarian 
outrages. With President Clinton, the barriers to U.S. intervention on behalf of U.N. 
humanitarian efforts have been just as imposing. Most noticeably, U.S. political 
support would require a clearly definable objective and scope of operation, a 
connection "to concrete political solutions," an efficient, organized U.N. effort (which 
2See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 88. See also 
James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World, International Peace Academy Occasional 
Paper Series, Marianne Heilberg (ed.) (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 20; 
Changing Our Ways: America and the New World (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1992), 37-54; Leslie H. Gelb, "Redefining National Security," New York Times, 2 
August 1992, sec. E, p. 17. According to Rosenau, with less ideological motivation, state leaders 
perceive global events less threatening and deserving of intervention. James N. Rosenau, "Intervention 
as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Conflict Resolution 13 (June 1969): 168. 
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is a terminal obstacle alone), a significant threat to peace and security (always of 
ambiguous meaning), and an advancement of U.S. interests. Indicative of realism's 
influence in American internationalism is the first U.S. precondition set by Clinton 
for the actual use of U.S. troops in such operations, which is the advancement of U.S. 
interests. Even amid the cruelty of Bosnia, there have been long-standing limits by 
the Clinton Administration on the use of U.S. ground forces there to the enforcement 
of an already existing peace agreement and the protection of departing U.N. 
peacekeeper. Likewise, recent suggestions by the Adminstration to expand the 
possibility of U.S. assistance to a safer redeployment of any besieged UNPROFOR 
II forces aroused great controversy in the U.S.3 
The U.S. official preconditions for intervention set standards which seldom 
can be met in the real world and which are clearly a series of responses to such U.S. 
failures of intervention as Vietnam and Lebanon. They reflect the ambiguity felt by 
Americans concerning the morally perplexing and unpredictable circumstances 
surrounding the use of intervention in a world that is still subject to the ethic of 
consequences. But acceptable consequences are defined in terms of interests, and 
American internationalists, like all people, are not willing to risk casualties and 
capital for less than protecting their core values. 
3David Broder, "Creiteria for U.S. Military Intervention," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14January 1990, 
p. Al3; Richard A. Haass, Intervention: The Uses of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World 
(Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 14-17; also see appendix 
H in Richard A. Haass, Intervention: The Uses of American Mi/ital)' Force in the Post-Cold War World 
containing The Clinton Administration's Policy on Refon11i11g Multilateral Peace Operations (May 1994); 
"Clinton Expands Rationale," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 31 May 1995, p. Al; Dana Priest and John F. 
Harris, "Clinton Tries to Reassure Americans While U.S. Troops Train for Bosnia," 171e Washington 
Post, 4 June 1995, Sec. A, p. 4. 
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Intervention as a Moral Problem 
Rosenau's writings most aptly describe the problems of intervention. First 
intervention is a moral problem--one which he unsuccessfully attempted to 
circumscribe by the improvement of social science. Today, normative theory still 
dominates the study of intervention and the boundary between social science and the 
moral question is still unclear. Intervention is unceasingly a matter of choosing 
desirable ends and meeting the demands of the real world. The resolution of 
intervention's moral question, therefore, will always be problematic. Underlying this 
impasse is the inability of Western thought to effectively comprehend the 
complextities of societies with different political and cultural values. 
Secondly, Rosenau's recent theories on turbulence in international politics 
imply certain conclusions about structural violence and humanitarian intervention. 
By implication, injustice is currently the byproduct of the impersonal forces that 
regulate world order. Though unintended by Rosenau, his metaphor of the stock 
market to explain the continuity between order and disorder has pessimistic 
implications for the pursuit of justice. He compares the continuity and change of 
world order to the short term wide swings in stock prices which flatten out over the 
long run. The steep peaks and valleys turn into gentle slopes over the long run. 
The implications for the actors during this process, according to Rosenau, depends 
upon their responses. Some "prosper" while others "founder," but order prevails in 
the longrun. Although the stockmarket maintains longrun order, it cannot remain 
orderly without many winners and losers among its investors, and too much 
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concentration on the short run to safeguard investors surely will destroy order in the 
long run.4 
The winners and losers of world order, unlike those of the stockmarket, are 
the winners and losers of the struggle for justice, which is a sideshow in the world's 
efforts to maintain order among states. The losers are the sacrificial atrocities to 
world order supposedly to assure a better life for the greatest number of people. 
The loosers include the victims of atrocities in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, 
Africa, and wherever people suffer from violent political conflict. If the maintenance 
of longrun order provides the best political protection for humanity through the 
reasonably stable relationships of states, then the valleys of losers along the way are 
the manifestations of the necessary world injustices needed to maintain the world for 
the winners. 
Interestingly, Rosenau, in discussing his metaphor of the stock market, offers 
no moral accounting for the losers probably because he sees order as patterns and 
structures and he is still baffled by the moral problems of international politics. One 
inference that can be drawn from Rosenau's lack of moral explanations for shortrun 
winners and losers is that there is a traditional ethos of international politics 
accepting the sacrifiCial necessity of some killing both within and among states, as 
suggested by Hedley Bull, to preserve both international and domestic order. 
Injustice then is a Darwinian byproduct of realist assumptions about the roles of 
power and the national interest in preserving international order, despite some 
4See James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 149; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence 
in World Politics, 66. 
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advances in favor of human rights. The result is a virulent form of structural 
violence based on the assumption by humanity--whether because of epistemic, moral, 
or sturctural causes--that it is circumscribed in protecting the rights, justice, and life 
of the individual by the necessities of international politics. This assumption is also 
strong in the West, which set the precedent during World War II of mass slaughter 
of noncombatants as an acceptable part of total war--a precedent of a world with few 
moral restraints on the behavior of states when their survival is at stake. Of this fact, 
Third World states have taken notice. Under these circumstances, it is not too 
difficult to see why R.J. Vincent wrote that there is no "justice constituency" in the 
international community for the needs and demands of the individual.5 
With international politics still controlled by realist and state-centric 
principles, interstate justice still has overwhelming priority over saving lives and 
relieving suffering, as can be seen from recent international efforts at humanitarian 
intervention. In Somalia, humanitarian intervention transformed a country gripped 
by famine and tribal conflict, which had killed hundreds of thousands, into a land of 
relative economic security for the majority of its civilian population. This outcome 
saved many lives, but it is mainly remembered in the U.S. for its failure in nation-
building and the fact that Mogadishu has returned to chaos. Despite saving many 
lives in Somalia, Americans still think in terms of political failure rather than 
5RJ. Vincent, Noninte1Vention and Intemational Order, 307, citing Julius Stone, "Approaches to the 
Notion oflnternationalJ ustice," in Richarcd A. Falk and Cyril E. Black (editors) The Future of the Legal 
International Order, Vol. 1, Trends and Pattems (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1%9), 425-
6. 
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humanitarian success there.6 In Bosnia, according to Jim Hoagland, "For all the 
weaknesses, the U.N. force has been feeding and protecting the populations of 
Sarajevo and other Muslin-controlled towns. The withdrawal (of the U.N. force] will 
mean death for a large number of Muslims." Yet success in Bosnia is usually 
discussed in terms of an eventual political arrangement instead of saving lives.7 
The Limits of Moral Action 
Yet the idea of an evolving international justice in favor of the individual 
cannot be fully discounted, especially in the area of human rights. Nor can foreign 
policy thinkers and practitioners be dismissed as reprobates for their acquiescence 
to structural violence. First, post-Cold War peacekeeping has involved attempting 
to use international military force in the middle of a war of cruelty to save the lives 
of innocent non-combatants while trying to assuage the fanatical feelings of the 
combatants--a thankless task requiring almost impossible feats of diplomatic 
dexterity. Secondly, a strong argument can be made that foreign policy practitioners 
refuse to act against structural violence because they are forced to negotiate in 
international politics with gangsters, whom they would incarcerate if they were free 
to do so. Even assuming that a gangster can be distinquished from a leader of 
legitimate political authority by some type of international consensus, there is even 
a bigger problem. Regardless of the cause--evil forces, impersonal, deterministic 
mechanisms, and so forth--gangsters hold power over the lives of many people 
6Keith B. Richburn, "Things Back to Chaotic in Somalia, 2 Years After U.S. Landing," Washington 
Post, 4 December 1994, p. Al. 
7Jim Hoagland, "Out With a Bang," Washington Post,11 December 1994, sec. C, p. 7. 
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limiting the power of foreign policy practitioners to obtain moral ends, similar to the 
limits of those dealing with hostage takers whose imprudent decisions could cause 
even greater loss of life. 
In addition, there is the reality that being world policeman and social worker 
is an overwhelming burden. Though a simple and often repeated argument against 
intervention, it is also a valid one. In a world containing primarily authoritarian 
states and a significant number of civil and international wars at any one time, 
effective reform intervention and nation-building would require almost limitless 
power and resources of the international community's most powerful members, i.e., 
of the United States and Western Europe. This problem is exemplified by the U.N.'s 
current overwhelming responsibilities of peacekeeping without adequate funding from 
the United States.8 
Another problem is that overwhelming force is often needed for victory 
against the complexity of reciprocal violence in ethnically conflicted states, which 
presents extreme practical and moral dilemmas for the intervenor states, especially 
in light of their increaseningly demanding publics. The threat of quagmire by 
survival nationalism raises the moral and practical problem of the intervenor's lack 
of will to sacrifice its young for the welfare of others. The state's national will 
historically is connected to the purpose of defending the national interest. Citizens 
8see Charles J. Hanley, "Half-Century Later, Will U.N. 'Seize Moment'?" Richmond Times Dispatch, 
6 December 1992, sec. A, p. 18; John M. Goshko, "U.N. Chief Stressed Need for Money," Washington 
Post, 22 November 1992, p. Al; Georgie Anne Geyer, "U.N. Chief Seeks to Keep Order in Chaotic 
World," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 September 1992, p. A15; John M. Goshko, "U.N. Chief Favors 
Use of Force in Somalia: Plan Offers Radical Change From Group's History of Passive Peace Keeping," 
Washington Post, 1December1992, p. Al; "Peacekeeping Bookkeepers Watched," Richmond Times-
Dispatch, 6 December 1992, sec. A, p. 20; William Branigin, "United Frustrations," The Washington 
Post, National Weekly Edition, Novermber 30-Decembcr 6, 1992, p. 6. 
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are conditioned to sacrifice against their enemies not to stop the suffering of others 
but to save their own states. They are conditioned to supporting their own states 
against foreign aggression and not to supporting foreign populations abused by their 
own leaders. Therefore, unless there is a change in the traditional attitude of citizens 
concerning the national interest, war to impose peace overseas for the sake of others 
is likely to be less sustainable than the more traditional war against external 
aggression.9 
Today's more demanding citizens are aware of the potential for military 
quagmire and unnecessary loss of life and, therefore, carefully scrutinize their 
governments' interventions. As a result, Western intervenor states must be highly 
confident of public support before intervening According to Edward Luttwak, the 
increasing sensitivity of societies to war casualties is becoming a limiting factor in the 
government's use of intervention At the same time, this new sensitivity to casualties 
may be unexpectantly deleterious to the morality of war and work against the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes. For instance, in Chechnya, Russians bomb civilians 
in Grozny to limit their military casualties and, thus, limit the domestic opposition 
to Yelsin's war.10 
9James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 166. 
10James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 166-7; Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are 
the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 25-6; See "Russians Selected Civilian 
Targets to Hit," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 5 January 1994, p. Al. 
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What Is To Be Done? 
With all said and done, the important question for Americans is how to avoid 
cyncism and disillusionment about the future of morality in international politics and, 
more specifically, about the future of human rights. One answer is the hope that we 
can see beyond our moral limitations in international politics to the possibility of 
realistic, incremental intrusions against death and suffering. This can be done by 
devising a coherent political philosophy of international morality and human rights 
as the basis of American foreign policy. Here, WOMP's vision of developing over 
time new world order values--through consciousness-raising in governments, publics, 
IOs, NGOs, regional, cultural, and ethnic groups--is applicable to the idea of a 
greater emphasis on individual justice and the extension of the idea of national 
security to include the newly profiled global threats, for it reinforces the idea that 
Western idealism, while not stopping structural violence, provides the hope for 
incremental advances in the protection of human rights and the evolution of values 
over time that theoretically will result in global justice. 
The hope is that small, incremental changes in the international human rights regime 
will gradually erode international amorality and will eventually lead to a seachange 
in international politics in favor of justice for the individual. While there may be 
little political will for military humanitarian intervention, hopefully the will of those 
pursuing the ostensibly insignificant but eventually meaningful victories like Helsinki 
may contribute to drastic changes in favor of human rights like the fall of the Soviet 
Union. 
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Indeed, Helzinki gives meaning to the idea of consciousness-raising in the 
longrun. In 1986, George Kennan attacked the Helsinki Accords as a "high-minded" 
but unrealistic "international code of behavior" which depended upon the naive hope 
for fundamental, internal reform within the Soviet Union. But now historians, and 
even some realists, are beginning to accept the important contribution that the 
Helsinki Accords' human rights provisions made to the Soviet Union's demise. 
According to Kissinger, "The European Security Conference... accelerated the 
collapse of the Soviet Empire" and " ... heroic reformers in Eastern Europe used [the 
human rights provisions] as a rallying point in their fights to free their countries from 
Soviet domination."11 The lesson here is to never underestimate deonotological 
principles holding certain behavior inherently moral or immoral regardless of foreign 
policy consequences in the making of foreign policy. Such principles were placed in 
the Helzinki Accords, admittedly by parties who saw some diplomatic gain and few 
minuses, but which nonetheless incrementally lead to consciousness-raising in favor 
of a stronger international human rights regime and the enlargement of democracy. 
The achievements of a foreign policy emphasizing human rights are gradual, faltering, 
and unpredictable but nevertheless are real. 
11George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985/86): 207-8; 
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 559-61; Walter Isaacson, 
Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 663; Jack Donnelly, International 
Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), 93-7. 
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